Jernigan v. Young
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00304-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-19-2011 Opinion Author: Griffis, P.J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Real property - Reopening divorce - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Section 93-5-2 - UCCR 8.05 - Validity of conveyances - Inter vivos deed of gift - Oral trust agreement - Section 91-9-1 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving, P.J., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts, Carlton and Maxwell, JJ. Procedural History: Summary Judgment Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-13-2010 Appealed from: Monroe County Chancery Court Judge: Talmadge Littlejohn Disposition: Summary Judgment in Favor of Amy Young Case Number: 2001-319 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Samuel D. Jernigan |
DONALD W. MEDLEY |
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| Appellee: | Amy Young | LUANNE STARK THOMPSON | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Real property - Reopening divorce - M.R.C.P. 60(b) - Section 93-5-2 - UCCR 8.05 - Validity of conveyances - Inter vivos deed of gift - Oral trust agreement - Section 91-9-1 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Samuel Jernigan sought to recover a parcel of real property that he had previously conveyed to his then wife, Mae Bell Jernigan, who had conveyed it to her daughter, Amy Young. Samuel attempted to have the chancery court set aside the judgment in his divorce from Mae Bell in an effort to reopen the property division. Samuel also attempted to set aside the two deeds of conveyance. The chancery court found that Amy was the rightful owner of the property and that summary judgment against Samuel was proper. Samuel appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Reopening divorce Samuel’s motion to set aside the original divorce decree, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(b), asked the chancellor to reopen the divorce judgment. Samuel argues that an irreconcilable-differences divorce should not have been granted because he did not consent to it. Pursuant to section 93-5-2(5), both spouses must consent to an irreconcilable-differences divorce. However, wavering on whether a divorce should be entered may often occur and does not invalidate the divorce. What is important is that agreement be validly expressed on the day that the chancellor is considering the issue. Relief under Rule 60(b) requires a showing of exceptional circumstances. Samuel has not carried that burden here. On the day the chancellor entered the decree, the chancellor had no reason to believe that Samuel did not consent. Samuel also argues that the chancellor erred when he entered the divorce decree without holding a hearing. Section 93-5-2(4) provides that, when there are no disputed issues to be decided by the chancellor, a joint complaint for an irreconcilable-differences divorce shall be taken as proved and a final judgment entered thereon, as in other cases and without proof or testimony. There is no authority to support Samuel’s argument that a hearing was necessary before a judgment could be entered. Samuel also argues that the chancellor erred when he incorporated Samuel and Mae Bell’s property-settlement agreement into the divorce decree without finding the agreement to be “adequate and sufficient” as required by section 93-5-2(2). While the chancellor did not recite that he found the agreement “adequate and sufficient,” that is not a magic phrase, and the absence of it is not a ground for reversal. Samuel argues the chancellor committed reversible error when he failed to require Samuel and Mae Bell to submit financial-disclosure statements pursuant to Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05. A chancellor’s failure to require such statements is not necessarily reversible error. If the lack of disclosure allowed one spouse to conceal major assets, it could be reversible error. Samuel makes no argument that Mae Bell was allowed to conceal major assets. Issue 2: Validity of conveyances Samuel makes a two-pronged attack on the quitclaim deed to Mae Bell and the warranty deed to Amy. He argues that both conveyances are invalid because they were not supported by consideration. He also argues that he and Mae Bell had an enforceable oral agreement, whereby she would hold the property in trust and deed it back to him at a later date. That agreement, Samuel contends, precluded Mae Bell from deeding the property to Amy. Samuel’s argument with regard to consideration fails because Mississippi law recognizes inter vivos deeds of gift. With regard to his allegation of an oral trust agreement, Samuel’s argument fails because section 91-9-1 does not recognize oral trusts in land. In the proper circumstances, equity may impose a constructive or resulting trust on the legal owner of real property despite the absence of a written trust agreement. However, that specific argument was never presented to the chancellor or raised on appeal. Since the conveyances to Mae Bell and Amy were valid and Amy is the rightful owner of the property, Samuel has no claim to the property and no basis for the lis pendens notice. |
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