Taylor v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-01846-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01846-COA ; 2009-CT-01846-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-26-2011 Opinion Author: Roberts, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Felony DUI causing death or disfigurement - Sufficiency of indictment - Right to remain silent - Voluntariness of waiver - Admission of evidence - Authentication - M.R.E. 901(b)(1) - Lay opinion - Destruction of evidence - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee and Carlton, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes and Maxwell, JJ. Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-31-2009 Appealed from: Harrison County Circuit Court Judge: Roger T. Clark Disposition: Convicted of Felony Driving Under the Influence Causing Death and Sentenced to Eighteen Years in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections District Attorney: Cono A. Caranna, II Case Number: B2401-2008-363 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Shirley Cumberland Taylor |
CECIL GERALD WOODS JR., LESLIE S. LEE, JUSTIN TAYLOR COOK |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Felony DUI causing death or disfigurement - Sufficiency of indictment - Right to remain silent - Voluntariness of waiver - Admission of evidence - Authentication - M.R.E. 901(b)(1) - Lay opinion - Destruction of evidence - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Shirley Taylor was convicted of felony driving under the influence causing death or disfigurement. She was sentenced to eighteen years. Taylor appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of indictment Taylor argues that the indictment did not sufficiently charge her with the essential elements of the charge. According to Taylor, the indictment alleged that she was negligent only in that she was intoxicated at the time she hit and killed the victim. Taylor further argued that an indictment for DUI causing death or disfigurement must include an allegation as to the manner in which the accused was negligent, and negligence may not be based simply on the fact that the accused was intoxicated. In order for an indictment to be sufficient, it must contain the essential elements of the crime charged. It is generally sufficient that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be punished. Whether an indictment in the language of the statute is sufficient, or whether other words or acts are necessary to properly charge the commission of a crime is dependent upon the nature of the offense and the terms in which it is described by the statute. The circuit court did not err when it held that Taylor had notice of the basis for the negligence charged in the indictment. Taylor’s attorney admitted that he was aware that the prosecution was going to argue that Taylor was negligent at the time she hit and killed the victim in that she was: driving on the wrong side of the road, and she was driving twenty-three to twenty-seven miles per hour over the posted speed limit. Issue 2: Right to remain silent Taylor argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed an officer to testify regarding statements that Taylor gave after having been informed of her right to remain silent. Taylor claims that she was too intoxicated to have knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to remain silent. Whether there was an intelligent, knowing and voluntary waiver is a factual question to be determined by a trial court from the totality of the circumstances. Intoxication does not automatically render a confession involuntary. However, the degree of intoxication is a matter which may be considered by the court in making its determination as to whether a statement should be suppressed. The circuit court gave Taylor’s trial counsel an opportunity to present additional testimony during the hearing. Nevertheless, Taylor’s trial counsel did not call Taylor or any other witness who testified that Taylor was too intoxicated to have knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to remain silent. At the time the circuit court made its ruling, it had heard testimony from only the officer who testified that Taylor was not so impaired that she could not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to remain silent. Because the circuit court’s decision was factually supported by the undisputed evidence and was not in manifest error, there was no error. Issue 3: Admission of evidence Taylor argues that the circuit court should have prohibited the prosecution from presenting evidence from the black box that had been in Taylor’s pickup truck. Taylor argues that the black box was outside the scope of the search warrant that authorities obtained. A search warrant must describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Once the articles particularly described in the warrant are discovered and seized, the search must cease. Taylor’s argument is based on the premise that the search warrant authorized the seizure of two strictly limited types of evidence: biological evidence on the outside of the vehicle, linking Taylor’s vehicle to the victim and evidence in the inside of the vehicle attempting to show that Taylor was intoxicated at the time of the incident. The search warrant specifically stated that the resulting search was “[t]o include items inside the vehicle.” The language in the search warrant thus authorized the seizure of any evidence that tended to demonstrate that Taylor was intoxicated at the time she hit and killed the victim. The black box and the data within it contained information that would assist in that regard. Taylor further argues that the data within the black box should not have been admissible because the officer did not properly authenticate the report. Although he did not personally extract the data from the black box, the officer testified that he personally observed another officer extract the data. M.R.E. 901(b)(1) provides that one means to authenticate evidence is through the testimony of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be. Here, the deputy had personal knowledge that the report was what it was claimed to have been and was properly authenticated. Taylor also argues that the circuit court erred when it allowed the officer to testify, over objection, as to his lay opinion regarding the black box and the information contained within it. However, the officer merely testified regarding the means by which one extracts data from the black box and the information that was contained within the report. Aside from his opinions that the data was readily understandable, in plain English, and that no scientific knowledge was required to interpret the data, no portion of the referenced testimony that could be interpreted as prejudicial to Taylor required that the officer form an opinion – much less that he testify regarding an opinion. Issue 4: Destruction of evidence Taylor takes issue with the fact that her blood sample was not preserved for trial. The State has the duty to preserve evidence, but that duty is limited to that evidence which might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. Unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law. There was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Mississippi Crime Laboratory. A witness testified that she destroyed the blood sample ten months after testing it because the laboratory protocol dictates that, unless requested otherwise, all evidence is disposed of six months after testing. Therefore, the disposal of Taylor’s blood sample was handled in a routine manner. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the blood sample was of an exculpatory nature. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Taylor argues the evidence against her was insufficient to find her guilty of felony driving under the influence causing death or disfigurement, because the evidence failed to demonstrate that she had committed a negligent act. Taking the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the State, there certainly was sufficient evidence that Taylor’s negligent driving caused the victim’s death. It was undisputed that Taylor was driving the pickup truck when it hit the victim. Furthermore, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Taylor was driving in a negligent manner when she killed the victim. There was evidence that Taylor left her lane of travel, drifted left into the opposite lane, and continued to drift left off of Mark West Road, where she hit and killed the victim as he stood off of Mark West Road. |
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