Pruitt v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00230-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00230-COA ; 2010-CT-00230-SCT ; 2010-CT-00230-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-19-2011 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Revocation hearing - Preliminary hearing - Discovery - Forensic testimony - Evidentiary hearing - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Barnes and Roberts, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Russell, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, P.J., and Maxwell, J., concur in part and in the result without separate written opinion Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-26-2010 Appealed from: Lauderdale County Circuit Court Judge: Lester F. Williamson Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DENIED Case Number: 08-CV-088(W) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Cecil Junior Pruitt |
JAMES A. WILLIAMS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JEFFREY A. KLINGFUSS | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Revocation hearing - Preliminary hearing - Discovery - Forensic testimony - Evidentiary hearing - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Cecil Pruitt pled guilty to the sale of cocaine. The circuit court sentenced Pruitt to twenty years, with all but one day suspended, and ordered Pruitt to serve three years on post-release supervision. While on PRS, Pruitt was arrested again for selling cocaine. Pruitt’s PRS was subsequently revoked, and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his twenty-year sentence. Pruitt appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Preliminary hearing Pruitt argues that he did not receive adequate notice of the PRS revocation hearing, because the hearing was held in lieu of the trial. Pruitt argues that he was only notified of the PRS revocation hearing on the day the hearing took place, and because of the late notice, he was unable to adequately prepare a defense. However, the record is contrary to his assertions. The evidence shows that a written “Warrant and Petition” for revocation of Pruitt’s PRS was entered on October 10, 2007, giving Pruitt notice that the MDOC had asked the circuit court to revoke the PRS due to the new charge of selling cocaine within 1,500 of a church. This petition served as formal written notice to Pruitt of the claim that he had violated his PRS. Further, the hearing transcript shows that both the trial and revocation hearing were scheduled for March 18, 2009. Pruitt also maintains that due process requires that he should have received a preliminary revocation hearing before the final revocation hearing. An inmate on PRS has a right to a preliminary hearing as soon as practicable after he receives notice that the State intends to pursue revocation. The record shows that Pruitt waived his right to arraignment on the second charge of the sale of cocaine, which led to the revocation hearing. At the revocation hearing, Pruitt did not raise this issue. Failure to raise the issue of denial of a preliminary hearing to revoke post-release supervision waives the issue. Also, Pruitt admits that he prepared for trial on the underlying charge, and he only later complained that he was surprised when the State introduced evidence gathered to prosecute this second charge to revoke his PRS. If he was prepared for trial, as he admits, he could not be unfairly surprised by the very evidence the State would have introduced at trial. Issue 2: Discovery Pruitt argues that he was denied a right to conduct discovery in preparation of a defense to the allegations leading to the revocation of his PRS, and he was prejudiced by the State’s decision to proceed only on the revocation of his PRS. Pruitt did not raise these issues at the revocation hearing. Moreover, Pruitt cites no authority for the proposition that he had any right to discovery in a revocation hearing. Minimal due-process requirements for probation revocation hearings include written notice of the claimed violations of probation or parole; disclosure to the probationer or parolee of evidence against him; opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); a neutral and detached hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and a written statement by the fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation or parole. Since Pruitt is only entitled to these minimum due-process rights, his assertion of error has no merit. Pruitt further argues he was prejudiced by the State when it proceeded with a PRS revocation hearing, rather than a criminal trial. In a revocation hearing, the State is not required to prove that an individual committed a second criminal act. Rather, the State must prove that it is more likely than not that an individual committed an act in violation of the terms imposed as part of his sentence. Pruitt was never punished for the second sale of cocaine because the prosecutor filed a nolle prose. Pruitt’s present incarceration is a result of his failure to comply with provisions of his PRS, which the circuit court ordered after he had pleaded guilty to the first charge of sale of cocaine. Issue 3: Forensic testimony Pruitt argues that the circuit court erred in relying upon copies of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory’s chemical analysis of the cocaine found on his person, and his Sixth Amendment rights require in-person testimony of individuals who conducted the chemical testing. It is well established that Sixth Amendment rights do not extend to parolees and other similarly situation persons who have already been adjudicated guilty of the crime for which they are punished. Issue 4: Evidentiary hearing Pruitt argues that an evidentiary hearing was required in order to comply with due process of law. A petitioner must demonstrate, by affidavit or otherwise, that there are unresolved issues of fact which, if concluded favorably to the petitioner, would warrant relief. The record shows that Pruitt was present at the revocation hearing and was represented by counsel. Yet the defense rested without calling any witnesses. Further, Pruitt had no right to criminal discovery in the revocation matter, but he had the opportunity to avail himself of full criminal discovery concerning the merits of the charge of the second sale of cocaine. Therefore, the circuit court properly summarily dismissed Pruitt’s allegations pertaining to his right to testify, criminal discovery, and to his allegation that the confidential informant committed perjury. Issue 5: Ineffective assistance of counsel Pruitt argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the revocation hearing, and due process requires that he should have been afforded an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The record also shows that Pruitt’s counsel did make some objections to evidence presented to the circuit court. In addition, Pruitt has not provided evidence to demonstrate that but for his counsel’s deficiency, his PRS would not have been revoked. |
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