Crider v. Crider
| Docket Number: | 2003-CT-01066-SCT Linked Case(s): 2003-CT-01066-SCT ; 2003-CA-01066-COA |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-31-2005 Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J. Holding: The Judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed; The Judgment of the Alcorn County Chancery Court is Affirmed. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Joint custody - Application of both parents - Section 93-5-24(2) - Section 93-5-2 Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Graves, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Dissenting Author : Lee, J. Dissent Joined By : Bridges, P.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-23-2003 Appealed from: Alcorn County Chancery Court Judge: Jacqueline Mask Disposition: JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE ENTERED AWARDING CUSTODY, ORDERING VISITATION, AND DIVIDING PROPERTY Case Number: 2002-56902) |
|
| Note: | The Mississippi Court of Appeals has interpreted Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-24(2) to prohibit a chancellor from awarding joint custody in ID cases unless both parents have specifically requested joint custody. Thus, when one or both parties to an ID divorce request primary custody, but both parties consent in writing for the chancellor to make the custody determination, the Court of Appeals has held that a chancellor is prohibited from granting joint custody, even if the chancellor determines that joint custody is in the child’s best interest. This reasoning was rejected as the supreme court found that a chancellor is required to make determinations that are in the best interest of the child in all circumstances. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Lainie Bell Crider |
JOHN A. FERRELL |
||
| Appellee: | John Paul Crider, Jr. | JASON D. HERRING |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Joint custody - Application of both parents - Section 93-5-24(2) - Section 93-5-2 |
| Summary of the Facts: | John and Lainie Crider filed a written consent to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and asked the chancellor to decide the remaining issues of primary custody, property settlement, and support. With regard to custody of the couple’s son, the chancellor found that, although joint custody was not specifically requested, joint custody was in their son’s best interest and awarded joint legal and physical custody until the summer prior to their son’s beginning kindergarten. Lainie appealed, asserting that section 93-5-24(2) prohibits the chancellor from awarding joint custody unless both parties specifically request that joint custody be awarded. The Court of Appeals reversed the chancellor, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The polestar consideration in all cases dealing with child custody and visitation is the best interest and welfare of the child. Although section 93-5-24(2) provides that joint custody may be awarded where irreconcilable differences is the ground for divorce upon application of both parents, section 93-5-24(1) provides that custody shall be awarded as follows according to the best interests of the child. The concept of joint application is defined by section 93-5-2, not section 93-5-24(2). The “application of both parents” language was included in section 93-5-24(2) due to the prior existence of section 93-5-2, requiring a written agreement between parties. The Court of Appeals erred by interpreting section 93-5-24(2) without reference to section 93-5-2. It is logical and reasonable that “application of both parties” exists when both parties consent to allowing the court to determine custody. The fact that the parties request that the court determine which parent is to receive “primary custody” does not alter this. If joint custody is determined to be in the best interest of the child using the Albright factors, the parties should not be able to prohibit this by the wording of the consent. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
