Booker v. State


<- Return to Search Results


Docket Number: 2004-KA-02143-COA
Linked Case(s): 2004-KA-02143-COA ; 2004-CT-02143-SCT ; 2004-CT-02143-SCT ; 2004-CT-02143-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Date: 08-29-2006
Opinion Author: King, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Capital murder - Transfer to youth court - Section 43-21-151 (1)(a) - Peremptory challenges - Right to speedy trial - Voluntariness of confession - Victim’s pain - Photographs - Jurors’ oath
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes and Roberts, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Ishee, J.
Procedural History: Jury Trial
Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 05-20-2004
Appealed from: Jackson County Circuit Court
Judge: Dale Harkey
Disposition: Conviction of capital murder and sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections
Case Number: 2003-10,660(3)

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Anthony Terrell Booker a/k/a Robert Booker








 

Appellee: State of Mississippi  

Synopsis provided by:

If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office.

Topic: Capital murder - Transfer to youth court - Section 43-21-151 (1)(a) - Peremptory challenges - Right to speedy trial - Voluntariness of confession - Victim’s pain - Photographs - Jurors’ oath

Summary of the Facts: Anthony Booker was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. He appeals.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Transfer to youth court Booker argues that because he had not reached the age of majority, had a low I.Q. score, and did not use a firearm in the murder, his case should have been transferred to youth court. Booker’s trial counsel failed to raise this issue before the trial court. A trial judge cannot be held in error for an issue that has not been presented to him for a decision at the trial level. In addition, the circuit court has original jurisdiction over a child charged with capital murder pursuant to section 43-21-151 (1)(a). Issue 2: Peremptory challenges Booker argues that the court erred in accepting as race neutral the reasons offered by the State for two of its four peremptory strikes against African-Americans on the venire. With regard to the first juror, the prosecution offered as a reason that he had a marijuana conviction, a driver’s licence violation, an insurance violation, and a seat belt violation. In arguing his motion for a new trial, Booker for the first time, contradicted the State’s representations by producing an affidavit from the Pascagoula City Court Clerk which stated that she had informed an investigator of the District Attorney’s office that the juror had been charged with the four misdemeanors but all of the charges had been dismissed by the City because the juror was not the person who had committed the offenses. A trial judge can only rule on that which is before him when the ruling is made. While giving false information to a judicial tribunal certainly calls for prosecutorial sanctions, it does not give rise to reversible error in this case. With regard to the second juror, the prosecutor’s reason was that he once had a contentious civil matter involving members of the Stallworth family. It was later discovered that the Stallworth on the venire panel was not a part of the Stallworth family that the prosecutor once represented. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed as race-neutral. Issue 3: Right to speedy trial Booker argues that the period in excess of more than sixteen months between his arrest and date of trial infringed upon his constitutional rights. When determining whether the state has violated the right of an accused to a speedy trial, the court consider the length of delay, reason for delay, assertion of right by defendant, and any resulting prejudice. Because there was a total of sixteen months between Booker’s arrest and date of trial, the delay is presumptively prejudicial. The State gives as the reasons for the delay the unavailability of the court and the time required to conduct an effective investigation. Thus, this factor weighs ever so slightly against the State. After his indictment, Booker made two demands for a speedy trial. Other than complaints of prejudice stemming from his incarceration, Booker has no claim of actual prejudice. Given these factors, this issue is without merit. Issue 4: Voluntariness of confession Booker argues that his confession should not have been admitted because his statements were the result of promises from the officers and were given because of his limited learning capacity. The prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was voluntary by introducing testimony from an officer, or other person having knowledge of the facts, that the confession was made without threats, coercion, or offer of reward. In this case, three officers testified that Booker gave his confession voluntarily, and that he was not promised anything for his truthfulness. After questions arose about Booker’s limited learning capacity, all three again testified that Booker did not seem to have any problems understanding his rights, and that he signed the waiver of rights form willingly after his rights were read to him. At the hearing, Booker was able to read aloud for the court each right listed on the waiver. Given the totality of the circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Booker’s videotaped confession into evidence. Issue 5: Victim’s pain Booker argues that because the death penalty was not sought in his case, testimony about the pain that the victim suffered was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. A forensic pathology expert for the State testified as to Johnson’s cause of death. Discussion of pain by a forensic pathologist is admissible. Booker also argues that the testimony was in violation of discovery rules, because the pathologist’s opinions were not fully contained within the autopsy report. Discovery violations are only reversible when there is a clear showing of prejudice. Because the statements were otherwise admissible and Booker offers no proof of any real discovery violation, this issue is without merit. Issue 6: Photographs Booker argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence two rather gruesome photographs. Photographs are deemed to have evidentiary value if admitted to aid in describing the circumstances of the killing, aid in describing the location of the body and cause of death, and supplement or clarify witness testimony. In admitting the photographs, the trial court cited to their relevancy to the cause of the victim’s death and the crime scene investigation. Such a decision is not error. Issue 7: Jurors’ oath Booker argues that his jurors did not receive the proper capital petit jurors’ oath. Although the record does not state that an oath was given, the sentencing order states that the jury was duly sworn. When the record does not show that the jurors were sworn, but the sentencing order reads that jurors were sworn, a rebuttable presumption exists that the trial judge properly performed his/her duties.


Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court