Evans v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-00854-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-00854-COA2009-CT-00854-SCT2009-CT-00854-SCT2009-CT-00854-SCT |
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| Oral Argument: | 01-12-2011 | |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 01-31-2013 |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-14-2011 Opinion Author: Irving, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Imperfect self-defense instruction - Prior abuse - Funds for expert - Jury selection - Statements to security guards - Miranda warnings - Statements to police officers - Constitutionality of sentence - Section 97-3-21 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Griffis, P.J., Myers, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Russell, J. Dissenting Author : Carlton, J. Dissent Joined By : Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 03-12-2009 Appealed from: HARRISON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT Judge: JERRY O. TERRY SR. Disposition: CONVICTED OF MURDER AND SENTENCED TO LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: Cono A. Caranna, II Case Number: B2402-2008-027 |
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| Note: | This judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court on 1/31/2004 The SCT opinion can be found at http://courts.ms.gov/Images/Opinions/CO76334.pdf | |
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Dante Lamar Evans |
ROBERT B. MCDUFF
ROBERT CHARLES STEWART
BRYAN A. STEVENSON |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Imperfect self-defense instruction - Prior abuse - Funds for expert - Jury selection - Statements to security guards - Miranda warnings - Statements to police officers - Constitutionality of sentence - Section 97-3-21 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Dante Evans was convicted of murder and was sentenced to life. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Imperfect self-defense instruction Dante argues that the circuit court erred by refusing his jury instruction on imperfect self-defense. Under the theory of imperfect self-defense, an intentional killing may be considered manslaughter if done without malice but under a bona fide (but unfounded) belief that it was necessary to prevent great bodily harm. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case; however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. While there is evidence that Dante’s father had physically abused Dante in the past, Dante admitted in his police statement that no abuse had occurred on the night of the murder or on the days leading up to the murder. Dante also told the police that he had practiced aiming the gun at his father, while his father slept, either one or two nights before the murder. Finally, there was no evidence of a renewed attack by Dante’s father, who was asleep when Dante shot him. Thus, the facts of this case do not support a theory of imperfect self-defense. Issue 2: Prior abuse Dante argues that the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of a neighbor who saw Dante’s father strike Dante with his fist and with a chain, and the testimony of a police officer, who would have testified regarding restraining orders issued against Dante’s father in 2006. Dante contends that the excluded testimony is central to his theory of imperfect self-defense. However, Dante has failed to present a sufficient evidentiary basis in support of his theory of imperfect self-defense. Moreover, Dante killed his father in 2007. The excluded testimony concerns conduct that allegedly occurred in 2006, before Dante came to live with his father. Issue 3: Funds for expert The circuit court appointed a psychologist to evaluate Dante and determine whether he was competent to stand trial. The psychologist noted that Dante had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 2001. Dante requested funds to hire a PTSD expert, but the circuit court denied Dante’s request. Because Dante sought the testimony in support of his theory of imperfect self-defense, which is not supported by the evidence, his argument concerning this issue is without merit. Issue 4: Jury selection Dante argues that the circuit court erred in instructing potential jurors that they were “not to be concerned with the fact that [Dante] was only [fourteen] years of age at the time of [the murder]” and that the court improperly excluded potential jurors who stated that Dante’s age would inhibit their ability to be fair and impartial. Dante argues that the statement impaired his ability to proceed on his theory of imperfect self-defense. However, the evidence does not support a theory of imperfect self-defense. Furthermore, the court’s statements to potential jurors were not improper. With regard to the exclusion of jurors, a defendant does not have a vested right to any particular juror but only the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. The circuit court was statutorily bound to exclude potential jurors who stated that they could not try the case impartially. Issue 5: Statements to security guards Dante argues that his statements made to two security guards were inadmissible because they were obtained without a Miranda warning. The security guards were employed by Asset Protection and Security Services. APSS contracted with the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide security services at the FEMA trailer park where Dante and Dante’s father lived. The APSS security guards were not required to give Miranda warnings to Dante. While the APSS security guards received some government training, such training does not constitute a sufficient “nexus” to elevate the private investigation by the guards to a state action. Even if the APSS security guards were found to be state actors, the public-safety exception to Miranda would apply. Miranda warnings are not required where police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety. In this case, the APSS security guards knew that a trailer-park resident had been shot; however, when they arrived at the scene, Dante was not in possession of a gun. Even if the APSS security guards were found to be state actors, they were entitled to ask Dante about the gun’s location under the public-safety exception to Miranda. Issue 6: Statements to police officers Dante argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress his videotaped statement to Biloxi police officers because the statement was involuntary. A confession is voluntary when, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused’s free and rational choice. Before beginning the interrogation, the officer told Dante, “Just got off the phone with your mom, Dante, ok. She knows I’m talking to you.” Dante argues that the officer’s statement implied that his mother approved of the interrogation and wanted Dante to confess. However, the officer’s statement included no promises of leniency or reward in exchange for Dante’s confession–in fact, it did not even request a confession from Dante. During the videotaped interview, the officer verbally informed Dante of his Miranda rights and gave Dante a waiver form, which Dante signed. The officer asked Dante whether he understood his rights, and he indicated that he did. There is no evidence that Dante lacked the intellectual capacity to understand his rights. Dante contends that because of his age, the absence of a parent, attorney, or other friendly adult during the interrogation renders his statement involuntary. However, Dante never asked to speak to an attorney, his mother, or any other adult during the interrogation. Because Dante was accused of murder, he was no longer afforded the protections of the Youth Court Act, which requires notification of a judge and the child’s parent or guardian when a child is taken into police custody. Issue 7: Constitutionality of sentence Dante argues that his mandatory life sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is unconstitutional. Section 97-3-21 carries a mandatory life sentence for murder, and it does not afford the trial judge any sentencing discretion. A sentence will not be subject to appellate review when it falls within the limits prescribed by statute. Dante argues that the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) supports his argument that his life sentence is unconstitutional. However, the Graham Court refused to extend its holding beyond the context of juveniles who commit nonhomicide crimes. Additionally, the Court expressly stated that murder was distinguishable from other violent crimes. Thus, there is find no basis for extending the holding in Graham to juveniles who commit murder. |
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