Young v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00825-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00825-COA ; 2010-CT-00825-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-09-2011 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Felony evasion & Burglary of automobile - Sufficiency of evidence - Siphoning fuel from vehicle - Habitual offender sentence - Section 99-19-83 - Unarmed carjacking - Section 97-3-117(1) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Irving, P.J. Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-10-2010 Appealed from: Rankin County Circuit Court Judge: William E. Chapman, III Disposition: CONVICTED OF COUNT I, FELONY EVASION, AND COUNT V, AUTOMOBILE BURGLARY, AND SENTENCED TO LIFE AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION District Attorney: Michael Guest Case Number: 20978 (I)(V) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Phillip Earl Young |
ERIN ELIZABETH PRIDGEN
MARTIN BRADLEY MILLS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Felony evasion & Burglary of automobile - Sufficiency of evidence - Siphoning fuel from vehicle - Habitual offender sentence - Section 99-19-83 - Unarmed carjacking - Section 97-3-117(1) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Phillip Young was convicted of felony evasion and burglary of an automobile. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to life without eligibility for parole or probation. Young appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Young argues that there is insufficient evidence to find him guilty of automobile burglary. He argues that because he did not enter the victim’s eighteen-wheeler when he siphoned the victim’s fuel, the jury could have only found him guilty of larceny. The issue is whether siphoning fuel from a vehicle qualifies as burglary of an automobile. This is a case of first impression in Mississippi. In State v. Muqqddin, 242 P.3d 412, 416 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that “A fuel tank—attached as it is, to a vehicle—is unquestionably a part of that vehicle and absolutely necessary for its primary function as a mode of transportation. Any penetration of a vehicle's perimeter is thus a penetration of the vehicle itself.” Although the decision in Muqqddin is not controlling in Mississippi, the court’s reasoning in that decision is persuasive, particularly in light of our own precedent that any effort, however slight, such as the turning of a door knob to enter, constitutes a breaking. The victim testified that Young would have had to “push down on [the gas cap] and click it to open [it].” He also testified that Young “had a pump with a long stem stuck down into my tank.” Consequently, the jury heard sufficient evidence that Young’s actions in opening the gas cap and inserting a pump into the fuel tank qualified as “breaking and entering.” Young also argues that his conviction for felony evasion is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence and that the evidence supports a conviction for misdemeanor fleeing. The determinative feature regarding whether Young was guilty of misdemeanor fleeing or felony evasion is whether the weight of the evidence supports the conclusion that Young drove either “in such a manner as to indicate a reckless or willful disregard for the safety of persons or property” or “in a manner manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.” The evidence at trial indicated that, at the interchange where I-20 meets I-55, Young suddenly “snapped” his truck north toward I-55. When Young did so, multiple law-enforcement vehicles were forced to evade Young and each other. Officer Scarber of the Pearl Police Department testified that he attempted to deploy spike strips, but Young evaded them. As Officer Scarber attempted to get ahead of Young by passing him on Young’s left, Young crossed into Officer Scarber’s lane and prevented Officer Scarber from passing him. Officer Scarber was fifteen to eighteen feet from Young when Young moved into Officer Scarber’s lane. Officer Scarber testified that Young would have hit his patrol car if he had not avoided Young. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury could have found that Young’s driving evidenced a reckless or willful disregard for the safety of others. Issue 2: Habitual offender sentence Young argues that the circuit court erred when it sentenced him to life imprisonment pursuant to section 99-19-83. According to Young, the circuit court erred when it found that Young’s previous conviction for carjacking was a crime of violence. Young correctly asserts that Mississippi law distinguishes armed carjacking and what Young characterizes as “unarmed carjacking.” However, just because a carjacking does not qualify as “armed carjacking” does not preclude the possibility that violence occurred during the commission of the offense. Section 97-3-117(1) provides that whoever shall knowingly or recklessly by force or violence, whether against resistance or by sudden or stealthy seizure or snatching, or by putting in fear, or attempting to do so, or by any other means shall take a motor vehicle from another person's immediate actual possession shall be guilty of carjacking. Accordingly, “unarmed carjacking” may qualify as a “crime of violence” for the purposes of enhanced sentencing pursuant to section 99-19-83. |
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