Dean v. Kavanaugh


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Docket Number: 2004-CA-01144-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-24-2006
Opinion Author: Chandler, J.
Holding: AFFIRMED

Additional Case Information: Topic: Wills & estates - Confidential relationship - Undue influence
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Southwick and Roberts, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-06-2004
Appealed from: Warren County Chancery Court
Judge: Patricia O. Wise
Disposition: FINDING OF UNDUE INFLUENCE IN DISSIPATION OF ASSETS
Case Number: 01-420GN

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Katherine V. Dean




KATHLEEN FITZGERALD TREADWELL, LANDMAN TELLER



 

Appellee: John Kelly Kavanaugh, Individually, and as Administrator of the Estate of Robert C. Kavanaugh, Deceased KENNETH B. RECTOR  

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Topic: Wills & estates - Confidential relationship - Undue influence

Summary of the Facts: Katherine Dean and Robert Kavanaugh were involved in a romantic relationship but were never officially married. Kavanaugh died after a long period of poor health. Dean cared for Kavanaugh during his illnesses. Approximately one year before his death, Kavanaugh opened a joint checking account with Dean. Approximately four months before his death, Kavanaugh opened a second joint account with Dean. When Kavanaugh died, Dean told Kavanaugh’s sons that he had died virtually penniless. Dean later disclosed the existence of the earlier joint account, which she divided equally between herself and Kavanaugh’s sons, but she did not disclose the existence of the second account. Kavanaugh’s children sued to recover the proceeds from the second joint account. The court granted the relief Kavanaugh’s sons requested, and Dean appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Confidential relationship Factors to be considered in determining if and when a confidential relationship exists include whether one person has to be taken care of by another; whether one person maintains a close relationship with another; whether one person is provided transportation and has their medical care provided for by another; whether one person maintains a joint account with another; whether one is physically or mentally weak; whether one is of advanced age or poor health; and whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and the another. As a result of his illnesses, Dean bathed Kavanaugh, cut his toenails, shaved him, cut his hair, cooked for him, and changed the dressings on his skin due to his skin cancers. Dean would also write checks for Kavanaugh at Kavanaugh’s direction. Kavanaugh resided with Dean in her home for more than ten years. They were involved in a romantic relationship. Dean provided Kavanaugh with transportation to his doctor when Kavanaugh’s physician instructed him not to drive. Dean was named as a joint owner on two of Kavanaugh’s banking accounts. Kavanaugh was eighty-one years old when he died and was in poor health for many years prior to his death. There was no power of attorney executed by Kavanaugh. The cohabitation that existed between Dean and Kavanaugh violated Mississippi law. The chancellor was correct in finding that Dean was in a confidential relationship that gives rise to a presumption of undue influence. Dean and Kavanaugh were not married, and they were involved in a relationship that our legislature prohibits. Issue 2: Undue influence The test to overcome the presumption of undue influence includes consideration of whether the grantee/beneficiary acted in good faith; whether the grantor had full knowledge and deliberation of his actions and the consequences of those actions; and whether the grantor exhibited independent consent and action. After Kavanaugh’s death, Dean destroyed all of Kavanaugh’s bank records. Immediately after Kavanaugh’s death, Dean told Kavanaugh’s sons that he had gambled away his money. When Kavanaugh’s sons threatened her with a lawsuit, she disclosed the existence of only one account, which she divided equally between herself and Kavanaugh’s sons. On the issue of good faith, the chancellor was entitled to consider the uncontested testimony from Kavanaugh’s sons that Dean opted to refinish the hardwood floors in her home in the fall of 2000. Kavanaugh’s son moved Kavanaugh to a hotel while Dean proceeded with her remodeling. The chancellor was also entitled to consider the fact that Dean’s house remodeling occurred after she had obtained ownership of all of Kavanaugh’s money and procured for herself a twenty-five percent interest in his real property. Dean failed to show that Kavanaugh had full knowledge of the consequences of his acts when he transferred his assets to a bank account he held jointly with Dean, as demonstrated by the fact that he told his sons explicitly and on multiple occasions that he wanted his estate shared equally between Dean and his children. The evidence shows that Dean understood that this was Kavanaugh’s intention because she suggested to Kavanaugh that he divide his real property four ways. All evidence at trial shows that Kavanaugh maintained a good relationship with his sons and had no reason to exclude them from receiving a lesser share of his money. Dean drove Kavanaugh to the bank on each occasion, and she was present while each transaction was consummated. No one else was present other than a bank officer. Prior to the transactions, Kavanaugh did not discuss with anybody his plans to open joint checking accounts with Dean. The chancellor, considering the medical evidence as a whole, was entitled to conclude that Dean failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Kavanaugh had the capacity for independent consent and action in the final months of his life. Kavanaugh was in a debilitated physical state as a result of his terminal cancer and other ailments.


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