Jenkins v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00016-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00016-COA |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-19-2011 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Possession of cocaine - Prior conviction - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Prosecutorial misconduct Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee and Russell, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-22-2008 Appealed from: Pike County Circuit Court Judge: David H. Strong Disposition: CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF AT LEAST ONE-TENTH GRAM BUT LESS THAN TWO GRAMS OF COCAINE AND SENTENCED TO SIXTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITH TWELVE YEARS TO SERVE , FOUR YEARS SUSPENDED AND FOUR YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, AND TO PAY A $10,000 FINE District Attorney: Dee Bates Case Number: 07-670-PKS |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Titus Rayon Jenkins |
RONALD L. WHITTINGTON |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LISA LYNN BLOUNT |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Possession of cocaine - Prior conviction - M.R.E. 404(b) - M.R.E. 403 - Prosecutorial misconduct |
| Summary of the Facts: | Titus Jenkins was convicted of possession of at least one-tenth gram but less than two grams of cocaine. He was sentenced as a repeat drug offender to sixteen years with four years suspended followed by four years of post-release supervision. Furthermore, the circuit court ordered Jenkins to pay a $10,000 fine, court costs, and $750 toward the payment of his court-appointed lawyer. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Prior conviction Jenkins argues that the circuit court should have prohibited the prosecution from presenting evidence of his prior conviction. He argues that his prior conviction was not admissible pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b) and M.R.E. 403. Evidence or proof of a prior crime or bad act is admissible where the offense charged and the prior crime are so interrelated as to constitute a single transaction or occurrence or a closely related series of transactions or occurrences. The prosecution did not introduce evidence that Jenkins was on probation or that he had an outstanding warrant for absconding from supervision as evidence of Jenkins’s character or as part of some effort to demonstrate that Jenkins was acting in conformity with his prior unspecified felony conviction. Instead, the prosecution introduced evidence that Jenkins had previously been convicted of some unspecified felony to explain the events that led to Jenkins’s arrest. Without being allowed to present the evidence at issue, the jury would not have understood why the probation officers were in Jenkins’s vicinity, why they recognized Jenkins, why they knew there was a warrant for Jenkins’s arrest, why Jenkins recognized them, why Jenkins ran from them, or why the probation officers pursued Jenkins. If the prosecution had been prohibited from explaining those matters, it would have appeared as though the probation officers had harassed Jenkins and then pursued and arrested him without probable cause. Through his own testimony, Jenkins informed the jury that his prior conviction was drug related. The prosecution abided by the trial court’s order to refrain from discussing the nature of Jenkins’s prior conviction. Also, the trial court implicitly performed the requisite balancing test under M.R.E. 403 and found that the evidence of Jenkins’s prior conviction – so long as the precise nature of that conviction was not put before the jury – was more probative than prejudicial. Issue 2: Prosecutorial misconduct Jenkins argues the circuit court committed plain error when it did not, sua sponte, prohibit the prosecution from eliciting testimony from Officer Dillon regarding the fact that Jenkins had opted to remain silent after he was arrested. According to Jenkins, Officer Dillon’s testimony tended to indicate that, because he did not deny that the cocaine belonged to him, the jury assumed that it was, in fact, Jenkins’s cocaine. It is error to refer at trial to an accused’s silence after arrest, provided that the silence occurred when the suspect was in custody and had been given Miranda warnings about the right to remain silent. However, there can be no infringement upon the right to remain silent when the defendant did not exercise that right at the time of his or her arrest. During his testimony, Jenkins claimed he did not remain silent when he was arrested. Jenkins testified that he told the probation officers that he had denied that he possessed the cocaine. Even if Jenkins testified that he had exercised his right to remain silent after he was arrested, a defendant’s due-process rights are not violated by prosecutorial comments concerning that defendant’s post-arrest silence when that defendant did not receive a Miranda warning. The record does not show that Jenkins received a Miranda warning when he was initially taken into custody. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
