Hughes v. State
| Docket Number: | 2007-KA-00209-SCT Linked Case(s): 2007-KA-00209-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 03-27-2008 Opinion Author: Waller, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Armed robbery & Aggravated assault - Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence - Proof of armed robbery - Supplemental instruction - Prosecutorial misconduct - Unconstitutional sentence - Motion to quash venire Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Diaz, P.J., Easley, Carlson, Dickinson, Randolph and Lamar, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-07-2006 Appealed from: WINSTON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: Clarence E. Morgan, III Disposition: Count I: Conviction of armed robbery and sentence of thirty (30) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Count II: Conviction of aggravated assault and sentence of twenty (20) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Count III: Conviction of aggravated assault and sentence of twenty (20) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The sentences imposed in Count II and Count III are to run concurrent to each other and both are to run concurrent to the sentence imposed in Count I. District Attorney: Doug Evans Case Number: 2006-056-CR |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | YASMINE HUGHES a/k/a YASMIN HUGHES |
James T. McCafferty |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DEIRDRE McCRORY | ||
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| Topic: | Armed robbery & Aggravated assault - Sufficiency of evidence - Reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence - Proof of armed robbery - Supplemental instruction - Prosecutorial misconduct - Unconstitutional sentence - Motion to quash venire |
| Summary of the Facts: | Yasmin Hughes was convicted on one count of armed robbery, for which he was sentenced to thirty years, and two counts of aggravated assault, for which he was sentenced to twenty years each. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Hughes argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he aided and abetted the crimes of armed robbery or aggravated assault. To aid and abet the commission of a felony, one must do something that will incite, encourage, or assist the actual perpetrator in the commission of the crime or participate in the design of the felony. Mere presence, even with the intent of assisting in the crime, is insufficient unless the intention to assist was in some way communicated to the principal. In this case, there is sufficient evidence of Hughes’ participation in the crime. Another man and Hughes had been riding around talking about ways to make money, which included “robbing.” After parking their truck on a small dirt road late at night, Hughes accompanied the other man some 150 to 200 yards to the victims’ home. One of the victims said that Hughes pulled a hood over his head and walked off before any shooting occurred. However, he explained at trial that it looked as if both men had turned to walk away. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and giving the state the benefit of all reasonable inferences, Hughes knew what was about to transpire and acted, along with the other man, as if he were walking away. Hughes communicated his intent to assist the other man in the commission of the crimes by accompanying him to the victims’ home, and acting, along with the other man, as if he were leaving just before the other man began shooting. Issue 2: Reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence Hughes argues that there remains a reasonable hypothesis that he did not commit the crimes, and that the jury was required to accept a reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. A jury is instructed to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt when a case is based entirely upon circumstantial evidence. A circumstantial evidence instruction is required only when the prosecution can produce neither an eyewitness nor a confession/statement by the defendant. Here, the state produced both an eyewitness as well as an admission of guilt by Hughes. Issue 3: Proof of armed robbery Hughes argues that his armed-robbery conviction cannot stand because there was no taking or attempted taking of any property as required under the armed-robbery statute. An attempt to commit a crime consists of an intent to commit a particular crime; a direct ineffectual act done toward its commission; and the failure to consummate its commission. Intent to rob can be inferred from the facts of this case and from the suspicious activity witnessed by a neighbor just before the crimes occurred. Assault with a deadly weapon was the act chosen to carry out the robbery. In the normal course of events, a robbery would have resulted. A juror reasonably could infer that the two men intended to rob the victims, but abandoned their plan when one of the victims did not go down after being shot multiple times. Thus, all the elements have been proven. Issue 4: Supplemental instruction Hughes argues that the trial judge impermissibly called attention to a specific instruction and failed to ascertain exactly what the jury was asking when it sent the trial judge a written note during deliberations which asked, “Is Yasmin being charged with armed or attempted robbery?” Once the trial court receives a question from the jury, the judge’s first responsibility is to determine whether any further instruction is necessary. Whether a single instruction has been singled out through supplemental instructions often turns on the manner in which the instruction is presented. There is reversible error when the repetition gives such undue prominence to some principle or phase of the case as is calculated to impress it unduly on the jurors’ minds, or results in an unfair statement of law in relation to accused’s rights. Here, the jury’s question required no additional inquiry from the trial judge. Furthermore, the trial judge’s supplemental instruction did not place undue prominence on any one principle or phase of the case so as to cause prejudice to Hughes. Jury Instruction No. 2 contained the elements of all the crimes for which Hughes was charged. Additionally, the trial judge instructed the jury to consider all the instructions given to them. Issue 5: Prosecutorial misconduct Because Hughes failed to object to the prosecution’s statements during closing arguments, this issue is procedurally barred on appeal. In addition, the prosecution’s reference to other local armed robberies which involved a similar pattern of behavior was for illustrative purposes, and was not intended to incite the passions and prejudices of the jury. The trial judge instructed the jury that arguments, statements, and remarks of counsel are not evidence. When a jury is instructed that comments made by counsel are not evidence, reversal is not required. Issue 6: Unconstitutional sentence Hughes argues that his sentence unconstitutionally punished him for exercising his right to trial. Because no objection was raised at trial, this issue is procedurally barred on appeal. In addition, Hughes was not given a heavier sentence because he exercised his right to trial. In sentencing Hughes, the trial judge’s concern was the nature of the offense and Hughes’ role in the crime. Additionally, there is no indication in the record that the trial judge was made aware of Hughes’ former plea negotiations until the sentencing phase of the trial. Issue 7: Motion to quash venire Hughes argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to quash the venire based on the fact that both the victims and the shootings were well known within the community. The venire members were questioned about their exposure to publicity about the case and their relationship with, or knowledge of, the victims. Impaneled jury members who had such exposure or knowledge indicated that they could be fair and impartial. Thus, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Hughes’ motion to quash. |
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