Easley v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CP-01559-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-26-2011 Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Habitual offender status - Section 99-19-81 - Illegal sentence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Procedural History: PCR Nature of the Case: PCR |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 09-11-2009 Appealed from: Calhoun County Circuit Court Judge: Andrew K. Howorth Disposition: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION COLLATERAL RELIEF DENIED Case Number: CV09-126 |
|
| Consolidated: 2010-CP-00507-COA Darrel Dewayne Easley v. State of Mississippi; Calhoun Circuit Court; LC Case #: CV09-126; Ruling Date: 02/24/2010; Ruling Judge: Andrew K. Howorth | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Darrel Dewayne Easley |
PRO SE |
||
| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LADONNA C. HOLLAND |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Habitual offender status - Section 99-19-81 - Illegal sentence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Darrel Easley pled guilty as a habitual offender to two counts of burglary of a dwelling and five counts of grand larceny. He was sentenced to twenty years with twelve years suspended and eight years to serve on each of the two burglary counts. He was sentenced to ten years with two years suspended and eight years to serve on each of the five counts of grand larceny. Easley was also placed on five years of post-release supervision. He filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was denied. He filed a second motion for post-conviction relief which was also denied. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Easley argues that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender, because he did not voluntarily enter a guilty plea as a habitual offender. He argues that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender because the word “habitual” did not appear in the plea agreement portion of his petition to enter a guilty plea at the time he signed the petition. Under each of the seven counts in Easley’s indictment, Easley was charged as a habitual offender. The language of the indictment set forth the details of Easley’s two prior felony convictions and specifically cited section 99-19-81. In his signed plea petition, Easley admits his guilt as to all the charges in the indictment, which clearly charged him as a habitual offender. Thus, the record refutes Easley’s current assertion that he was unaware he would be sentenced as a habitual offender. Easley further argues that he was improperly sentenced as a habitual offender because the State did not put on proof of his prior convictions during the plea hearing. Easley failed to raise this issue until his second motion, which is both time-barred and barred as a successive writ. In addition, Easley was properly indicted as a habitual offender. In his signed plea petition, he admitted that the charges in the indictment were correct, and he admitted that he was convicted of “burglary in Arkansas, Tennessee, and Mississippi.” Admissions to prior criminal convictions are sufficient to permit a finding of habitual status. Easley argues alternatively that, if he was properly sentenced as a habitual offender, the length of his sentence is illegal, because section 99-19-81 prohibits the suspension of any portion of a habitual offender’s sentence, and because part of his sentence was suspended, the habitual offender portion of his sentence should be removed. A defendant should not be allowed to reap the benefits of an illegal sentence, which is lighter than what the legal sentence would have been, and then turn around and attack the legality of the illegal, lighter sentence when it serves his interest to do so. Thus, Easley cannot argue that his more lenient sentence is illegal in order to circumvent procedural bars to the review of his second motion. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
