Harden v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-00141-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-21-2011 Opinion Author: Chandler, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Statutory rape - Continuance - Mental evaluation - URCCC 9.06 - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Motion to suppress - Coerced confession instruction - Weight of evidence Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar and Pierce, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): King, J. Dissenting Author : Kitchens, J. With Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-16-2008 Appealed from: DeSoto County Circuit Court Judge: Robert P. Chamberlin Disposition: Convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to twenty (20) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with ten (10) years post-release supervision, five (5) years reporting, and five (5) years non-reporting with conditions District Attorney: John W. Champion Case Number: CR2007-401CD |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Timmy Terrell Harden a/k/a Timmy Hardin |
OFFICE OF INDIGENT APPEALS: GEORGE T. HOLMES |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: BILLY L. GORE |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Statutory rape - Continuance - Mental evaluation - URCCC 9.06 - Ineffective assistance of counsel - M.R.A.P. 22(b) - Motion to suppress - Coerced confession instruction - Weight of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | Timmy Harden was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to twenty years, followed by ten years on post-release supervision, with five years reporting. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Mental evaluation Harden argues that the trial court should have granted his two motions for a continuance and ordered a mental evaluation. The decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance will not be grounds for reversal unless shown to have resulted in manifest injustice. URCCC 9.06 provides that if before or during trial the court has reasonable ground to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial the court shall order the defendant to submit to a mental examination by some competent psychiatrist selected by the court. The rule further provides that, after the examination, the trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant is competent to stand trial. On review, the pertinent question is whether the trial judge received information which, objectively considered, should reasonably have raised a doubt about defendant’s competence and alerted him to the possibility that the defendant could neither understand the proceedings, appreciate their significance, nor rationally aid his attorney in his defense. The trial court denied Harden’s first motion for a continuance because the case already had been continued twice at Harden’s request, discovery was complete, and every opportunity had been given to bring forth the motion to suppress. At that point, Harden’s attorney had not requested a mental evaluation. When the trial court denied Harden’s second motion for a continuance, the trial court determined that insufficient grounds were before the court at that time to warrant a mental evaluation. There was no manifest injustice resulted from the trial court’s ruling. At that point in the proceedings, the trial court had received scant information concerning Harden’s mental state. Harden also complains that the trial court erred by denying his subsequent motion for a mental evaluation. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Harden entered a petition to plead guilty, but he had difficulty responding to questioning by the trial court. He stated that he did not understand the contents of the plea petition. The trial court allowed his attorney to review the petition with him again. However, after the review, Harden again said he did not understand. Harden’s mother informed the court that Harden has difficulty understanding concepts. The trial court refused to accept his guilty plea. Harden moved for a mental evaluation, arguing that, because he was mentally incapable of participating in the plea proceedings, a mental evaluation was necessary to determine his competency to stand trial. The court carefully considered all the evidence of Harden’s mental state that was available and had determined that no reasonable ground existed to believe Harden was incompetent to stand trial. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination. Issue 2: Ineffective assistance of counsel Harden argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to move for a mental evaluation before the trial date. M.R.A.P. 22(b) states that issues which may be raised in post-conviction proceedings may also be raised on direct appeal if such issues are based on facts fully apparent from the record. But if the appellant is represented by counsel who did not represent the appellant at trial, the failure to raise such issues on direct appeal shall constitute a waiver barring consideration of the issue in post-conviction proceedings. Harden argues that this issue is ripe for appellate review because it is apparent from the record that counsel’s failure to move for a mental evaluation earlier than the day of trial prejudiced him. However, the trial court’s ruling shows that, although the trial court was displeased with the timing of the motion, the reason the court denied the motion was that Harden had failed to present evidence sufficient to convince the court that Harden required a mental evaluation under Rule 9.06. This implicates Harden’s other ineffectiveness argument, which is that counsel should have investigated Harden’s mental state more thoroughly before filing the motion. There is no way to know what additional evidence would have revealed based solely on the appellate record. Therefore, this argument is dismissed without prejudice to Harden’s ability to raise it on post-conviction relief. Issue 3: Motion to suppress Prior to trial, Harden moved to suppress his tape-recorded confession on the grounds that it was not freely and voluntarily given, or was given in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Harden renews both grounds for suppression on appeal. For a confession to be voluntary, it must have been freely given and must not be the product of coercion by threats, promises, or inducements. The State bears the burden to prove a confession was voluntary. Voluntariness may be established through testimony from officers or those who may have specific knowledge of the facts that the confession was made without any threats, offers of reward, or coercion. Harden argues that the detective’s mention of spiritual matters during the interrogation coerced his confession. Whether an interrogator’s statement was an inducement, as opposed to a mere exhortation, generally depends on the circumstances surrounding the confession, such as the defendant’s youth, good reputation, lack of familiarity with the criminal justice system, and relationship with or trust in the interrogating officers. The defendant’s mental abilities are but one factor to be considered. In the audiotaped confession, Harden repeatedly denied that anything had happened with the victim, before he finally confessed. The trial court noted the detective’s testimony that Harden had been emotional, that he had understood what was being asked, and that he had understood his rights. The trial court held that the statements regarding religion did not amount to coercion. The court found that there was nothing to indicate Harden did not understand what was going on, that he had a particular susceptibility to religious matters, or that he was overcome due to a lack of mental capacity. Harden was thirty-four years old. Although he was not familiar with the criminal justice system, nothing showed he had a specific relationship with or trust in the detective. During the interview, the detective repeatedly encouraged Harden to own up to his actions. He did not tell Harden that he would receive forgiveness from the criminal justice system, but instead told him he would receive forgiveness from God according to Harden’s own expressed belief that God forgives all. Harden did not confess until after the detective had told him that forensic evidence would prove Harden’s guilt. The trial court was within its discretion in finding from the contents of the tape-recorded interview that Harden’s mental condition did not render the confession involuntary. Harden also argues that he invoked his right to counsel by repeating that right after it was read to him by the detective. There is a bright-line rule that, once an accused has requested counsel during the interrogation process, interrogation must cease, and the accused may not be questioned further without an attorney being present, unless the accused voluntarily initiates communication. The right to an attorney must be specifically invoked. Harden merely repeated one of his rights after it was read to him, then stated he could not afford counsel. He did not ask for counsel; nor did he even ambiguously ask for counsel. At no time did Harden expressly request the presence of counsel. The fact that Harden has never argued that his statement, “I can’t afford no lawyer,” invoked his right to counsel strongly indicates Harden did not intend to invoke the right. Thus, the trial court did not manifestly err in denying the motion to suppress Harden’s confession on this ground. Issue 4: Coerced confession instruction A defendant is entitled to jury instructions on his theory of the case whenever there is evidence that would support a jury’s finding on that theory. However, a trial court may refuse a jury instruction when it is an incorrect statement of law, is fairly covered in other instructions, or has no foundation in the evidence. Harden argues that the trial court erred by denying one of his proposed instructions. However, the instruction erroneously asked the jury to determine whether Harden’s confession was coerced. The matter of whether the confession was coerced was for determination by the trial court on the motion to suppress; it was not a matter for the jury. Issue 5: Weight of evidence Harden argues that, due to inconsistencies in the victim’s statements, the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Harden also argues that there was no physical evidence supporting the conviction, that his confession was involuntary, and that there are continuing questions about his mental capacity. The evidence did not preponderate so heavily against the verdict as to cause an unconscionable injustice. Although there were conflicts in the victim’s statements, in every statement, she consistently maintained that Harden had had sexual intercourse with her on the day before Thanksgiving in 2006. In addition to her testimony and prior statements, the jury was confronted with both Harden’s confession that he had had sex with the victim, and the results of the physical examination of the victim, which revealed recent blunt penetrating trauma. |
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