Chambers v. Brown
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00845-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-26-2011 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Discovery sanctions - M.R.C.P. 37(e) - Dismissal with prejudice Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Russell, JJ. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-23-2010 Appealed from: Grenada County Circuit Court Judge: Clarence E. Morgan, III Disposition: DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S CASE FOR DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS Case Number: 2006-268CVM |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Lisa Chambers |
DANA J. SWAN |
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| Appellee: | Robert K. Brown | JOHN BRIAN HYNEMAN | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Discovery sanctions - M.R.C.P. 37(e) - Dismissal with prejudice |
| Summary of the Facts: | Lisa Chambers and Tasha Nobles sued Robert Brown for injuries caused when his vehicle collided into theirs. Brown stipulated to liability. The sole triable issue was the extent of the plaintiffs’ damages. Although both plaintiffs claimed they suffered pain caused by the wreck, Chambers testified she began experiencing debilitating neck pain and headaches after the wreck. After discovery was completed, the circuit judge set trial for July 28, 2009. By agreement of the parties, the trial was continued. It was later re-set for December 1, 2009, but then again continued by the circuit judge. Soon after December 1, Brown discovered other relevant medical information that Chambers had not provided in discovery. Through these additional medical records, Brown learned Chambers had been treated for headaches and neck pain in 2004. Upon intake, Chambers complained her headaches and neck pain were “often” and “constant.” In January 2005, one year prior to the wreck, Dr. Keith Stanford referred Chambers to Grenada Lake Medical Center for an MRI of her spine due to her complaints of “neck and back pain.” The hospital performed the MRI on January 25, 2005. Then, in October 2005, just three months before the accident, Chambers returned to Ballard Chiropractic for treatment for neck pain and constant headaches. Brown moved to dismiss Chambers from the lawsuit under M.R.C.P. 37, citing discovery violations. He pointed to Chambers’s sworn deposition testimony from September 2006. During her deposition, Chambers testified she had not suffered any headaches until after the accident. She also claimed she had neither received treatment for nor complained of headaches and neck or back pain to any physicians within ten years prior to her deposition. Chambers’s counsel responded by acknowledging her deposition testimony was false. He informed the circuit court that Chambers recalled going to Ballard Chiropractic for headaches and neck pain. Chambers justified not disclosing her pre-accident chiropractic treatment because she found it unimportant since her previous pain was minor and had been resolved. Yet Chambers gave no explanation for omitting both Dr. Stanford’s treatment and the MRI she underwent at the hospital. The circuit judge granted Brown’s motion and dismissed Chambers’s action with prejudice. The circuit court further granted Brown an M.R.C.P. 54(b) final judgment. Chambers appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Chambers argues that dismissal was too harsh a sanction. M.R.C.P. 37(e) provides the court great latitude in imposing sanctions for discovery abuse. But dismissing a cause of action for failure to comply with discovery is only justified under the most extreme circumstances. Factors used for determining whether a trial court abused its discretion when dismissing a case with prejudice include: dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court’s order results from wilfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply; dismissal is proper only in situation where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions; another consideration is whether the other party’s preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced; and dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party’s simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court’s orders. Here, the judge found Chambers’s omissions were both willful and in bad faith. From the record, there is no error in this finding. The circuit judge believed it was “highly unlikely” Chambers forgot her recent MRI examination. The circuit judge considered other sanctions, such as imposing costs for additional discovery. But he found lesser sanctions would not achieve the deterrent value of Rule 37. Confronted with false testimony, the supreme court has similarly emphasized that any other sanction beside dismissal would virtually allow the plaintiff to get away with lying under oath without a meaningful penalty. The circuit judge also properly recognized that had the case been tried on damages, as scheduled, Brown would have been severely prejudiced. And his finding that Chambers’s concealment was willful and in bad faith negates any inference her omissions were due to a misunderstanding. The circuit judge here correctly adduced that all fault lay with Chambers alone and did not abuse his discretion in dismissing her claim with prejudice. |
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