Johnson v. State


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Docket Number: 2008-CT-00537-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2008-KA-00537-COA ; 2008-KA-00537-COA ; 2008-CT-00537-SCT ; 2008-CT-00537-SCT
Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-30-2011
Opinion Author: Pierce, J.
Holding: Affirmed
Additional Case Information: Topic: Aggravated assault & Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Challenges for cause
Judge(s) Concurring: Carlson, P.J., and Randolph, J.
Non Participating Judge(s): King, J.
Dissenting Author : Waller, C.J.
Dissenting Author : Dickinson, P.J.
Dissent Joined By : Kitchens and Chandler, JJ. Waller, C.J., Joins This Opinion In Part
Concurs in Result Only: Lamar, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY
Writ of Certiorari: Granted
Appealed from Court of Appeals
Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-13-2008
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Tomie Green
Disposition: Convicted of aggravated assault and sentence of twenty years
District Attorney: Robert Shuler Smith
Case Number: 07-0-017CR
Note: Johnson was convicted of aggravated assault and armed robbery in Hinds County Circuit Court. Johnson appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the Court of Appeals finding that Johnson’s right to a speedy trial was not violated, and because Johnson was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to grant Johnson’s for-cause challenges of two prospective jurors. The Court of Appeals decision can be found at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/HDList/..%5COpinions%5CCO62780.pdf
  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Virgil N. Johnson




 DONALD W. BOYKIN



  
Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY  
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Topic: Aggravated assault & Armed robbery - Right to speedy trial - Challenges for cause
Summary of the Facts: Virgil Johnson was convicted of aggravated assault and armed robbery. He appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Right to speedy trial Johnson argues that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, because 680 days passed between the time of arrest and the date of his trial. Four factors to consider whenever a defendant claims that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated include length of delay, reasons for delay, whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether the defense suffered any prejudice from the delay. A delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. When the delay is presumptively prejudicial that does not mean that actual prejudice to the defendant exists. Rather, actual prejudice is determined at a different point in the Barker analysis. A “presumptively prejudicial delay” acts as a triggering mechanism for further inquiry into the Barker analysis, and shifts the burden to the State to show the reason for delay. To the extent the case Smith v. State, 550 So. 2d 406, 408 (Miss. 1989) says otherwise, that portion of the opinion is overruled. Here, 680 days passed between Johnson’s arrest and his trial, so the delay is presumptively prejudicial. The trial court found the delay was necessary due to the backlog of cases, and noted that several, older cases were set before Johnson’s that may have caused his case to be put off until the court’s next term. Further, the State provided three trial dates from the computer system used throughout Hinds County, which showed that Johnson’s case had been set for trial three months after he was arraigned. At most, this prong weighs slightly against the State. Johnson asserted his right to a speedy trial. Johnson does not come close to showing a prima facie case of actual prejudice, nor does the record reveal that Johnson suffered any prejudice other than being incarcerated. Since the defendant is clearly in the best position to show prejudice under the “prejudice” prong, the burden remains with him. Although Johnson’s pretrial incarceration was lengthy, incarceration alone does not constitute prejudice. Johnson put forth absolutely no evidence that he has ever suffered symptoms of anxiety and concern as a result of his incarceration. In order for this prong to favor any defendant, evidence of legitimate anxiety and concern (medical records, documentation from the jail, etc.) must exist. Generally, the Court will find prejudice where there was a loss of evidence, the death of a witness, or the investigation became stale. None of these occurred here. Thus, the Court of Appeals and the trial court are affirmed. Issue 2: Challenges for cause Johnson argues that his constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated because he was forced to use two of his six peremptory challenges on two jurors who should have been excused for cause by the trial court. The mere loss of a peremptory challenge is not enough to constitute a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean that the defendant was denied his constitutional rights. A defendant must show two prerequisites before a claim related to the denial of a challenge for cause may be made: the defendant must have exhausted all of his peremptory challenges; and an incompetent juror must be forced by the trial court’s erroneous ruling to sit on the jury. Even though Johnson used all of his peremptory challenges, he fails to meet the second prerequisite. The two jurors in question did not sit on the jury. And Johnson does not argue, or much less show, that any of the jurors who sat on the jury were biased or incompetent.


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