Intown Lessee Associates, LLC, et al. v. Howard, et al.
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01987-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01987-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-30-2011 Opinion Author: Kitchens, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Directed verdict - Jury instruction - Admission of evidence - Comparative fault instruction - Statutory cap on non-economic damages - Remittitur Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Waller, C.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-25-2009 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: Tomie Green Disposition: Howard and Poole were awarded a four-million-dollar jury verdict against InTown. Case Number: 251-08-571CIV |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Intown Lessee Associates, LLC; Intown Lessee Services, LLC; IT Tenant RBS, LLC; and Timothy Tucker |
WILLIAM ‘TREY’ JONES, III
JOSEPH ANTHONY SCLAFANI |
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| Appellee: | Michael Keith Howard, Individually, and Shannon Poole, Individually | JAMES ASHLEY OGDEN JAMES W. SMITH, JR. WENDY MICHELLE YUAN |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Directed verdict - Jury instruction - Admission of evidence - Comparative fault instruction - Statutory cap on non-economic damages - Remittitur |
| Summary of the Facts: | Michael Howard and Shannon Poole were awarded a four-million-dollar jury verdict against InTown, an extended-stay motel, for injuries each sustained as victims of an armed robbery in the motel. InTown appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Directed verdict At the close of all of the evidence, InTown moved for a directed verdict on the issue of causation. The court denied the motion and InTown’s post-trial motion. InTown now argues that Howard and Poole failed to meet their burden to establish that the proximate cause of their assault was the failure of InTown to employ an armed, off-duty JPD officer to provide security at the Jackson property. The substantial evidence submitted by the plaintiffs was more than legally sufficient, and included a stipulation that InTown’s management and employees had been the victims of three armed robberies that had closely preceded these attacks. InTown rested without calling a single witness to rebut the plaintiffs’ substantial lay and expert witness testimony. By the presentation of their lay and expert witnesses, the plaintiffs had created a question sufficient for the jury’s determination. Issue 2: Jury instruction InTown argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that provided that the jury could find against InTown if it found that InTown had failed “to warn Michael Keith Howard and Shannon Poole of the existence of a known dangerous condition.” Unless substantial rights are affected, issues not presented to the trial judge are procedurally barred from being raised for the first time on appeal. InTown was afforded an opportunity to object to the plaintiffs’ theory of liability and supporting jury instruction before the trial court; however, InTown failed to avail itself of that opportunity. Thus, InTown is procedurally barred from raising this issue. Issue 3: Admission of evidence InTown argues that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding (a) the profitability of the Jackson property; (b) armed security provided by InTown at other locations across the South without requiring Plaintiffs to lay a proper foundation that the circumstances surrounding those other properties were similar to the circumstances surrounding the Jackson property; and (c) the alleged motive/reason why InTown did not employ an armed, off-duty JPD officer at the Jackson property. Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, the Court will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party. InTown failed to make a contemporaneous objection to questioning at trial regarding the profitability of InTown for the year preceding the armed robbery of Howard and Poole. Thus, this argument is barred. InTown argues for the first time on appeal that plaintiffs’ counsel made inappropriate comments during opening arguments. InTown did not make a contemporaneous objection to plaintiffs’ counsel’s opening argument and to questions on cross-examination. InTown is procedurally barred from raising this issue. Issue 4: Comparative fault instruction InTown argues that it was entitled to a comparative fault instruction because the jury could have apportioned the Plaintiffs some fault for their personal injuries. InTown argues that Howard and Poole should have immediately given their money and possessions to the three assailants who had broken into their room, rather than insisting that they did not have money and that their injuries would have been less severe. If all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. Evidence of the plaintiff’s own negligence may operate to reduce the plaintiff’s damages. However, no case law supports InTown’s argument that the victims of this armed robbery had a duty to mitigate their damages by abiding by the robber’s demands. The cases from other states cited by InTown in support of their argument are clearly distinguishable. To penalize a crime victim for his failure to cooperate with his assailant would constitute a bizarre and perverse misapplication of the doctrine of comparative fault. Issue 5: Statutory cap on non-economic damages InTown argues that the trial court should have given the jury “a verdict form that would require the jury to segregate economic damages from non-economic damages[,] enabling the trial judge to perform her statutory duty to apply the $1,000,000 cap on non-economic damages.” InTown also argues that “the failure of the trial judge to either submit to the jury a verdict form that would require the jury to segregate economic damages from non-economic damages, or to inquire of the jury post-verdict how it arrived at its damage calculation requires a new trial.” InTown did not object to the jury instruction on the form of the verdict, and InTown did not request a jury instruction that the form of the verdict should segregate economic damages from noneconomic damages. InTown did not object to the jury instructions. Because it did not object to the form of the verdict jury instruction at trial, InTown is procedurally barred from doing so on appeal. Additionally, because InTown did not ask the trial court to give a jury instruction that separated economic and noneconomic damages, it cannot complain on appeal that such an instruction was not given. It would be nothing more than supposition for the Court to try to guess what amount the jury awarded in economic damages and what amount it awarded in noneconomic damages. Alternatively, InTown argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for a remittitur. InTown argues that Howard’s damages should be remitted from $2,000,000 to $1,692,400, and Poole’s damages should be remitted from $2,000,000 to $1,853,800. InTown argues that Howard’s economic damages ranged from $651,800 to $692,400, which would make his damages, at most, $1,692,400, including noneconomic damages, and that Poole’s economic damages ranged from $813,400 to $853,800, which would make her damages, at most, $1,853,800. The standard for granting an additur or remittitur is whether or not the court finds that the jury was influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion or if the damages were contrary to the overwhelming weight of credible evidence. InTown does not cite any law supporting its contention that it is entitled to a remittitur. Moreover, in light of the general verdict and InTown’s failure to request a special verdict or special interrogatories, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the remittitur. |
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