GGNSC Tylertown, LLC v. Dillon


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-01241-COA
Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-01241-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-26-2011
Opinion Author: Carlton, J.
Holding: Affirmed in part, reversed and rendered in part.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Contract - Arbitration agreement - Availability of forum
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Maxwell and Russell, JJ.
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-09-2010
Appealed from: Walthall County Circuit Court
Judge: David H. Strong
Disposition: DENIED APPELLEE’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
Case Number: 2009-198S

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: GGNSC Tylertown, LLC d/b/a Golden Living Center-Tylertown




JOHN ERNEST WADE JR., SHARON F. BRIDGES, CLAIRE W. KETNER



 

Appellee: Virgie Dillon, by and Through Her Next Friend, Arverta Hargrove DOUGLAS BRYANT CHAFFIN, JAMES BURKE MCHUGH, MICHAEL JAY FULLER JR.  

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Topic: Contract - Arbitration agreement - Availability of forum

Summary of the Facts: Virgie Dillon was admitted to GGNSC Tylertown, LLC d/b/a Golden Living Center-Tylertown, a nursing facility, in 2003. Dillon has continued to reside at the facility through the present. In 2009, Dillon executed a general durable power of attorney appointing her sister, Arverta Hargrove, as her “true and lawful attorney-in-fact.” Hargrove became Dillon’s responsible party for her residency at Tylertown. Consistent with her authority as power of attorney, Hargrove executed an admission agreement for Dillon with Tylertown. Dillon and Hargrove also executed a resident and facility arbitration agreement as part of the admission-documents packet. On October 2, 2009, Dillon, by and through Hargrove, filed suit alleging that she sustained injuries over the years as the result of deficient care at the facility. Tylertown subsequently filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery. Dillon filed a response, attacking the validity of the arbitration agreement based on “insufficient” consideration and a lack of voluntariness. She also claimed that any agreement to arbitrate should apply only to claims which arose after the contract was executed on May 21, 2009. The court denied in part Tylertown’s motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery. The order stated that the court found the arbitration agreement to be valid and enforceable as to any claims arising after its execution, but regarding any claims which arose prior to execution, the agreement failed for lack of consideration. Tylertown moved to reopen the time for appeal, and Dillon moved for an expedited trial setting. The circuit judge granted Tylertown an additional fourteen days from the entry of its July 8, 2010 order to file its notice of appeal, and he further ordered that the parties confer on a scheduling order including an early 2011 trial setting. Tylertown appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Tylertown argues that the circuit court erred in denying, in part, its motion to compel arbitration and stay discovery. In determining the validity of a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, the court considers whether there is a valid arbitration agreement and whether the parties' dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement. The language of the arbitration agreement at issue mandates that “any and all claims, disputes[,] and controversies . . . arising out of, or in connection with, or relating in any way to the Admission Agreement or any service or health care provided by the Facility to the Resident shall be resolved exclusively by binding arbitration to be conducted . . . in accordance with the National Arbitration Forum Code of Procedure.” However, precedent recognizes that as of July 24, 2009, the National Arbitration Forum voluntarily ceased to administer consumer arbitration disputes, thus leaving courts unable to enforce the arbitration clauses that agreed to arbitration conducted in accordance with the NAF’s rules. Thus, the agreement to arbitrate in the present case lacks enforeability since the forum is no longer available.


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