Long Meadow Homeowners’ Association, Inc. v. Harland


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01775-COA
Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-01775-COA ; 2009-CT-01775-SCT ; 2009-CT-01775-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 04-26-2011
Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Real property - Subdivision covenants - Equitable estoppel - Acceptance of warranty deed
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Ishee, Roberts and Carlton, JJ.
Non Participating Judge(s): Myers and Maxwell, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Barnes, J. Without Separate Written Opinion
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 10-12-2009
Appealed from: Lafayette County Chancery Court
Judge: HON. PERCY L. LYNCHARD JR.
Disposition: Held that the Sellers of Property (Sub-Divided in Phases) Could Change the Protective Covenants as to Later Purchases
Case Number: 2007-421

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Long Meadow Homeowners' Association, Inc., William H. Arnold, Carol K. Arnold, Kenneth G. Barron, Sylvia D. Barron, Alan B. Cameron, Mary D. Cameron, Joseph B. Christman, Leah M. Christman, Clyde H. Coltharp, Mary Frances Coltharp, Rebecca Ann Culver, Tristan Denley, Kimberly Denley, Robert Byron Ellis, Suzete M. Ellis, Aubrey O'Neal Farrar, Cynthia Leigh Farrar, Charles D. Hufford, Alice C. Hufford, E. Jeff Justis, Sally V. Justis, Scott B. Lennard, Elaine A. Lennard, Timothy J. Mays, Carla Janene Mays, Glenn R. Parsons, Cheryl B. Parsons, James C. Propes, Charlotte C. Propes, Rick N. Rafinson, Bonnie S. Rafinson, Roderick N. Rafinson, Diana G. Rafinson, Jimmy Earl Shankle, Margaret Shankle, Robert C. Speth, Janet F. Speth, Allen Spurgeon, Debra Spurgeon, Julien Tatum and Christine B. Tatum




KENNETH A. RUTHERFORD



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Ernest C. Harland and Bonnie S. Harland LAWRENCE LEE LITTLE, TARA BETH SCRUGGS  

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    Topic: Real property - Subdivision covenants - Equitable estoppel - Acceptance of warranty deed

    Summary of the Facts: Ernest and Bonnie Harland purchased three lots within phase three of the Long Meadow subdivision, with the intention of building a church on the property. The Long Meadow Homeowners’ Association, Inc. objected to the building of a church and claimed that the protective covenants applicable to other lots within phases one and two of the subdivision did not permit the building of a church. The Harlands filed suit and asked the court to determine whether a church could be built on the property they had purchased. The court found in favor of the Harlands. The Homeowners’ Association appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Subdivision covenants The Homeowners’ Association argues that the covenants imposed on phase one and phase two should also apply to phase three. The Homeowners’ Association alleges that the Leavells represented to residents within the subdivision that the entirety of the property would be governed by covenants which allowed the development of only one single-family residential structure for each four acres. For the covenants imposed on phase one and phase two to apply to phase three, the covenants must be real covenants and run with the land. A covenant must meet the following criteria to run with the land: the covenanting parties must intend to create such covenant; privity of estate must exist between the person claiming right to enforce the covenant and the person upon whom the burden of covenant is to be imposed; and the covenant must touch and concern the land in question. The record provides no evidence to suggest that the Leavells intended for the covenants imposed on phase one and phase two to apply to phase three. Of the twelve lots located in phase three, nine were conveyed by a deed including a protective covenant that permitted only residential use and defined the term residential use to include churches and schools. Of those nine, five lots were conveyed by deeds that were recorded prior to the Harlands’ expression of interest in purchasing property. Two lots within phase three were conveyed with covenants that allowed the development of only one single-family residential structure for each four acres. The one remaining lot within phase three was conveyed with covenants permitting single or double-family residences. The Leavells conveyed the property to the Harlands and included a covenant in the deed that specifically permitted construction of a church on the property. The chancellor did not err in holding that the intent of the Leavells was to vary the covenants within phase three according to the individual lots. Privity of estate was not established when the Leavells sold the lots within phase three to the Harlands. The covenants imposed on phase one and phase two of the subdivision were not incident to the original conveyance between the Leavells and the Harlands. The deeds issued to the Harlands neither included nor referenced the covenants imposed on phase one and phase two. The covenants imposed on phase one and two do not touch and concern the land within phase three of the subdivision. For a covenant to touch and concern the land, it must be so related to the land as to enhance its value and confer a benefit upon it, or, conversely, impose a burden on it. The subdivision was divided into three separate phases. The three phases were developed at different times and governed by different covenants. The record does not suggest that the covenants governing phase one and two “touch and concern the land” within phase three. The Homeowners’ Association argues that the covenant in the deed from the Leavells to the Harlands should be declared null and void, insofar as it defines the term residential to mean churches and church-related structures. However, the original deed including its protective covenants was a valid conveyance from the Leavells to the Harlands, which was duly recorded. Issue 2: Equitable estoppel The Homeowners’ Association argues that the Harlands and any successive owners of lots two, three, and four should be equitably estopped from building a church or any structure besides a single-family residence on the property. To prevail on a claim of equitable estoppel, the Homeowners’ Association must prove that they changed their position in reliance upon the conduct of another, and they suffered detriment caused by that change of position in reliance upon such conduct. The chancellor held that there was a lack of reliance on behalf of the Homeowners’ Association. No covenants were recorded with respect to phase three. Instead, the Leavells conveyed each individual lot subject to covenants as deemed appropriate through negotiation. The restriction within the deeds conveying nine of the lots within phase three, allowed the construction of a church. Thus, the chancellor did not err in finding that there was no reliance. Issue 3: Warranty deed The Homeowners’ Association argues that the chancellor erred in granting the Harlands' motion to set aside the corrected warranty deed. In order for a deed to be valid, it must be both delivered to and accepted by the grantee. Because of the Homeowners’ Association’s opposition, counsel for the Homeowners’ Association prepared a proposed corrected warranty deed, which prohibited the construction of a church on the property. A copy of the proposed corrected warranty deed was provided to the Leavells, with the request that the Leavells execute and deliver the deed to the Harlands. The Leavells' attorney was notified via telephone that the Harlands did not agree to accept the terms of the proposed corrected warranty deed. Notwithstanding the Harlands’ refusal to accept the proposed corrected warranty deed, it was executed by the Leavells and filed in the land records of Lafayette County. The Harlands had no knowledge the deed was recorded. The record clearly indicates there was no acceptance of the deed by the grantee.


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