Richardson v. Norfolk Southern R.R. Co.


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Docket Number: 2004-CA-00876-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2004-CA-00876-SCT ; 2004-CA-00876-SCT ; 2004-CA-00876-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 01-19-2006
Opinion Author: Carlson, J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Personal injury - Federal preemption - 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) - Prior accidents - Jury instructions
Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Easley, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Diaz and Graves, JJ.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PERSONAL INJURY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 03-26-2004
Appealed from: Alcorn County Circuit Court
Judge: Thomas J. Gardner
Disposition: The jury returned a verdict for Norfolk Southern, and the trial court entered judgment consistent with the jury verdict.
Case Number: 99-151(G)A

Note: Appellant's Motion to Call the Court's Attention to Altered Documents in the Record is denied.

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Frances Mary (Robbins) Richardson, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Michael Ray Robbins, II, Deceased




JOHN W. CHANDLER, JR., PAMELA R. O’DWYER, PHIL R. HINTON



 

Appellee: Norfolk Southern Railway Company STEPHANIE CAMILLE REIFERS, EVERETT B. GIBSON  

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Topic: Personal injury - Federal preemption - 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) - Prior accidents - Jury instructions

Summary of the Facts: Michael Robbins died as a result of his injuries resulting when a train collided with his car crossing the railroad tracks at a grade crossing. Robbins’ mother, Frances Richardson, sued both Alcorn County, the county in which the incident occurred, and Norfolk Southern Railway Company for negligence. Alcorn County prevailed on its motion for summary judgment. The jury returned a verdict for Norfolk Southern, and Richardson appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Federal preemption Norfolk Southern’s defense included an assertion that federal law preempted Richardson’s claim. Richardson argues that a prior decision, Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., Inc. v. Johnson, 798 So.2d 374, 379 (Miss. 2001), dispels Norfolk Southern’s defense, because two factual elements are needed for federal preemption – federal approval and federal funding, and that where there is no remedy, there is a presumption against federal preemption. Recognizing that federal law preempts a state law when the two are in conflict, the United States Supreme Court found in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 670 (1993), that when 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable, these federal regulations preempt state tort law. Therefore, the trial court correctly applied federal preemption law to Richardson’s claims of inadequate signalization. Issue 2: Prior accidents Richardson argues that the court erred in excluding evidence at trial of two other accidents at this same grade crossing. Evidence of prior accidents may be introduced at trial to show two things: the existence of a dangerous condition and the defendant’s notice or knowledge of such dangerous condition. However, evidence of prior accidents will only be admitted upon a showing of substantial similarity of conditions. When evidence of other accidents is introduced, it may not be too remote in time from the accident in issue. Here, one of the prior accidents occurred over thirteen years earlier. The other accident occurred over three and one-half years later. One accident occurring at the same location over thirteen years before Robbins’ accident does not necessarily show an existence of a dangerous condition or that the defendant had notice or knowledge of a dangerous condition. Likewise, an accident occurring at the same location more than three and one-half years after Robbins’ accident could not possibly be relevant to prove that a yet-to-happen 2003 accident put Norfolk Southern on notice in 1999 that a dangerous condition existed at the grade crossing at the time of Robbins’ accident. Issue 3: Jury instructions Richardson argues that the court erred in refusing two instructions she submitted. While Richardson’s proposed instruction P-12 mirrored section 77-9-249(1)(d), it was an incomplete statement of the law, confusing, and misleading. In applying this instruction, the jury would have been required to find that Robbins had a statutory duty to stop at the crossing only if the train was plainly visible and in hazardous proximity to the crossing. Conversely, according to instruction P-12, if the jury found the train was not plainly visible, Robbins was not under a statutory duty to stop at the crossing. This is an incorrect and incomplete statement of the law. Richardson also submitted instruction P-22, which was basically a verbatim recitation of section 77-9-249(3). In refusing this instruction, the court quite appropriately found that this instruction included “a section out of the Mississippi Code which I consider to be a directive to the court in the trial of the case and not the subject of an instruction to the jury.” Richardson also submitted a proposed spoliation of evidence jury instruction because Norfolk Southern never recovered the train’s event recorder. However, the record is absolutely devoid of any evidence that Norfolk Southern in any way intentionally, or even negligently, destroyed evidence in its possession. Therefore, the court did not commit error in refusing Richardson’s spoliation of evidence jury instruction.


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