Wilson v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-01498-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01498-COA ; 2009-CT-01498-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-26-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sexual battery - Motions in limine - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - Peremptory challenges - Jury instruction - Section 97-3-95(2) - Closing argument - Biblical reference - M.R.E. 610 - Sufficiency of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Barnes, J. Without Separate Written Opinion Concurs in Result Only: Maxwell, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 07-30-2009 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Convicted of Sexual Battery and Sentenced to Thirty Years in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections Case Number: 06-0-401 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Joseph Johnett Wilson |
GEORGE T. HOLMES |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: SCOTT STUART |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sexual battery - Motions in limine - M.R.E. 401 - M.R.E. 403 - Peremptory challenges - Jury instruction - Section 97-3-95(2) - Closing argument - Biblical reference - M.R.E. 610 - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Joseph Wilson was convicted of sexual battery and sentenced to thirty years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Motions in limine A motion in limine should be granted only when the trial court finds two factors are present: the material or evidence in question will be inadmissible at a trial under the rules of evidence; and the mere offer, reference, or statements made during trial concerning the material will tend to prejudice the jury. The State first filed a motion in limine to prohibit Wilson from making any reference to his pretrial incarceration and also to prohibit Wilson from testifying as to what sentence he stood to receive if convicted. The State’s first motion was undisputed by Wilson. The State filed its second motion in limine to prohibit Wilson from introducing any testimony concerning the victim’s past sexual behavior. Wilson agreed not to introduce such evidence. The third motion in limine filed by the State sought to exclude all testimony relating to his daughter’s alleged boyfriend. Wilson objected arguing that the witnesses’ testimonies supported his theory that his daughter had accused Wilson of rape in retaliation for his disciplining and interfering with her relationship with her boyfriend. The trial court granted the State’s motion in limine finding that the proposed evidence by the defendant was not relevant under M.R.E. 401. Wilson provided no evidence of any plan or conspiracy between the victim and her boyfriend against Wilson. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling on the State’s third motion in limine. The trial court abused no discretion in excluding Wilson’s evidence showing his sexual responses when previously stimulated by his former wife during their sexual activities. This past sexual relationship was not at issue in this case; thus, the purported evidence lacked relevancy to the issue in the case at hand, Wilson’s sexual conduct with his minor daughter. In addition, the record supports the trial court’s finding that in addition to Rule 401, M.R.E. 403 applied to exclude the evidence. Issue 2: Peremptory challenges Wilson argues that the trial court erred in finding during jury selection that his peremptory strikes were insufficiently race neutral. The record shows that Wilson used his first peremptory strike against a Caucasian, claiming that he struck this juror because the juror’s wife was a school teacher in the Hinds County school district. The court did not err in determining that the State provided sufficient grounds to challenge Wilson’s purported nondiscriminatory purpose for the peremptory challenge by stating that the status of employment of a juror’s spouse failed to constitute a sufficient race-neutral justification. Wilson exercised his second peremptory challenge against a Caucasian on the basis that the juror’s spouse worked as an attorney. Wilson’s challenge as to this juror lacked credibility in the context of this case since Wilson had previously accepted an attorney as a juror during the jury-selection process. Wilson utilized a peremptory challenge on a Caucasian on the ground of his youthful age of twenty-one years old. While the trial judge did not first articulate whether the reason of inexperience and youthful age constituted a race neutral reason on its face, a review of the record shows that the trial judge found Wilson’s race-neutral justification insufficient. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s findings as to the Batson challenges raised by Wilson and no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s findings as to the challenges raised by the State in the context of the facts of this case. Issue 3: Jury instruction Wilson argues that one of the jury instructions improperly stated the law due to its peremptory effect on the element of whether Wilson possessed a position of trust or authority over the victim. Wilson argues that the law requires proof of a fiduciary position and authority, in addition to proof of his status as a parent. The instruction tracks the language of section 97-3-95(2), the statute under which Wilson was convicted, and is sufficient. Moreover, the State bears no burden in proving that the defendant actually cared for or controlled the minor victim in order to sustain a conviction for a charge of sexual battery in violation of section 97-3-95(2). Issue 4: Closing argument Wilson argues that the trial court erred by ruling that Wilson’s biblical references during the closing argument were improper. M.R.E. 610 prohibits the use of a witness’s beliefs on religious matters for the purpose of attacking or enhancing credibility. The trial judge holds the best position to make a determination as to whether the alleged objectionable remark has a prejudicial effect on the jury. Wilson sought to reference a biblical passage in his closing argument for an evidentiary purpose of attacking his daughter’s credibility by using the conduct of Lot’s daughters from the Bible. Wilson stated that the point of the biblical reference was to show that a daughter can sexually overcome the father. Wilson improperly sought to use this biblical reference in his closing argument solely for an evidentiary purpose. No evidence had been introduced at trial to argue such as a reasonable inference. Issue 5: Sufficiency of evidence Wilson argues that the verdict was not supported by the evidence. The parties presented the jury with two varying theories on how Wilson’s DNA arrived inside of his daughter’s vagina. The victim and her father, the only witnesses to the event, both testified to the jury about what happened on the night in question. The jury considered the evidence and testimony presented by both parties and reached their verdict based on this information. The credibility of witness testimony is the province of the jury. |
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