Meka v. Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Co., et al.


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01921-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-28-2011
Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J.
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Apportionment of fault - Negligence per se - Violation of section 63-3-903 - Jury instructions - Citizenship status
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton, Maxwell and Russell, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-05-2009
Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court
Judge: Tomie Green
Disposition: $60,000 JURY VERDICT FOR THE PLAINTIFF; MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, NEW TRIAL, OR ADDITUR DENIED
Case Number: 251-08-155CIV

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Satyadev Meka




JAMES ASHLEY OGDEN



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Company and Albert Grube CECIL MAISON HEIDELBERG GINNY Y. KENNEDY  

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    Topic: Personal injury - Apportionment of fault - Negligence per se - Violation of section 63-3-903 - Jury instructions - Citizenship status

    Summary of the Facts: Satyadev Meka sued Grant Plumbing & Air Conditioning Company and its employee Albert Grube for injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. A jury determined that Meka suffered $100,000 in damages, but it assessed Meka with forty-percent comparative fault for the accident. Accordingly, the trial court entered a judgment awarding Meka $60,000 in total damages. Meka filed a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a new trial or an additur of the damages awarded. The court denied the motion, and Meka appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Apportionment of fault Meka argues that Grant Plumbing failed to present any evidence showing he acted negligently or caused or contributed to his injuries; thus, the jury should not have been allowed to consider apportioning fault to him. Under the comparative negligence doctrine, negligence is measured in terms of percentage, and any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to amount of negligence attributable to the person for whose injury, damage or death recovery is sought. Where negligence by both parties is concurrent and contributes to injury, recovery is not barred under such doctrine, but the plaintiff's damages are diminished proportionately. This holds true even to the extent that negligence on the part of the plaintiff was ninety percent (90%) and on the part of the defendant was ten percent (10%); in such an instance, the plaintiff still would be entitled to recover theoretically that ten percent. Thus, even though the plaintiff was negligent, the plaintiff may recover from a defendant whose negligence contributed to the plaintiff’s injury. Grant Plumbing’s theory of the case was that Meka was negligent per se for violating section 63-3-903. Grant Plumbing attempted to demonstrate a violation of section 63-3-903, at trial, by the agreed upon terms contained in the trial court’s pretrial order, which set forth each parties’ theory of the case, and which amended the parties’ respective pleadings, accordingly. The effect of section 63-3-903 is to provide that no person shall stop his motor vehicle on the main traveled part of the highway when it is practical to stop off the highway. The construction of the statute requires consideration of whether under the facts and circumstances of a particular case it is reasonably practical for a driver to pull his or her vehicle off the main traveled part of the highway. This question is ordinarily one of fact to be submitted to a jury on proper instructions. Here, the trial court instructed the jury accordingly. The record discloses that there was adequate space in the base of the white-striped triangular area for Meka to remove his vehicle completely from the lane of travel. The shoulders lining the right-hand lane leading up to and past this particular area also provided enough space for Meka to stop his vehicle without obstructing the lane of travel. Meka maintains that he was in the “process” of pulling his SUV out of the lane of travel and into the “safety zone” when the Grant Plumbing truck collided with his vehicle. Meka’s factual contentions notwithstanding, evidence was presented both by Grube and Koontz, a disinterested witness, that Meka’s SUV had already come to a complete stop prior to the accident, and a portion of Meka’s SUV remained in the lane of travel. This, according to Koontz’s testimony, made it necessary for Koontz to change lanes. Grube did not see the stopped SUV until Koontz proceeded into the other lane, and he had little time to react at that point. Meka partly obstructed the right-hand lane of travel in violation of section 63-3-903. His act in so doing was a proximate and contributing cause to the complained-of accident. Issue 2: Jury instructions Meka argues that the trial court erred by giving four jury instructions, because no evidence was presented that he did anything negligent. Reading the jury instructions submitted in this case as a whole, the jury was correctly guided on the law. Meka also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a proposed jury instruction. However, he fails to show how it affected the outcome of the trial. Moreover, the jury found against Grant Plumbing on Meka’s respondeat superior claim. This was the most favorable result that Meka could have received against Grant Plumbing; thus, any alleged error in the trial court’s failure to grant the proposed jury instruction is moot. Issue 3: Citizenship status Meka, who is from India and is not a United States citizen, argues that despite having been granted a motion in limine to exclude testimony and evidence regarding his citizenship status, Grant Plumbing “was allowed to question [his] Indian citizenship and to make him tell the jury that at one point his work permit status after the accident was withheld for a year.” The fact that Meka was not authorized to work in the United States is relevant evidence to the issues of causation and damages. When Meka asserted at trial that he has suffered, and will continue to suffer, loss wages solely because of his back injury, Grant Plumbing had the right to raise the issue of Meka’s work-authorization status. There is nothing in the record that suggests the jury was prejudiced against Meka because of his national origin or his lack of citizenship.


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