Jenkins v. Jenkins
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00129-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00129-COA |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-21-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Division of marital property - Fair market value of assets - Date of evaluation Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Russell, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-03-2009 Appealed from: Jones County Chancery Court Judge: Franklin C. McKenzie, Jr. Disposition: CHANCELLOR GRANTED DIVORCE AND DIVIDED THE PARTIES’ ASSETS Case Number: 2007-0269 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Susan Kristine (Gregory) Jenkins |
TERRY L. CAVES |
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| Appellee: | Robert Wayne Jenkins, Jr. | THOMAS T. BUCHANAN JOHN D. SMALLWOOD | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Division of marital property - Fair market value of assets - Date of evaluation |
| Summary of the Facts: | Bobby and Kris Jenkins were granted a divorce based on irreconcilable differences. The chancellor classified the couple’s separate and marital property, then equitably divided and distributed the marital assets. Kris appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Division of marital property Kris argues that the chancellor committed reversible error in his division of the marital assets and marital debts. Specifically, Kris argues that the chancellor erred: by finding that only the appreciation of the homestead property was subject to equitable division; by classifying Industrial Steel Corporation and the 3.8 acres of land as non-marital assets; by failing to consider Kris’s total disability and health condition at the time of trial; and by inadequately dividing all of the marital assets and marital debts. The chancellor should determine whether the equitable division of the marital property, considered in light of the non-marital assets, adequately provides for both parties. If the distribution of the parties’ assets, including any separate property, fails to adequately provide for the parties, the chancellor then considers whether to award alimony to one of the parties. Equitable distribution does not mean equal distribution. No requirement exists dictating that Kris must receive half of the equity in the marital home. The goal as it pertains to equitable division is a fair division of marital property based on the facts of each case. The record shows substantial evidence supporting the chancellor’s exercise of discretion in equitably dividing the marital property and awarding a larger share of the property to Bobby. More specifically, the chancellor’s opinion, as shown in the excerpts set forth herein, reflects that the chancellor considered the homestead to constitute marital property, as opposed to Kris’s assertion that the chancellor only considered the value in appreciation of the homestead as marital property. Further, in his opinion dividing the marital property, the chancellor stated that he considered the contributions and expenditures of each spouse to the seven-year marriage and to the acquisition of the marital property. The chancellor also acknowledged in his opinion that Bobby owned the bulk of the marital assets prior to the marriage and also expended premarital earnings on improvements to the property during the marriage. The chancellor’s findings are supported by credible evidence. While the chancellor awarded Kris a smaller percentage of the parties’ assets, this fact, standing alone, is an insufficient ground for reversal. Issue 2: Fair market value of assets Kris argues that the chancellor erred by not appointing an expert to opine as to the fair market value of several of the couple’s assets. It is the chancellor’s responsibility in a divorce proceeding to make an adequate investigation into the value of the marital property that is subject to division. Property division should be based upon a determination of fair market value of the assets, and these valuations should be the initial step before determining division. Findings on valuation do not require expert testimony and may be accomplished by adopting the values cited in the parties' 8.05 financial disclosures, in the testimony, or in other evidence. In the present case, the record shows that only Bobby attempted to provide the chancellor with evidence regarding the valuations of the marital property. By contrast, the record shows that Kris failed to present any documents indicating her assets or liabilities, and she failed to place any valuation whatsoever on the marital property at issue. It is not the chancellor’s duty to obtain appraisals of the marital property. Kris cannot now complain that the chancellor’s valuations are unfair when no reliable evidence of the value of the property was presented by her at trial, especially after she provided no objection at trial as to the valuations provided by Bobby. The chancellor was faced with less than ideal proof, but he classified and divided the marital property in a way that was supported by the evidence presented by Bobby and testimony at trial. Issue 3: Date of evaluation Kris argues that the chancellor committed reversible error in his determination of the date of evaluation for the marital property. Kris contends that the chancellor should have used the date of trial, rather than the date the temporary order was entered, in setting the valuation date for the property division. Because the valuation date falls within the discretion of the chancellor when equitably dividing marital property upon divorce, the chancellor in the present case did not abuse his discretion in setting the date of valuation as the date the temporary order was entered. |
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