Yarbrough v. Patrick


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Docket Number: 2010-CA-00391-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 06-07-2011
Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Inter vivos gift - Confidential relationship - Constructive trust
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Russell, J.
Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Irving, P.J. Without Separate Written Opinion
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 02-09-2010
Appealed from: Hinds County Chancery Court
Judge: J. Dewayne Thomas
Disposition: Final Judgment Entered in Favor of Appellee
Case Number: G2009-345 (T)(1)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Laura M. Yarbrough




HARRY J. ROSENTHAL, W.O. CHET DILLARD



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Ann Morrison Patrick JAMES ELDRED RENFROE, ROY J. PERILLOUX  

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    Topic: Inter vivos gift - Confidential relationship - Constructive trust

    Summary of the Facts: Laura Yarbrough filed suit against her daughter, Ann Patrick, alleging that Ann had obtained title to the assets by abuse of a confidential relationship or other wrongful means. Ann claimed that Laura had given her the assets as gifts. The chancellor entered a judgment in favor of Ann. Laura appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Confidential relationship The chancellor found that Laura failed to establish the existence a confidential relationship between herself and Ann at the time alleged gifts were made; therefore, the presumption of undue influence was not raised. Laura argues that this finding was in error. With respect to inter vivos gifts, when it is shown that a confidential relationship existed between the donor and the donee at the time the gift was made, a presumption of undue influence is raised, and the burden shifts to the donee to rebut the presumption. A confidential relationship is akin to a fiduciary relationship, and it arises when a dominant, overmastering influence controls over a dependent person or trust justifiably reposed. At trial, the testimony on this issue was limited. Laura puts a lot of emphasis on the fact that she had a stroke in 2004 and that, after that stroke, Ann drove her to the doctor and made sure she was properly taking her medications. However, the pertinent question is whether a confidential relationship existed at the time the alleged gifts were made. There was substantial evidence from which the chancellor could have found that the CDs were transferred to Ann in 2001 and that the real property was conveyed in 2003. Therefore, the stroke and its aftermath are not relevant to this inquiry. Turning to the seven factors the courts take into account when considering whether a confidential relationship exists, only three of the factors could conceivably point in the direction of a confidential relationship. Ann and Laura maintained a close relationship. They maintained joint accounts, as evidenced by the CDs titled in the names of “Laura L. Yarbrough or Ann Patrick.” And Laura was of advanced age. The other four factors argue against a confidential relationship. According to Laura’s own testimony, she took care of herself. She provided her own transportation. She saw to her own medical care. In addition, there was no evidence that she was mentally or physically weak. And Ann did not have Laura’s power of attorney. Thus, the chancellor was not manifestly in error when he found that Laura failed to establish a confidential relationship by clear and convincing evidence. Issue 2: Inter vivos gift Laura argues that Ann failed to prove that she was given the real property and CDs as inter vivos gifts. With respect to the real property, a person who seeks to set aside a facially valid deed bears the burden of proof. Here, the two deeds were facially valid. Therefore, it was Laura’s burden to establish some ground to set them aside. In addition, whenever a CD is titled in the names of two or more persons, payable to any of the persons named, it is presumed that those persons are owners of the account. That presumption of ownership may be overcome upon proof of forgery, fraud, duress, or an unrebutted presumption of undue influence. Here, the CDs were at one point titled in the names of “Laura L. Yarbrough or Ann Patrick,” and sometime thereafter Ann acquired sole ownership of some of the CDs. Therefore, it was Laura’s burden to disprove Ann’s right to the CDs. Laura’s argument that Ann failed to establish the elements of an inter vivos gift by clear and convincing evidence must fail because the burden of proof was on Laura to disprove Ann’s rights to the real property and the CDs. Issue 3: Constructive trust Laura argues that equity should impose a constructive trust on the real property and the CDs for her benefit, because Ann has acquired title to these assets by wrongful means. Specifically, Laura claims that she transferred the assets to Ann in order to qualify for Medicaid and that Ann persuaded her to do that. A constructive trust is one that arises by operation of law against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. Furthermore, to receive the aid of equity a claimant must have clean hands. Laura claims that she transferred her assets to Ann in order to qualify for Medicaid. She admittedly tried to conceal assets from a governmental agency in order to obtain benefits to which she was not rightly entitled. Her hands were unclean, and the chancellor was correct to deny her the aid of equity.


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