Price v. State
| Docket Number: | 2003-KA-02311-SCT Linked Case(s): 2003-KA-02311-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 02-24-2005 Opinion Author: Graves, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Statutory rape - Right to speedy trial - Sufficiency of evidence - Other crimes’ evidence - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Sufficiency of indictment - URCCC 7.06(5) - Excessive sentence - Section 97-3-65(2)(c) Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz, J. Concurs in Result Only: Cobb, P.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-26-2003 Appealed from: Marion County Circuit Court Judge: R. I. Prichard, III Disposition: Price was convicted of three counts of statutory rape and was sentenced to terms of imprisonment for twenty years on count 1, ten years on count 2, and ten years on count 3, with the sentences to run consecutively. District Attorney: Claiborne McDonald Case Number: K02-0146P |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Mitchell D. Price, Sr. a/k/a Lucky |
MICHAEL ADELMAN |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Statutory rape - Right to speedy trial - Sufficiency of evidence - Other crimes’ evidence - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Sufficiency of indictment - URCCC 7.06(5) - Excessive sentence - Section 97-3-65(2)(c) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mitchell Price, Sr. was convicted of three counts of statutory rape. He was sentenced to terms of imprisonment for twenty years on count 1, ten years on count 2, and ten years on count 3, with the sentences to run consecutively. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Right to speedy trial Price argues that the court denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. In determining whether a defendant has been deprived of his right, the court considers the length of delay, reason for the delay, defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Here, a delay of approximately thirty-four months lapsed which is presumptively prejudicial. Of this 342-day period, 112 days weighed against Price, while the remaining 230 days weighed against the State. There is no evidence that Price ever affirmatively asserted his right to a speedy trial prior to filing his motion to dismiss. In fact, Price waived his right to a speedy trial through his own motion for continuance and pre-setting trial. The record bears no proof of extraordinary anxiety or loss of evidence or witnesses by Price to demonstrate actual prejudice. Balancing all of these factors, Price was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Issue 2: Sufficiency of evidence Price argues that the evidence offered by the State does not support a conviction of statutory rape, because the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim was insufficient. During trial the victim established that during the alleged incidents, she was less than fourteen years old. Further, she testified that on three different occasions, Price inserted his penis inside her vagina. The unsubstantiated and uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to support a guilty verdict if that testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence, especially if the conduct of the victim is consistent with conduct of one who has been victimized by a sex crime. The jury, having the benefit of observing the demeanor and expressions of the witnesses, found that the victim’s testimony was more credible than Price’s. The verdict was supported by legally sufficient evidence. Issue 3: Other crimes’ evidence Prior to trial, the trial court dismissed Count 1 of the original indictment which charged Price with child molestation. Price argues that the court erred in granting the prosecution’s M.R.E. 404(b) Motion, which essentially allowed the victim to testify regarding the various allegations contained in Count 1 of the original indictment. Proof of another crime or act is allowed when it is so interrelated to the charged crime that it constitutes either a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. Proof of another crime or act is also admissible where necessary to identify the defendant, to prove motive, or to prove state of mind. Here, the evidence of fondling was necessary to show the defendant’s state of mind and/or motive at the time these alleged rapes took place. Further, the victim’s testimony as to the fondling was necessary so as to complete a story for the jury as to the events leading up to the alleged rapes. Price also argues that a separate analysis under M.R.E. 403 is required. Because the prejudicial effect, if any, was minimal, the court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct a Rule 403 analysis of the fondling evidence. Issue 4: Sufficiency of indictment Price argues that Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment were not sufficiently specific as to date and time. URCCC 7.06(5) provides that failure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient. Where the language used in the indictment is sufficiently specific to give notice of the act made unlawful, and exclusive enough to prevents its application to other acts, it is sufficient. Here, Counts 2, 3, and 4 of the indictment were sufficiently specific as to apprise the defendant of the charges against him. Issue 5: Excessive sentence Price argues that his sentence of twenty years on count 1, ten years on counts 2, and ten years on count 3, with each sentence running consecutively for a total sentence of forty years violates his Eighth Amendment rights. Section 97-3-65(2)(c) provides a minimum penalty of twenty years’ imprisonment and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Price’s sentence was well within the sentencing range established by statute and is therefore not subject to appellate review. |
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