Carter v. State
| Docket Number: | 2004-KA-02109-COA Linked Case(s): 2004-KA-02109-COA ; 2004-CT-02109-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-22-2006 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery & Statutory rape - Voluntariness of confession - Suppression hearing - Disclosure of witnesses - Send a message argument - Voir dire - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis and Barnes, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Roberts, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-24-2004 Appealed from: Lauderdale County Circuit Court Judge: Robert Bailey Disposition: CONVICTED OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SENTENCED TO SERVE THIRTY YEARS IN CUSTODY OF MDOC; CONVICTED OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCED TO SERVE THIRTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF MDOC; SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY. District Attorney: BILBO MITCHELL Case Number: 676-03 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Contrell Carter, Jr. a/k/a Cottrell Carter, Jr. |
JAMES A. WILLIAMS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sexual battery & Statutory rape - Voluntariness of confession - Suppression hearing - Disclosure of witnesses - Send a message argument - Voir dire - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Contrell Carter, Jr. was convicted of sexual battery and statutory rape, and received concurrent sentences of thirty years for each. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Voluntariness of confession Carter argues that his confession was not voluntary, and that he was denied his right to remain silent and counsel because he was not allowed an attorney when he requested one. For a confession to be admissible it must be given voluntarily and not given because of promises, threats or inducements. Testimony of an officer, or of other persons having knowledge of the facts, establishes a prima facie case that the confession was voluntarily made without threats, coercion, or offer of reward when the officer testifies. The court’s decision to admit the confession into evidence against Carter is not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of evidence. Carter’s arguments concerning threats, coercion, promises and denial of counsel appear in the trial transcript to have been largely fabricated and the product of Carter’s legal research in jail. Issue 2: Suppression hearing Carter contends that he was denied his right to remain silent, counsel, due process of law, and to a fair trial when asked, during his suppression hearing, about the truthfulness of his statement to the police. Much of the inquiry into truthfulness occurred as a result of impeaching Carter and attempting to ascertain his credibility. The trial judge made no reference to the truthfulness of the confession in denying the motion to suppress, and there is nothing in the record indicating that such line of questioning influenced his decision. Issue 3: Disclosure of witnesses Carter argues that he had no disclosure of the State’s intent to call the child’s mother to the stand. The judge let in the mother’s testimony in order to establish foundational facts, which was fully within his discretion. Issue 4: Send a message argument Carter argues that the prosecutor improperly made a “send a message” argument during closing argument. The standard to warrant reversal is whether the error affected a trial in such a way as to bring its fairness into question. Here, the comment by the State in its closing argument in no way brought the trial’s fairness into question. Issue 5: Voir dire Carter argues that the jury panel was tainted by the oral reactions of several jurors during voir dire, expressing revulsion at the nature of the charge. Carter has provided no further evidence beyond the mere assertion that his trial was fundamentally unfair because of prospective jurors’ expressions of revulsion. However, those prospective jurors did not serve on the jury that convicted Carter, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that the jury panel was tainted by their remarks. Issue 6: Ineffective assistance of counsel Carter argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to numerous leading questions, failed to insist upon a continuance when the State made inadequate disclosure of its case, failed to obtain an instruction for the voluntariness of the confession, did not ask for a mistrial and get a ruling of inflammatory remarks of the members of the jury panels, and failed to object to a hearsay statement in the State’s closing argument. Carter has failed to carry his burden in persuading the Court that his trial counsel’s lack of objection to leading questions during direct examination fell outside the broad range of reasonable professional assistance or trial strategy. Any potential need for continuance was obviously remedied when the statement was made available to Carter’s trial counsel during the recess. Carter fails to even suggest that the failure to obtain an instruction was not a matter of trial strategy or reasonable professional assistance. With regard to the jurors, the remarking prospective jurors did not serve on the jury that convicted Carter, and there is nothing in the record suggesting that their remarks tainted the remaining jury panel. The decision whether to object to hearsay falls within the broad discretion alleged to counsel in formulating and carrying out his trial strategy. |
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