Wood v. Cooley
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00395-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00395-COA ; 2010-CT-00395-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 07-19-2011 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: AFFIRMED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Alienation of affection - Defective jury verdict - Section 11-7-157 - Judicial estoppel - Discovery violation - M.R.C.P. 37 - Indispensible party - M.R.C.P. 19 - Motion in limine - Closing argument - Jury instructions Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee and Russell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Maxwell, J. Concurs in Result Only: Carlton, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-18-2009 Appealed from: Lee County Circuit Court Judge: James L. Roberts Disposition: JURY VERDICT FOR COOLEY IN THE AMOUNT OF $100,000 Case Number: CV06-199(R)L |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Chuck Wood |
JASON D. HERRING, HENDERSON MCKELVY JONES |
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| Appellee: | Jason Chad Cooley | J. MARK SHELTON, JANA L. DAWSON | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Alienation of affection - Defective jury verdict - Section 11-7-157 - Judicial estoppel - Discovery violation - M.R.C.P. 37 - Indispensible party - M.R.C.P. 19 - Motion in limine - Closing argument - Jury instructions |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jason Cooley filed a complaint for alienation of affection against Chuck Wood. The jury returned a $100,000 verdict in favor of Cooley. Wood filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and discovery sanctions or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial or a remittitur. The court denied the motions, and Wood appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jury verdict At the end of the trial, the jury returning a verdict in favor of Cooley and awarding him damages in the amount of attorneys’ fees and court costs. Upon hearing that verdict, the circuit judge directed the jury to return to deliberations to determine an amount because the verdict “is more likely than not a legally recognizable verdict which the Court can accept.” The jury then returned a second verdict in favor of Cooley and awarded him $100,000 in damages. Wood now argues that the jury’s first verdict was a legally cognizable verdict that awarded Cooley no compensatory damages; thus, the circuit judge erred by sending the jury back to continue deliberations. As a result, Wood also argues that the second verdict is defective because the jury improperly considered attorneys’ fees and court costs when returning the $100,000 verdict. Section 11-7-157 provides that even though a jury verdict is not in the proper form, it will not be reversed if there has been a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law in rendering a verdict. The test to determine if a verdict is in substantial compliance is whether or not it is an intelligent answer to the issues submitted to the jury and expressed so that the intent of the jury can be understood by the court. The meaning of the verdict must be obtained from the language used; otherwise it is the duty of the court to require the jury to retire and return a verdict responsive to the issue in the case. Here, the meaning and intent of the first jury verdict were open to more than one interpretation; the intent was not able to be obtained solely through the language of the verdict; thus, the intent of the jury was not understood by the court based on the language of the first verdict submitted. Further, it is settled Mississippi law that attorney’s fees are not an issue to be decided by the jury, and, instead, are committed to the discretion of the trial court. Had the jury returned even a nominal amount of compensatory damages, the verdict would be in substantial compliance; instead, they failed to quantify any amount of damages. The judge advised the jury to “refer to the instructions given by the Court and continue [its] deliberations.” After further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict stating: “We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and assess damages at $100,000.” This verdict was properly adopted by the circuit court because it was in proper form and clearly expressed the jury’s intent. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury considered anything except what was presented to it in the instructions. Wood also argues that the jury’s award of $100,000 was a result of the jury acting on emotion, whim, or caprice. There is no evidence in the record to support Wood’s contention that the jury was acting on emotion, whim, or caprice. Issue 2: Judicial estoppel It is undisputed that when Cooley filed his counterclaim for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and irreconcilable differences, he was not aware of Wood and Jennifer’s affair. After learning of the affair, Cooley did not seek to amend his divorce complaint to allege adultery. Wood argues that Cooley is prohibited from now asserting that Wood was the cause of the separation since he had previously stated in the divorce proceeding that the cause of the separation was habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is based on expedition of litigation between the same parties by requiring orderliness and regularity in pleadings. A party cannot have contrary positions in the same litigation. Cooley’s alienation-of-affection claim against Wood is not subject to judicial estoppel. Wood was not a party to the Jennifer and Cooley’s divorce proceedings, and the current case was not the same litigation as was in the divorce proceeding. Issue 3: Discovery violation Wood argues that Cooley failed to identify Michael Langley in the discovery process. Langley and Jennifer began a dating relationship subsequent to Jennifer and Cooley filing for divorce and subsequent to Jennifer and Wood ending their affair. Pursuant to M.R.C.P. 37, a trial court may impose sanctions against a party for failing to cooperate during the discovery process. More specifically, Rule 37(b)(2)(C) gives the trial court the option of dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof if a party does not cooperate in the discovery process. In the current case, Wood’s attorney propounded an interrogatory asking Cooley to “list each and every person who may have discoverable information” pertaining to Cooley’s allegations. Although aware of the identity of Langley, Cooley did not provide his name when he responded to the interrogatory, and Wood only learned of Langley at trial. The circuit judge did not issue any discovery sanctions against Cooley or his attorney for failing to disclose Langley as a person who would have had discoverable information. In choosing not to issue any discovery sanctions and overruling Wood’s motion for a mistrial, the circuit judge relied on the facts that before Jennifer and Langley began their relationship, Jennifer and Wood’s affair had already started and ended and that Jennifer and Cooley had separated and filed for divorce. Based on the evidence presented, the circuit court did not err. Issue 4: Indispensible party Wood argues that, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 19, Langley was an indispensable party who was not joined. The circuit judge did not err in not dismissing Cooley’s case for the failure to join an indispensable party. A claim of alienation of affection accrues when the alienation or loss of affection is finally accomplished. The testimony at trial indicates that Jennifer and Langley did not begin their relationship until after she and Cooley separated and filed for divorce and after she and Wood had already ended their relationship. Langley’s absence from the proceeding does not invoke concerns about Rule 19 sufficient to find that the circuit judge abused his discretion in not dismissing the case. Issue 5: Motion in limine Wood argues that the circuit judge erred in granting Cooley’s motion in limine. At trial, Cooley moved the circuit court to exclude evidence regarding custody modification because it was not relevant to what occurred during the marriage and prior to the divorce. Wood argues that he should be able to mitigate his damages by showing that Cooley did not lose Jennifer’s ability to care for the child since she was not an adequate caregiver to begin with and that Cooley has been able to maintain a meaningful relationship with their daughter. The parties were permitted to ask where the current residence of the daughter was. This exception provided Wood with the opportunity to mitigate his damages by showing that Cooley still had a meaningful relationship with the child while preventing him from using the evidence of Jennifer’s behavior post-divorce to mitigate his damages for the harm he caused to the marriage prior to the divorce. Issue 6: Closing argument Wood argues that Cooley’s attorney violated the motion in limine by making comments about custody during closing arguments and that the court erred in not ordering a mistrial. Attorneys are given wide latitude when making their closing statements; as such, any alleged improper comment must be viewed in context, taking the circumstances of the case into consideration. In context, the statement made by Cooley’s attorney went to refute Cooley’s violent temperament. Wood’s attorney had ample opportunity of which the attorney took advantage, to show Cooley’s violent temperament. Thus, the statement made did not prejudice Wood. Issue 7: Jury instructions Wood next argues that jury instruction C-5 was vague, and the circuit court erred in submitting it to the jury. He also argues that the circuit court erred in submitting jury instructions C-7 and C-9 because, when read with jury instruction C-10, they were confusing and misleading to the jury about the elements of alienation of affection. It is clear that the jury was properly advised of the elements of alienation of affection. Jury instructions C-9 and C-10 both contain the elements of alienation of affection. Jury instruction C-5, when read with jury instructions C-9 and C-10, clearly instruct the jury on the proper elements that Cooley had to prove to be successful in his claim of alienation of affection. The circuit court instructed the jury to not just view one instruction to determine the applicable law but to view the instructions as a whole to determine the law. Jury instructions C-7 and C-9, given alone, might have been subject to confusion as to the elements of alienation of affection, but when viewed in light of the remaining instructions, particularly jury instruction C-10, the circuit court did not err in issuing those instructions. |
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