Street v. Street
| Docket Number: | 2004-CA-02501-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 08-29-2006 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Motion for reconsideration - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - Child custody - Albright factors - Alimony Judge(s) Concurring: King, C.J., Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ., Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-07-2004 Appealed from: Madison County Chancery Court Judge: Janace Harvey Goree Disposition: THE COURT GRANTED THE PARTIES A DIVORCE ON THE GROUND OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES, AWARDED PRIMARY CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO STEPHEN STREET, AND DIVIDED THE MARITAL ASSETS. Case Number: 2003-619 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Carla Ann Crenshaw Street |
ANNA CLAIRE WARD, WILLIAM R. WRIGHT, W. BENTON GREGG |
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| Appellee: | Stephen Edward Street | BENNY MCCALIP "MAC" MAY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Motion for reconsideration - M.R.C.P. 59(e) - Child custody - Albright factors - Alimony |
| Summary of the Facts: | Carla Street and Stephen Street were divorced on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The chancellor entered a final judgment of divorce and awarded primary physical and legal custody of the Streets' two children to Carla and ordered Stephen to pay $500 per month in alimony. Stephen filed a motion for reconsideration which the court granted. The court entered an amended judgment awarding primary physical and legal custody to Stephen and revoking Carla's alimony award. Carla appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motion for reconsideration Carla argues that the chancellor erred by considering Stephen's motion for reconsideration because it was untimely filed. A motion for reconsideration requesting a change in the result of a bench trial has been deemed to be a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 59(e). The timing of post-trial motions under Rule 59(a) and Rule 59(e) is the same; such motions must be made not later than ten days after the entry of judgment. Carla argues that Stephen's motion for reconsideration was untimely under Rule 59(e) because it was filed before the final judgment was entered rather than within ten days after the entry of the final judgment. Federal authority is settled that a Rule 59 motion is timely though filed after the court makes findings of fact but before the entry of a final judgment. Therefore, Stephen's Rule 59(e) motion was timely filed after the chancellor's rendition of her bench opinion, though before the final judgment was entered. Issue 2: Albright factors In the amended judgment, the chancellor reconsidered several of the Albright factors and concluded that the best interest of the children required Stephen to have primary custody of the couple’s children. Carla argues that the chancellor placed undue weight on her relationship with another man. Carla argues that, under the tender years doctrine, the chancellor should have found that the age, sex and health of the children favored her as the boys' mother. While the tender years presumption is an important consideration in determining custody, it is only one factor out of many in determining the custody arrangement that is in the best interest and welfare of the child. The record showed that both parents actively cared for the children, and that Stephen was adept at caring for the boys' physical needs. Thus, the chancellor's decision was not manifestly erroneous. With regard to parenting skills, Carla argues that the chancellor erred by placing weight on Carla's decision to become involved with another man because that decision impacted Carla's personal life and was not indicative of her skills as a parent. However, Carla's decision to move this man into her children's home was a decision that necessitated an exercise of parental judgment. The record fully supports the chancellor's finding that this exercise of parental judgment was a poor one. The guardian ad litem found that this man presented a clear and present risk to the children. With regard to the willingness and capacity to provide primary child care, Carla argues that the chancellor erroneously overlooked her capacity to care for the children due to her work schedule as a public schoolteacher. However, in light of the evidence concerning Carla's questionable willingness to care for the children, the chancellor did not manifestly err in finding that this factor favored Stephen. The finding that Stephen's employment was more stable was supported by the evidence that Carla had recently lost her long-term employment and had entered a new field of employment. With regard to moral fitness, the chancellor acted within her discretion in placing more weight upon Carla's adulterous relationship with another man and her ongoing co-habitation with him than upon the evidence surrounding Stephen's morally unfit behavior. The chancellor carefully weighed each Albright factor and properly exercised her discretion in determining that awarding primary custody to Stephen was in the children's best interest. Issue 3: Alimony Carla argues that the chancellor erred by altering the alimony award in the amended judgment without considering the factors from Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). While the chancellor performed an on-the-record Armstrong analysis in her original judgment, the chancellor did not perform a second on-the-record balancing of the factors in her decision to deny alimony. Nonetheless, the original and amended judgments enable a meaningful review of the chancellor's decision. The amended judgment divested Carla of primary custody and the financial responsibilities of the mortgage, home maintenance, and childcare that she was burdened with under the original judgment. It is readily apparent from the original judgment that those financial burdens were the primary reasons for the chancellor's initial alimony award, and from the amended judgment that the removal of those financial burdens was the primary reason for the denial of alimony. Thus, there is no error. |
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