In Re C.B.Y.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00256-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-22-2006 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Termination of parental rights - Section 93-15-103(1) - Section 43-15-13(3) - Section 93-15-105(1) - Section 43-21-151(1)-(2) Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes and Roberts, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: King, C.J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - OTHER |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-05-2005 Appealed from: Forrest County Youth Court Judge: Michael McPhail Disposition: TERMINATION OF NATURAL MOTHER’S PARENTAL RIGHTS Case Number: 18-YC-04-P-0535-124 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | In the Interest of: C. B. Y., a Minor |
SHEILA HAVARD SMALLWOOD |
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Termination of parental rights - Section 93-15-103(1) - Section 43-15-13(3) - Section 93-15-105(1) - Section 43-21-151(1)-(2) |
| Summary of the Facts: | The Forrest County Department of Human Services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of A.Y., R.H., and an unknown putative father. A.Y. was fifteen years of age when she gave birth to a boy, C.B.Y. R.H. is the alleged natural father of C.B.Y The youth court entered a judgment terminating A.Y.’s parental rights, and A.Y. appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | A.Y. argues that the facts in this case do meet the requirements of section 93-15-103(1) governing the termination of parental rights. She argues that C.B.Y. was taken from the hospital because she was considered a runaway, not because of any unwillingness or inability on her part to care for C.B.Y. and that the facts do not support the conclusion that C.B.Y. could not be returned to her within a reasonable amount of time. Substantial credible evidence supports the youth court’s findings. A.Y. took C.B.Y. and ran away from her foster home. In addition, A.Y.’s testimony alone is sufficient evidence to support the youth court’s finding that her behavior, i.e., choosing to remain on runaway status to avoid the DHS, is the reason that C.B.Y. could not be returned to her within a reasonable amount of time. The findings of the youth court met the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under section 93-15-103(1) and the findings are supported by substantial credible evidence. The record shows that C.B.Y. was in the custody of the DHS well over the statutory requirement of one year. A.Y.’s decision to remain on runaway status prevented her from maintaining a bond with C.B.Y., as it was impossible to return C.B.Y. to her custody and care when she chose to avoid the DHS. Also, the evidence shows a substantial erosion of the parent/child relationship. A.Y. also argues that the DHS created a conflict of interest when it filed suit against her because she was still in the legal custody of the DHS. Pursuant to sections 43-15-13(3) and 93-15-105(1), the DHS clearly had the authority to file for termination of A.Y.’s parental rights. A.Y. argues that she should not have been in the custody of the DHS after her eighteenth birthday, pursuant to section 43-27-101. However, section 43-21-151(1)-(2) provides for exclusive original jurisdiction to youth court in all proceedings concerning a delinquent child, a child in need of supervision, an abused child or a dependent child until the child’s twentieth birthday, unless sooner terminated by order of the youth court. Therefore, the youth court retained its jurisdiction over A.Y. until her twentieth birthday. A.Y. also argues that the court’s failure to give her or her attorney notice of the hearing constituted a violation of her substantive and procedural due process rights. If a party receives an oral or written explanation of the charges against her, then the notice requirement has been satisfied. The DHS was duly diligent in attempting to find A.Y. to give her notice of the hearing. In addition, A.Y.’s attorney received no notice of that hearing because he was not her attorney of record. A.Y. argues that by attempting to force her into the foster care system with her newborn, and by threatening to withhold contact with C.B.Y., the DHS subjected her to unconstitutional involuntary servitude. In every case in which the U.S. Supreme Court has found a condition of involuntary servitude, the victim had no available choice but to work or be subject to legal sanction. This case does not involve forced labor. A.Y. chose to avoid contact with the DHS. |
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