Bennett v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00324-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00324-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-09-2011 Opinion Author: Myers, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder, Aggravated assault, Shooting into occupied dwelling & Felon in possession of firearm - Exclusion of evidence - Defective indictment - URCCC 7.09 - Hearsay - Leading questions - M.R.E. 611(c) - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) - Prior bad acts - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Russell, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Maxwell, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-02-2009 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, MURDER, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE; COUNTS II-V, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, AND SENTENCED TO TWENTY YEARS ON EACH COUNT; COUNT VI, SHOOTING INTO AN OCCUPIED DWELLING, AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS; COUNT VII, CONVICTED FELON IN POSSESSION OF A FIREARM, AND SENTENCED TO TEN YEARS, WITH THE SENTENCES IN COUNTS II-VII TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith Case Number: 09-559CRY |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Joseph Bennett |
CLARENCE TERRELL GUTHRIE III |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY JR. |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder, Aggravated assault, Shooting into occupied dwelling & Felon in possession of firearm - Exclusion of evidence - Defective indictment - URCCC 7.09 - Hearsay - Leading questions - M.R.E. 611(c) - M.R.E. 801(c) - M.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) - Prior bad acts - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Joseph Bennett was found guilty of one count of murder, four counts of aggravated assault, one count of shooting into an occupied dwelling, and one count of felon in possession of a firearm. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Exclusion of evidence Bennett argues that he announced early in the trial that he intended to assert a claim of self-defense to the charges set forth in his indictment. Bennett maintains that evidence existed in the case to support his self-defense claim, as there was evidence of a weapon present during the “spilled-drink” altercation and evidence of weapons found in the vicinity of the victim’s body after the shootings. Bennett argues that the trial court’s decision to exclude this evidence improperly denied him his theory of the case and necessitated the withdrawal of his self-defense instructions. If there is no foundation in the evidence to support a particular defense theory, a proposed jury instruction setting forth that theory is properly refused. When Bennett testified, Bennett did not present a factually or legally cognizable theory of self-defense; rather, he presented a defense based on the claim that he was not the shooter. According to the record, the proposed self-defense instructions that Bennett’s trial counsel withdrew were each predicated on the theory that Bennett, himself, had acted in self-defense. Based on the evidence in this case, had these instructions been submitted to the jury, it would have been error. Thus, these particular proposed self-defense instructions were rightly withdrawn. The trial court also excluded the handgun found inside the 302 Manship residence and the SKS rifle found underneath the house located next door from being admitted into evidence, and Bennett argues this was error. With regard to the handgun, as the trial court found, Adams was not present at that time of the shootings, and she merely assumed that the handgun she found inside her home belonged to the victim. This is conjecture, not evidence. According to the record, when Bennett made his proffer, no evidence had been presented that the victim was armed at or around the time of the shootings. This, along with defense counsel’s empty assertion(s) that Bennett was claiming self-defense, is all that the trial court had to go on when it made its ruling. As to the SKS rifle, Bennett’s trial counsel sought to have it admitted into evidence through Investigator Bufkin’s testimony. The trial court did not allow the SKS rifle to be admitted into evidence because, as with the handgun, no showing was made that the SKS rifle was used or visibly present at the time of the shootings. Bennett argues that at the time Investigator Bufkin found the twelfth casing lying on Manship Street the day after the shootings, Investigator Bufkin had been dispatched to the scene by the JPD to recover the SKS rifle. Bennett, thus, maintains that he should have been allowed to present this fact to the jury. Investigators determined that neither the bullets nor the casings recovered from the crime scene came from the SKS rifle. And no one, not even Bennett, testified that the SKS rifle was visibly present at the time of the shootings. As far as this record is concerned, the SKS rifle bore no connection with the case at hand. Issue 2: Defective indictment Bennett argues that the seventh count of his indictment, which alleged that he was a felon in possession of a firearm, was defective because it: contained no date of the offense, set out an incorrect statute number, and failed to conclude with the phrase “against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi.” There is no error with the trial court’s decision to allow the State to amend Bennett’s indictment. URCCC 7.09 provides that all indictments may be amended as to form but not as to the substance of the offense charged. An amendment to correct the date the crime occurred is one of form, unless time is an essential factor or element. Bennett never asserted that time was an essential factor or element with the crime charged in count seven. As the trial court found, the other six counts included the date the alleged offense occurred. This provided a sufficient basis for Bennett to know that he was accused of having possessed a firearm on the same day he was alleged to have committed the other offenses. Amendments to correct errors in citations to statutes are likewise permissible. Lastly, the failure to include the phrase, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi, was a defect of form. Issue 3: Hearsay Bennett argues that the State was allowed to ask his co-conspirator leading questions during the Rule 104 predicate hearing. M.R.E. 611(c) generally prohibits leading questions. M.R.E. 1101(b)(1), however, provides that the rules of evidence do not apply to Rule 104 predicate hearings. Thus, there is no need to delve into the strictures of Rule 611(c). Bennett also argues that the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay statements to go before the jury. M.R.E. 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than the one made by the declarant while testifying offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The co-conspirator’s testimony about what Johnson had requested explained Bennett’s actions of retrieving a rifle and then driving away with Johnson. Generally, an out-of-court statement offered to show its effect on the listener is relevant nonhearsay, as it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter of asserted. Both Johnson’s statement and Warren’s statement were admissible for the fact each was said. And Bennett’s statement qualified as non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Issue 4: Prior bad acts Bennett argues that the State introduced prior-bad-act evidence without providing proper notice. As the State points out, Bennett did not object to the prior-bad-act evidence on the ground of a discovery violation; rather, he objected that the evidence was inadmissible because it was not relevant. An objection on one specific ground waives all other grounds. Bennett is procedurally barred from asserting a discovery violation for the first time on appeal. Evidence deemed admissible pursuant to the exceptions found in M.R.E. 404(b), is still subject to the prejudice test of M.R.E. 403. Here, the trial court did not perform an on-the-record Rule 403 analysis before overruling Bennett’s objection to this prior-bad-act evidence going before the jury. Nevertheless, the trial court’s failure to do so was harmless error, as the prior-bad-act evidence presented to the jury was not manifestly prejudicial to Bennett. The prior shooting incident that Parker claimed occurred on January 8 was admissible under Rule 404(b), as it both showed a possible motive and indicated intent on the part of Bennett for the crimes he had allegedly committed on May 26, 2008. |
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