Culp v. State
| Docket Number: | 2002-KA-01966-SCT Linked Case(s): 2002-KA-01966-SCT |
|
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 12-15-2005 Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Forcible rape, Armed robbery, Kidnaping, Arson, Aggravated assault & Conspiracy to commit armed robbery - Motion to suppress - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) - M.R.E. 611(b) - Sufficiency of evidence - Inconsistent verdicts - Double jeopardy - Grand jury Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Easley, Carlson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Dickinson, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-20-2002 Appealed from: Holmes County Circuit Court Judge: Jannie M. Lewis Disposition: Culp was tried by a Holmes County Circuit Court jury on a multi-count indictment for forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnaping, arson, aggravated assault, conspiracy to commit an armed robbery, and capital murder while in the commission of felonious abuse of a child. On February 18, 2002, he was found guilty of all counts except capital murder, and was sentenced to serve sixty years incarceration in the Mississippi Department of Corrections. District Attorney: JAMES H. POWELL, III Case Number: 10,607 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Elliot Culp |
IMHOTEP ALKEBU-LAN, CHOKWE LUMUMBA |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: SCOTT STUART |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Forcible rape, Armed robbery, Kidnaping, Arson, Aggravated assault & Conspiracy to commit armed robbery - Motion to suppress - Hearsay - M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C) - M.R.E. 611(b) - Sufficiency of evidence - Inconsistent verdicts - Double jeopardy - Grand jury |
| Summary of the Facts: | Elliot Culp was convicted of forcible rape, armed robbery, kidnaping, arson, aggravated assault, and conspiracy to commit an armed robbery. He was sentenced to sixty years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion to suppress Culp argues that the search warrant for a blood sample was based on an illegal arrest made in Culp’s home without an arrest warrant or exigent circumstances; that by surrendering his clothes, he was required to make a statement in violation of Miranda v. Arizona; and that the search warrant was based on evidence which did not amount to probable cause. Culp’s assertion that he was arrested at his home is not borne out by the record, which clearly indicates that the officers were there to speak to him because he and another person were the last people seen with the victims. The officers did not arrest Culp at that time, and in fact, told Culp’s mother that they merely wanted to question him. Culp agreed to accompany the officers to the police station. At all times Culp remained free to refuse to go with the officers. While at the police station, Culp asked the Chief, without being prompted, whether he should remove his clothing and surrender it to the police. The officer responded that he probably should do so, but did not compel Culp to surrender his clothing. Clothing is not testimonial evidence and therefore the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will not bar its introduction at trial. Use of Culp’s clothing did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because it was not testimonial. Further, at the time that the officer told Culp that he should probably surrender his clothing, Culp was not under custodial interrogation. The exchange between Culp and the officer was initiated by Culp and not by the police, and lasted only long enough for the officer to reply to Culp’s direct inquiry. Voluntary consent eliminates the warrant requirement. The evidence in this case gives rise to a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause exists. The trial judge did not err in issuing a warrant to have a sample of Culp’s blood taken. Issue 2: Hearsay Culp argues that the court erred in admitting an officer’s hearsay testimony that the victim told him that she left the Amigo Mart in a car with the same two men with whom he had seen her earlier. As an identification, the statement was admissible under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(C). Defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant after the statement was admitted into testimony. Cross-examination would have been proper under M.R.E. 611(b). The fact that counsel chose not to do so was apparently part of trial strategy. The tactical choice of counsel to seek testimony on a particular subject is a personal one and not a restriction by the trial court. As a statement of identification, the officer was allowed to testify as to what the victim told him regarding the identity of the two attackers. Issue 3: Sufficiency of evidence Culp argues that the State failed to prove a common plan and the necessary union of minds between Culp and his co-conspirator to form a conspiracy. However, testimony from other witnesses, including Culp’s co-conspirator, indicate that not only did Culp agree to the conspiracy, but also he was involved in its planning. Culp argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he forcibly raped the victim and that the State did not prove that the victim was sixteen years or younger. The State acknowledges that a typographical error was made in Count II of the indictment, which was properly entitled Forcible Rape, but should have cited subsection (4)(a), which addresses forcible rape instead of subsection 3(a), which addresses statutory rape. Culp’s conviction should not be reversed due to the incorrect citation of the statute in the indictment, especially since the language of Count II spoke in terms of forcible rape. Culp was adequately apprised of the charges levied against him by the State. Culp argues that neither the physical nor testimonial evidence present is reliable and sufficient to prove that he committed the assaults charged. There was ample evidence for a reasonable jury to convict. The testimony of Culp’s coconspirator and the victim is sufficient to support a finding that Culp participated in the aggravated assault by stabbing one of the victims with a knife, and, that he cut the other victim with the same knife. Issue 4: Inconsistent verdicts The jury found Culp guilty of aggravated assault but not guilty of capital murder. Culp argues that these verdicts are inconsistent, and thus his conviction and subsequent sentence for the aggravated assault must be vacated. Clearly the essential elements of aggravated assault are present here beyond a reasonable doubt. Inconsistent verdicts are permissible. Issue 5: Double jeopardy Culp argues that his rights under the Mississippi and United States Constitutions were violated when he was charged with both aggravated assault and capital murder by felonious abuse of a child. Where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not. The crime of capital murder by felonious abuse of a child requires proof that a child is involved. This is an additional element that must be proven for capital murder that is not required for aggravated assault. Issue 6: Grand jury Culp argues that his constitutional rights were violated because of the appearance of improper influence and fraud in the grand jury that indicted him, stating that one of the jurors was the wife of the county attorney, she did most of the writing for the grand jury, and was pretty much doing the talking. There is no evidence in the record that there was improper influence on the grand jury. The trial court held an extensive hearing on this issue, over the course of two days. Culp asked members of the grand jury whether anything influenced them in their decision and they said only the evidence presented influenced their votes. The presumption that the grand jury acted properly, together with the sacredness of grand jury proceedings, prevents the Court from quashing the indictment based on the appearance of impropriety alone. Culp also argues that his constitutional rights were violated because the State did not disclose the identity of two allegedly interested grand jurors. Suppression of material evidence justifies a new trial irrespective of good faith on the part of the prosecutor. Because the record does not show actual improper influence, the identity of the two grand jurors alleged to be interested is immaterial. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
