McDonald v. King
| Docket Number: | 2010-CA-00688-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-19-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Eminent domain - Application for private road - Scope of eminent domain court - Section 65-7-201 - Section 11-27-3 - Section 9-9-1 - Standard - Reasonableness Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Procedural History: Dismissal Nature of the Case: CIVIL - EMINENT DOMAIN |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 10-08-2009 Appealed from: Rankin County Special Court of Eminent Domain Judge: Kent McDaniel Disposition: Dismissed Appellants' Application for a Private Road Case Number: 2008-1594 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | Brief(s) Available: | ||
| Appellant: | Anse Gerald McDonald and Laureen J. McDonald |
JOHN DENVER FIKE |
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| Appellee: | Jerry King | MARK C. BAKER SR. | ||
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Eminent domain - Application for private road - Scope of eminent domain court - Section 65-7-201 - Section 11-27-3 - Section 9-9-1 - Standard - Reasonableness |
| Summary of the Facts: | Anse and Laureen McDonald own approximately eighty acres of land in Simpson County, and this property is also accessible from Rankin County. Jerry King owns land in Rankin County, which adjoins Moncure Road, a public road located north of the McDonalds’ land in Simpson County. King’s property has access to Moncure Road by way of an existing driveway on his property. In 2008, the McDonalds filed a complaint for the removal of obstruction of an easement through a portion of King’s land, which would allow Anse to haul sand from his property using eighteen-wheeler trucks for the purposes of operating his commercial mining business. The court held that the McDonalds did not possess an easement across King’s property. The McDonalds then filed a complaint in the Special Court of Eminent Domain, seeking to establish a private road through a portion of King’s land for ingress and egress. The McDonalds claimed that without an easement across King’s property, they are landlocked from accessing their property. The Special Court of Eminent Domain dismissed the McDonalds’ petition without prejudice. The McDonalds appeal. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Scope of eminent domain court The McDonalds argue that the Special Court of Eminent Domain acted outside of its scope and power by improperly acting as an appellate court, instead of determining the case on its merits. Section 65-7-201, as amended in 2003, instructs the Special Court of Eminent Domain to determine the reasonableness of the petitioner’s application for a private road. Section 11-27-3, which created the Special Court of Eminent Domain, establishes that the original powers and jurisdiction shall be and is hereby fixed in the county court in each county that has elected to come under the provisions of section 9-9-1. The McDonalds argue that the court simply relied on the assertions of the Rankin County Board of Supervisors. However, the procedural history in the record shows no decision by the Rankin County Board of Supervisors, nor any review of such decision by the Special Court of Eminent Domain. The court conducted a bifurcated trial as required by section 65-7-201 and determined the case on its merits, finding insufficient evidence that a route across King’s property was reasonably necessary for ingress or egress to McDonalds’ property. Issue 2: Standard The McDonalds argue that not only did the 2003 amendment to section 65-7-201 transfer the forum for eminent-domain proceedings, but it also changed the procedure for such proceedings. Prior to the 2003 amendment, the private-way statute held that a person desiring the establishment of a private road should apply by petition, and then the board of supervisors should determine the reasonableness of the application based on the facts and reasons stated in the petition. The amended version now states that a special court of eminent domain shall determine reasonableness based on the facts and reasons stated by the petitioner, and it also states that the case shall proceed as nearly as possibly as provided in Title 11, Chapter 27 for the condemnation of private property for public use. In cases falling under the purview of section 65-7-201, the Mississippi Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “necessary for ingress and egress” as reasonably necessary and not absolutely necessary. Additionally, the petitioner carries the burden of proving the proposed private road is reasonably necessary. Despite the McDonalds’ allegations, the record shows that the court heard testimony regarding the reasonableness and existence of other possible alternative routes across and also south of King’s property. The trial judge listened to testimony from the parties and their witnesses before dismissing the McDonalds’ petition. After considering this evidence, the trial judge determined that the alternate route proposed by King provided reasonable access to the McDonalds’ property; hence, the McDonalds’ suggested route across King’s property was not necessary for ingress or egress to the McDonalds’ property based upon the evidence presented. The trial judge utilized the proper standard for determining reasonableness in the bifurcated hearing. |
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