Bergeron v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-01722-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-19-2011 Opinion Author: Barnes, J. Holding: Reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Post-conviction relief - Habitual offender status - Section 99-19-81 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Ishee, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Concur in Part, Concur in Result 1: Roberts, J. Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: PCR; Dismissal Nature of the Case: PCR |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-01-2009 Appealed from: Adams County Circuit Court Judge: Forrest Johnson Disposition: Motion for Post-Conviction Relief Dismissed Case Number: 09-KV-0025-J |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | James Lynwood Bergeron |
DANIEL WESLEY KITCHENS |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Post-conviction relief - Habitual offender status - Section 99-19-81 |
| Summary of the Facts: | James Bergeron pled guilty in 2002 to the charges of possession of a weapon and stolen property and was sentenced to three years and five years, respectively, with the sentences to run consecutively without reduction, suspension, or probation. That same year, Bergeron was convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter. He was given the maximum sentence of twenty years based on his classification as a habitual offender. This sentence was ordered to run consecutively to the eight years resulting from his guilty-plea sentences. Bergeron’s conviction was upheld on direct appeal. In 2009, the Mississippi Supreme Court partially granted Bergeron’s application for leave to seek post-conviction relief on the sole issue of his classification as a habitual offender. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied Bergeron’s motion for post-conviction relief, and Bergeron appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Bergeron argues that the circuit court erred in sentencing him as a habitual offender under section 99-19-81, because his two Georgia convictions were not separately brought and did not arise out of separate incidents and different times. Both charges were brought in a single indictment. Both convictions arose from a series of acts committed by Bergeron on December 13, 1993, when he broke into a car dealership, stole a set of keys, and used the keys to take an automobile from the lot. Bergeron stole the keys solely to obtain the vehicle, and these actions happened within minutes of one another. A prior offense may be considered under the statute even if it occurred on the same day as the instant offense as long as the two charges arose from separate incidents. It would seem that the events should be sufficiently separate that the offender’s criminal passions may have cooled so that he has time to reflect, and if after such an interval the individual forms and actualizes a new criminal design, and then does so a third time, he should be met with all of the power of the public force. Conversely, two offenses committed in rapid succession do not suggest the same repetitiveness of criminal design such that the offender may be thought predictably habitual thereafter, or deserving of severe sanction. Bergeron broke into the car dealer’s office, stole a set of keys, and used the keys to take the car from the dealer. There was only one victim and one intent, to steal a car. Thus, Bergeron’s two 1993 Georgia convictions – burglary and theft by taking – arose from the same incident. As such, they cannot alone support his habitual-offender status. The State argues that, even if the two Georgia convictions could not be counted separately, the two felonies for which Bergeron pled guilty immediately prior to trial would support his status as a habitual offender. However, as section 99-19-81 states, the convictions supporting the habitual-offender classification must be brought separately and arise “out of separate incidents at different times.” The record shows that the two guilty pleas – possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a stolen motor vehicle – arose out of the same incident that resulted in Bergeron’s manslaughter conviction. The circuit judge correctly stated that he would not consider these convictions for the purposes of Bergeron’s habitual-offender status. Thus, the record does not support Bergeron’s status as a habitual offender. |
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