Smith v. State


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Docket Number: 2004-CA-01194-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 07-18-2006
Opinion Author: Barnes, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Post-conviction relief - Time bar - Disparity in sentencing
Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Ishee and Roberts, JJ.
Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-21-2004
Appealed from: Chickasaw County Circuit Court
Judge: Henry L. Lackey
Disposition: DISMISSED MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Case Number: H-2004-031

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: James Buster Smith




JAMES D. MINO



 

Appellee: State of Mississippi OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOHN R. HENRY  

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Topic: Post-conviction relief - Time bar - Disparity in sentencing

Summary of the Facts: James Smith pled guilty to one count of manufacture of crystal methamphetamine, and one count of possession of crystal methamphetamine with intent to distribute. He was sentenced to a term of fifteen years for each count of the indictment, with five years suspended, ten to serve, and the sentences to run concurrently. Smith filed a motion for post-conviction relief which the court denied. Smith appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: In his motion, Smith alleged that his co-defendant had produced new evidence and had been resentenced to the time she had already served. Smith therefore argued that there was a disparity in sentencing, and asked the court to reduce his sentence in the same manner that his co-defendant’s had been reduced. The circuit judge denied Smith’s motion on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations. Smith argues that the statute of limitations should be tolled from the date that his codefendant was resentenced. Section 99-39-5(2) specifically provides that the three year time period begins to run from one of three dates: the date of dismissal of a prisoner’s direct appeal, the date of a judgment of conviction or sentence has expired, or, in the case of a guilty plea, the date of the judgment of conviction. Smith pled guilty. Thus, the statute began to run from the date of the judgment of conviction, which was entered at Smith’s sentencing hearing on June 12, 2000. When Smith filed his motion for post-conviction relief on February 11, 2004, it was time barred, and the trial judge properly dismissed it on that ground. Smith offers no Mississippi cases which support his contention that the statute should be tolled from the date that his co-defendant was resentenced. Smith also argues that the reduced sentence given to his co-defendant was disparate when compared to the original sentence given to him. If a defendant who insists on a trial receives a harsher sentence than does a codefendant who pled guilty, that can raise significant Sixth Amendment issues regarding the unfettered right to a jury trial. However, those Sixth Amendment concerns are not present where both of the defendants pled guilty, as is the case here.


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