Spahn v. Spahn


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Docket Number: 2005-CA-00368-COA
Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-00368-COA ; 2005-CT-00368-SCT

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 09-26-2006
Opinion Author: King, C.J.
Holding: Affirmed

Additional Case Information: Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Child support - Division of marital property - Medical insurance - Attorney’s fees
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ.
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 11-01-2004
Appealed from: Tate County Chancery Court
Judge: Percy L. Lynchard, Jr.
Disposition: CHANCELLOR ENTERED JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE DIVIDING MARITAL PROPERTY, ORDERING CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY.
Case Number: 03-3-79

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: Daughn Spahn




T. SWAYZE ALFORD



 

Appellee: Joseph Gilbert Spahn H. R. GARNER  

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Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Child support - Division of marital property - Medical insurance - Attorney’s fees

Summary of the Facts: Daughn Spahn filed for divorce from Joseph Spahn. The parties agreed to proceed with an irreconcilable differences divorce but left the issues of equitable distribution of marital assets, child support, alimony, and attorneys’ fees to be decided by the chancellor. Daughn appeals from the chancellor’s decision.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Child support Daughn argues that the chancellor erred in accepting at face value Joseph’s Rule 8.05 financial declaration to calculate child support, because the figure submitted and accepted was artificially low for the sole proprietor of a business with a gross annual business income of $1,421,873. The chancellor’s finding of Joseph’s adjusted gross income for purposes of calculating child support was based on the substantial credible evidence provided by Joseph’s Rule 8.05 financial statement, Joseph’s 2003 federal tax return, Joseph’s testimony, and the court-appointed CPA’s testimony. In addition, the chancellor correctly applied section 43-19-103 in determining the amount of child support. Issue 2: Division of marital property Daughn argues that the chancellor’s division of marital property was erroneous with respect to Spahn House and its contents, the life insurance policies, Joseph’s IRA, and a number of other assets and with respect to classification of the warehouse and lot on Tate Street and the house on Camille Street as Joseph’s non-marital property. Assets acquired or accumulated during the course of a marriage are subject to equitable division unless it can be shown by proof that such assets are attributable to one of the parties’ separate estates prior to the marriage or outside the marriage. Because Joseph acquired the warehouse prior to the marriage and did not commingle the proceeds from the warehouse, nor use the warehouse for family purposes, the chancellor was correct in classifying the warehouse as Joseph’s nonmarital property. Although the Camille Street property was purchased after the parties separated but during the course of the marriage, the record reveals that it was not acquired through their joint efforts. Thus, the chancellor was correct in classifying the Camille Street house as Joseph’s non-marital property. Even were the chancellor’s classification were considered to be error, it would be harmless error since the value of this property is exceeded by the outstanding mortgage. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, the chancellor assigned value to each item of marital property, and determined that the total value of all marital property was $434,063.50. The chancellor awarded Daughn Spahn House and its contents, 100 shares of First Tennessee stock, and a one-half interest in the AIM mutual funds, for a total award of $211,196.50 of the marital property. Joseph was awarded M&R Construction, the Protective Life Policy, the Jefferson Pilot policy, the Guardian Life policy, one-half of the AIM account, and 100 shares of First Tennessee stock, for a total award of $222,867. Equitable distribution does not require equal distribution. The chancellor conducted a sufficient Ferguson analysis, made findings supported by substantial credible evidence, and equitably divided the marital property. Daughn also argues that the chancellor erred in failing to address several items of personal property which Joseph possessed and which Daughn claims are marital assets. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in allowing each party to retain the remaining personal property in their respective possessions. Issue 3: Medical insurance Daughn argues that the chancellor erred by failing to require Joseph to pay for her medical insurance coverage. If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse’s non-marital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more need be done. Not only did Daughn receive $211,196.50 of assets in the distribution of marital property, or forty-eight percent of the marital estate, but also she received an award of $56,835.25 in lump sum alimony. Additionally, Daughn presented no proof of any special medical needs that she may have. Issue 4: Attorney’s fees Daughn argues that she accumulated $49,000 in attorney’s fees, and that she received no liquid assets in the equitable distribution from which she could pay her attorney’s fees. If a party is financially capable of paying his or her own attorney’s fees, that party should do so. The chancellor’s decision is supported by substantial credible evidence. Daughn received an award of lump sum alimony, 100 shares of First Tennessee stock, and Spahn House, a potentially income-producing business.


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