Haggard v. City of Jackson
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00930-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00930-COA ; 2010-CT-00930-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-19-2011 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contract - Breach of employment contract - Third-party beneficiary - Racial discrimination - Sections 1981 & 1983 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Russell, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CONTRACT |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-15-2010 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: GRANTED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Case Number: 251-07-861CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Ricky L. Haggard |
ROBERT N. NORRIS, LOUIS H. WATSON JR. |
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| Appellee: | City of Jackson, Mississippi | PIETER TEEUWISSEN, CLAIRE BARKER HAWKINS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contract - Breach of employment contract - Third-party beneficiary - Racial discrimination - Sections 1981 & 1983 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Ricky Haggard was employed by the City of Jackson through a federal grant program for approximately three years. The grant provided a salary for Haggard’s position of up to $70,000 per year. After his employment was terminated, Haggard filed suit against the City, alleging that the City owed him approximately $91,000 in retroactive pay because he received less annual salary throughout his employment than the grant’s yearly maximum. Haggard further asserted claims of racial discrimination against the City. The City filed a motion to dismiss, which was granted as to Haggard’s contract claims. However, with regard to the claims of racial discrimination, the circuit court requested that the parties provide the court with information outside of the pleadings for the court’s review. As such, the remainder of the City’s motion to dismiss, concerning the racial-discrimination claims, was converted by the circuit court into a motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted the City’s motion and entered a judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. Haggard appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Breach of contract The traditional features of an employment contract are consent of the parties, consideration for the service rendered, and control by the employer over the employee. In the instant case, it is clear that the City and Haggard both consented to Haggard’s employment. The City benefitted from Haggard’s services and in return, Haggard received a salary. The record further reflects that the City exercised control over Haggard during his employment. Accordingly, Haggard and the City operated under an implied contract even though no written contract existed to outline the parties’ agreement. Haggard argues he was not paid enough in light of the maximum salary allowed by the MMRS grant program. As such, eligibility for a raise would be an implied condition of the implied contract between Haggard and the City. Section 11-46-3 provides that breach of an implied term or condition of any contract does not negate the immunity of the state or its political subdivisions. Hence, as a matter of law, the City cannot be held liable for Haggard’s breach-of-contract claim. Additionally, Haggard asserted that he was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between the City and the federal government concerning the MMRS grant program. The right (of action) of the third-party beneficiary to maintain an action on the contract must spring from the terms of the contract itself. The contract between the City and the federal government regarding the funding of the MMRS grant program was negotiated for the benefit of the public. Haggard, as an employee within the MMRS grant program, was not a direct beneficiary. His employment was an indirect consequence of the contract between the City and the federal government. Issue 2: Racial discrimination Haggard argues that the City is liable for racial discrimination under sections 1981 and 1983. A state municipality cannot be found liable for an employee’s violation of section 1981 under a theory of respondeat superior. Accordingly, the relief sought by Haggard under section 1981 was properly dismissed by the circuit court. An action under section 1983 against a state actor is valid if the plaintiff shows that the execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicted the injury. The City may not be held liable for the actions of its employees unless Haggard can prove that the City adopted a policy or custom of discrimination. In support of Haggard’s theory that the City employed a policy or custom of racial discrimination, Haggard merely provided the circuit court with his own pleadings and affidavits reflecting allegedly discriminatory actions of the former Fire Chief. Haggard did not provide the circuit court with any further evidence of the chief’s purported actions, or evidence of any discriminatory actions on the part of the City or other City employees. Accordingly, Haggard failed to meet his burden of proof in showing that the City, or its employees, operated under a custom or practice of racial discrimination. |
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