Hill v. State
| Docket Number: | 2010-CP-00514-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 05-10-2011 Opinion Author: Maxwell, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Voluntariness of plea Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Carlton, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-12-2010 Appealed from: Lauderdale County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Bailey Disposition: Motion for Post-Conviction Relief Denied Case Number: 04-CV-145(B) |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Robert E. Hill |
PRO SE |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE, SCOTT STUART | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Voluntariness of plea |
| Summary of the Facts: | Robert Hill pled guilty to first-degree arson and was sentenced pursuant to a plea agreement with the State to eight years without eligibility for parole or probation. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was denied. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Hill argues his counsel was ineffective for failure to raise his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Our courts have found ineffective-assistance claims based on the failure to raise speedy-trial issues waived where the plea was voluntary and intelligent, but they have found such claims not waived to the extent the plea was rendered involuntary by ineffective assistance. In Hill’s petition to enter a guilty plea, he acknowledged by writing his initials that he understood that he could plead not guilty. The petition also reflected that he understood that by pleading guilty he was relinquishing various constitutional rights, including the right to a speedy and public trial by jury. Hill agreed to waive these rights. During his plea hearing, the court specifically asked Hill if he had read the section of his petition pertaining to his constitutional rights that he was waiving. Hill answered that he had. After waiving these rights, Hill maintained that he wished to plead guilty. Hill provides no facts or evidence showing why his attorney’s performance rendered his guilty plea unintelligent, other than asserting that the passage of 367 days between his arrest and his guilty plea entitles him to relief. This bare allegation is insufficient to show his guilty plea was not intelligent or that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Hill must show that some error by his counsel prevented him from understanding his right to a speedy trial, which by all indications, he voluntarily waived. His failure to show any unreasonable mistake by his counsel is fatal to his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Issue 2: Voluntariness of plea Hill argues that his guilty plea is involuntary because he was not specifically advised by the circuit judge of the elements of first-degree arson. However, Hill did not raise this issue with any specificity in his PCR motion, which is a procedural bar. At his plea hearing, Hill swore he was pleading guilty with a full understanding of the matters set forth in the indictment. He also acknowledged his lawyer had advised him of what the State was required to prove at trial to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Hill agreed that he understood “those essential elements.” The trial court ensured that Hill’s attorney had explained the elements of the offense and that Hill understood the nature of the charges. Hill’s bare assertions in his brief cannot overcome the strong presumption that his sworn statements in open court were true. |
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