Keys v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CT-01050-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01050-COA ; 2009-CA-01050-COA ; 2009-CT-01050-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-11-2011 Opinion Author: Dickinson, P.J. Holding: Reversed and Rendered |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Right of habeas corpus - Jurisdiction - Section 99-39-5 - Section 99-39-3 - Section 99-39-7 - Parole eligibility - Section 99-19-21 Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson, P.J., Randolph, Lamar, Kitchens, Chandler and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, J. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-27-2009 Appealed from: Forrest County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Helfrich Disposition: Appellant was eligible for parole on a five-year sentence for a later, simple assault conviction, and the circuit court held that he is not now eligible for parole on either conviction because he cannot begin serving the five-year sentence until he completes the life sentence. Case Number: CI08-0044 |
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| Note: | The supreme court found that the trial court had jurisdiction, and because Keys remains parole-eligible on his life sentence, it reversed and rendered. | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Kenneth W. Keys |
HERBERT H. KLEIN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Right of habeas corpus - Jurisdiction - Section 99-39-5 - Section 99-39-3 - Section 99-39-7 - Parole eligibility - Section 99-19-21 |
| Summary of the Facts: | In 1987, Kenneth Keys pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life. Under the statute then in effect, Keys was eligible for parole after serving ten years of his life sentence. The MDOC paroled Keys in November 1998, but, for reasons not stated in the record, revoked his parole in April 2002. The MDOC again paroled Keys in August 2002, and his parole was again revoked when he was charged with simple assault of a police officer. He was convicted and received a five-year sentence to run consecutively to his previously imposed life sentence. Because Keys was a subsequent offender, he was ineligible for parole on his five-year sentence. When Keys’s inmate time sheet reflected he was ineligible for parole or any other early release, he filed a motion to mandate parole eligibility, arguing that – even though he was ineligible for parole on the five-year sentence – he retained parole eligibility on his 1987 life sentence. Treating Keys’s motion as one for post-conviction relief, the court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider Keys’s motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | The Court of Appeals found that the PCR motion was procedurally improper because Keys did not follow the MDOC’s administrative procedures to review inmates’ complaints which required him to seek relief through the MDOC’s administrative-review process. Keys argues that his motion was not administrative in nature but actually a petition for habeas corpus, and that it was properly adjudicated under the PCR framework. The Mississippi Constitution guarantees the right of habeas corpus, and the circuit court has original jurisdiction over such matters. Also, although Keys’s motion was not termed a habeas corpus petition, section 99-39-5 of the PCR statutes provides that the PCR procedure applies to claims in which an inmate alleges that his sentence has expired; his probation, parole or conditional release was unlawfully revoked; or that he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody. Furthermore, as a habeas corpus petition, the trial court had jurisdiction under section 99-39-3, which provides that the PCR article replaces all post-conviction habeas corpus writs. Keys correctly filed his motion in the trial court, as allowed by the Mississippi Constitution, and as allowed by section 99-39-7. Exhaustion of administrative remedies was not necessary. Keys acknowledges that he is not parole-eligible on his second sentence, but he argues that he remains parole-eligible on the original life sentence. The State insists that section 99-19-21 is an impediment to parole on the original life sentence and that Keys cannot begin serving his non-parole-eligible sentence until the expiration of his previous term of life imprisonment. The trial court agreed with the State. However, section 99-19-21 is not an impediment to Keys’s parole eligibility. The statute does not say that imprisonment for the second sentence shall commence at the termination of the preceding conviction’s sentence; rather, it reads that the imprisonment shall begin at the termination of the preceding conviction’s imprisonment. In the event Keys is granted parole on his life sentence, his imprisonment for that crime will end, and he then must begin serving his mandatory five-year sentence. |
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