Lafayette v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-KA-00064-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-KA-00064-COA ; 2010-CT-00064-SCT ; 2010-CT-00064-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-19-2011 Opinion Author: Judge Barnes Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Manslaughter - Peremptory instruction - Jury instructions - Sharplin instruction - Prior inconsistent statements - M.R.E. 613(b) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-17-2009 Appealed from: Bolivar County Circuit Court Judge: Kenneth L. Thomas Disposition: CONVICTED OF MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCED TO EIGHTEEN YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Brenda Fay Mitchell Case Number: 2008-001-CR1 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Anthony Lafayette |
STAN PERKINS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Manslaughter - Peremptory instruction - Jury instructions - Sharplin instruction - Prior inconsistent statements - M.R.E. 613(b) |
| Summary of the Facts: | Anthony Lafayette was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eighteen years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Peremptory instruction Lafayette argues that the circuit court should have granted his peremptory instruction as the State failed to prove the necessary elements of murder. In the alternative, Lafayette claims that the judge should have reduced the charge against Lafayette to manslaughter as the evidence did not support a verdict of murder. There was sufficient evidence to support the verdict and the denial of Lafayette’s peremptory instruction. Two witnesses testified that they saw Lafayette standing near the victim prior to the shooting and that Lafayette was holding a gun. The evidence showed that Lafayette had been engaged in a heated exchange with the victim prior to the shooting and that Lafayette’s gun matched the type of ammunition found at the crime scene and the type of ammunition that killed the victim. The jury was given instructions for both murder and manslaughter and determined that Lafayette was guilty of manslaughter, not murder. Based on the evidence, a rational trier of fact could find the elements of manslaughter existed beyond a reasonable doubt. Issue 2: Jury instructions Lafayette argues that it was error for the circuit court to deny two jury instructions. A court may deny a jury instruction if it incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. The circuit judge denied one of the instructions because it attempted to define the term “reasonable doubt.” Mississippi courts have a long-standing rule that any attempt to define “reasonable doubt” for a jury is improper since reasonable doubt defines itself. The circuit court denied the second jury instruction as being repetitious. Lafayette argues that the circuit judge should have granted this instruction regarding the State’s burden of proof regarding self-defense as it was not covered fairly in the other instructions. However, other instructions sufficiently established the appropriate elements and burden of proof for the jury, rendering Lafayette’s jury instruction repetitious. Issue 3: Sharplin instruction The Sharplin instruction is to be given by the judge when he or she determines there is a likelihood that the jury may not reach a verdict. Lafayette argues that the circuit judge deviated from the “precise language” of Sharplin and made improper comments prior to sending the jury back for further deliberations. The circuit court’s comments, which can be interpreted as implying that the jury was not being “reasonable and fair” and that failure to reach a decision would “put the County and the State to . . . expense,” were not appropriate. However, although defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial after the jury had left the courtroom “based on what happened and the, the fact that the jurors indicated they’re hopelessly deadlocked,” Lafayette failed to object contemporaneously to the comments. Furthermore, this issue was not brought in Lafayette’s motion for a JNOV or for a new trial. Therefore, this issue is waived on appeal. The judge made improper remarks but then gave the jury the formal Sharplin instruction which included an admonition not to “surrender your honest conviction as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors or for the sole purpose of returning a verdict.” There is no reason to believe that the jury did not follow the instruction. Issue 4: Prior inconsistent statements Prior inconsistent, out-of-court statements made by a nonparty witness are not admissible as substantive evidence. However, under M.R.E. 613(b), unsworn prior inconsistent statements of a witness may be used to impeach the witness’s credibility. At trial, the club’s security guard said that he did not see Lafayette shoot the victim. To impeach this testimony, the State introduced recordings of the guard’s prior statements to the police, which indicated that he witnessed Lafayette shoot the victim. Lafayette argues that the circuit court failed to properly explain to the jury that the tapes could not be used to convict him. As there was no contemporaneous objection at trial by defense counsel regarding the circuit judge’s instruction to the jury, this issue is waived on appeal. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of defense counsel to ask for a limiting instruction that certain testimony is for impeachment purposes only. |
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