Fails v. Jefferson Davis County Pub. Sch. Bd.
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00042-COA Linked Case(s): 2010-CA-00042-COA ; 2010-CT-00042-SCT ; 2010-CT-00042-SCT ; 2010-CT-00042-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-24-2011 Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: School transfer policy - Authority of conservator - Section 37-17-6(14)(a) - Revocation of existing transfer - Section 37-15-31 - Section 37-15-15 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Myers, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Russell, J. Dissenting Author : Carlton, J. With Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Admin or Agency Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-04-2009 Appealed from: Jefferson Davis County Circuit Court Judge: Michael R. Eubanks Disposition: Affirmed the Decision of the Conservator of the Jefferson Davis County Public School to Revoke all Inter-District Transfers Case Number: 2008-187P |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Mark Fails and Laura Fails |
ALEXANDER IGNATIEV |
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| Appellee: | Jefferson Davis County Public School Board | REGINALD ERVIN JONES | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | School transfer policy - Authority of conservator - Section 37-17-6(14)(a) - Revocation of existing transfer - Section 37-15-31 - Section 37-15-15 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Mark and Laura are the parents of Courtney. They reside in the Jefferson Davis County Public School District. In 2003, Mark and Laura requested and obtained a transfer for Courtney to attend school in Sumrall, located in the Lamar County Public School District. In May 2007, the Governor declared a state of emergency in the Jefferson Davis County Public School District. Thereafter, the State Board of Education appointed Glenn Swan to the position of interim conservator for the District. On August 13, 2007, the Jefferson Davis County Public School Board adopted a “New Student Transfer Policy” and notice was published in a local newspaper that informed all parents within the District of the new transfer policy. The notice stated that all prior transfers were revoked and that no transfers would be allowed in the future. The effect of this policy was that Courtney would have to leave the Sumrall school and return to the District’s schools. Mark appeared before the Board at its regularly scheduled meeting and argued that the intent of the new policy was not to revoke existing transfers but merely to prohibit future transfers. Swan invoked his authority as conservator and refused to allow the Board to vote on the matter. Swan decided that the policy did in fact revoke existing transfers. Mark and Laura appealed to circuit court which affirmed. Mark and Laura appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Authority of conservator Mark argues that Swan did not have the authority to prevent the Board from voting to clarify the meaning of the “New Student Transfer Policy.” Swan’s authority as the conservator was broad under section 37-17-6(14)(a). The conservator, in essence, becomes the Board. Mark and Laura correctly point out that the statute does not specifically provide Swan with the power to prevent the Board from voting to clarify the transfer policy. Nevertheless, the statute expressly grants the conservator authority over “the administration, management and operation of the school district.” The statute also indicates that the specific powers granted under the statute are not exhaustive. Control over “administration, management and operation” is commonly understood to mean a very high degree of authority. Based on the statute’s plain language and the general powers conveyed by this language, Swan operated within his statutory powers when he refused to allow the Board to vote on a matter dealing with the “administration, management and operation” of the District. Issue 2: Revocation of existing transfer Mark and Laura argue that the Board did not have the authority to revoke Courtney’s transfer. They contend that once an inter-district transfer has been approved it is permanent and irrevocable. Inter-district transfers are governed by section 37-15-31. Pursuant to the statute, both the transferor and the transferee school boards must consent to the transfer. The statute further provides that if both school boards approve the transfer “such decision shall be final.” And if either school board rejects the transfer that decision is also “final.” Prior versions of the statute show that “final” does not mean that the transfer could never be revoked but simply means that there is no administrative appeal to the State Department of Education. While older versions of the statute allowed for various administrative appeals, the current version does not. Thus, a school board may withdraw its consent to an inter-district transfer and thereby revoke the transfer. Issue 3: Transfer policy Mark and Laura argue that the Board could not adopt a blanket policy against inter-district transfers. They argue that individual transfer requests must be considered on a case-by-case basis and that, when making their decisions, school boards must consider certain factors enumerated in section 37-15-15. However, section 37-15-15 requires school boards to consider certain factors when assigning students to a particular school or attendance center within a district. It does not apply to inter-district transfers. Section 37-15-31 grants school districts absolute discretion to grant or deny inter-district transfers, with some exceptions that are not applicable to this case. It follows that districts may adopt uniform policies against transfers. |
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