City of Jackson v. Rhaly
| Docket Number: | 2009-CA-00350-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-CA-00350-COA2009-CT-00350-SCT2009-CT-00350-SCT2009-CT-00350-SCT |
|
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-19-2011 Opinion Author: Ishee, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Property damage - Discovery violation - Dismissal of case - M.R.C.P. 37 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Barnes, Roberts and Carlton, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Myers, J. Dissenting Author : Irving, P.J. With Separate Written Opinion Dissent Joined By : Griffis, P.J. and Maxwell, J. Procedural History: Default Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - PROPERTY DAMAGE |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 05-14-2008 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: Answer Stricken, Default Judgment Awarded Case Number: 251-04-1214-CIV |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | City of Jackson, Mississippi |
PIETER JOHN TEEUWISSEN, CLAIRE BARKER HAWKINS |
|
|
| Appellee: | Myrt Naylor Rhaly, and sons, Henry Crawford Rhaly, Jr., John Thomas Rhaly, William Dewitt Rhaly, Bill Alan Wilson, and wife, Linda Gay Wilson, Mary Sue Creel, Hilda Louise Ferron and Amy Jo Baxter | WILLIAM JOSEPH KERLEY, JOHN G. CLARK | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Property damage - Discovery violation - Dismissal of case - M.R.C.P. 37 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Myrt Naylor Rhaly, Henry Crawford Rhaly Jr., John Thomas Rhaly, William DeWitt Rhaly, Bill Alan Wilson, Linda Gay Wilson, Mary Sue Creel, Hilda Louise Ferron, and Amy Jo Baxter were owners of property in Jackson, located near Eubank’s Creek, an improved drainage ditch. The Rhalys brought suit against the City of Jackson, alleging that its failure to maintain the ditch had caused their properties to flood on two separate occasions. Shortly before trial, the trial court struck the City’s answer for a discovery violation. The Rhalys were awarded a default judgment, and the City appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | M.R.C.P. 37 is designed to vest with the trial court great latitude in deciding when and what sanctions will be imposed for a discovery violation. Dismissal is to be used as a sanction only as a last resort. Dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court's order results from wilfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply. Dismissal is proper only in a situation where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Another consideration is whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party's simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders. The City argues that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding the “death penalty” sanction. Its principal argument is that the discovery response at issue was not, in fact, false. It also claims that the manual was disclosed in discovery and promised to be produced, but, as a result of a simple oversight, was never actually produced. Clearly, the City’s initial response falsely stated that there were no standard operating procedures. It was followed by a supplemental response that specifically and unequivocally stated: “There was no standard operating procedure which governed water quantity control in the City of Jackson at the time of the incident.” This was also false. Acknowledging this, the City contends that the supplemental response must be considered in its entirety. It claims that the last two sentences contain a “clear reference” to the manual and a promise that it would be produced. The City’s response did mention an “Operations and Maintenance Manual,” but if this is a reference to the manual at issue, it is not a clear one. The response describes the manual only as having been “prepared for water quality requirements of the EPA.” Not only did this fail to inform the Rhalys of its relevance (since water quality was not at issue in the Rhalys’ suit), but if it is describing the manual at issue, that description appears to be inaccurate. The manual says almost nothing about “water quality,” and the record contains no reason to believe it was prepared for the EPA. The maintenance it discusses pertains almost exclusively to controlling erosion and keeping the City’s drainage system free of obstructions. If anything, the manual appears to address water “quantity” rather than “quality” as claimed in the response. Additionally, contrary to the City’s contention, it is plain that the document the City stated would be produced in its response is not the manual, but the “Storm Water Drainage Maintenance Plan,” which was not relevant because it was adopted after the floods at issue. The City asserts, correctly, that the trial court was required to find that its discovery failure was a product of wilfulness in order to support the severe sanction of dismissal. The trial court specifically found that there was no evidence the City had intentionally concealed the manual, and the City argues that this precludes a finding of wilfulness. A finding of willfulness may be based upon either a willful, intentional, and bad faith attempt to conceal evidence or a gross indifference to discovery obligations. The trial court specifically found that the City’s false response, though not proven to be intentional, reflected at least a “gross indifference to discovery obligations.” The City argues that the trial court did not have the authority to order a sanction under Rule 37 without first entertaining a motion to compel discovery. This argument is plainly without merit. While some of the language in Rule 37 does suggest that sanctions may only be awarded following an order compelling discovery, Rule 37(e) has no such requirement. Moreover, the trial court possesses the inherent authority to dismiss a case as part of its power to control its own docket. The trial court concluded that lesser sanctions would not suffice. This has not been shown to be an abuse of discretion. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
