Crutcher v. State
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-01819-COA Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01819-COA ; 2009-CT-01819-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-12-2011 Opinion Author: Carlton, J. Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Sale of cocaine - Mistrial - Right to remain silent - Authentication of videotape - M.R.E. 901(b)(1) - Chain of custody - Habitual offender status - Section 99-19-81 - Section 41-29-147 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Ishee, Roberts and Maxwell, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: Barnes, J. Without Separate Written Opinion Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 11-05-2009 Appealed from: Desoto County Circuit Court Judge: Robert P. Chamberlin Disposition: Convicted of Sale of a Controlled Substance and Sentenced to Sixty Years in the Custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections as a Habitual and Subsequent Offender Without Eligibility for Parole or Probation District Attorney: John W. Champion Case Number: 2007-989-CD |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Anthony Crutcher |
GEORGE T. HOLMES |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: STEPHANIE BRELAND WOOD |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Sale of cocaine - Mistrial - Right to remain silent - Authentication of videotape - M.R.E. 901(b)(1) - Chain of custody - Habitual offender status - Section 99-19-81 - Section 41-29-147 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Anthony Crutcher was convicted of selling cocaine and was sentenced to sixty years. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Mistrial Crutcher argues that the State, when conducting voir dire, improperly commented on his right to remain silent and not to testify. The trial court must declare a mistrial when there is an error in the proceedings resulting in substantial and irreparable prejudice to the defendant’s case. Any reference to a defendant’s failure to testify, implying that such failure is improper or indicating that the defendant is guilty, is improper. Even if an error occurs, such comment is deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the evidence of guilt is so overwhelming that the jury would have returned a guilty verdict in spite of the prosecutor’s comment. In this case, there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in denying Crutcher’s motion for a mistrial. The prosecutor simply remarked that the “defense is never required to put on any witnesses” and did not speak to Crutcher’s failure to testify nor his right to remain silent. Issue 2: Authentication of videotape Crutcher argues that the trial court erred in allowing the videotape of the drug sale into evidence, arguing that the State failed to lay a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the evidence in accordance with M.R.E. 901(b)(1). In order for a videotape to be entered into evidence through a witness, it must be authenticated by someone who can testify that the events on the tape accurately depict the transaction as it occurred on the day in question. The State presented testimony from two officers to authenticate the videotape in this case. While they were not at the actual property address while the drug transaction was occurring, the record shows that the officers’ testimonies satisfied the authentication requirements of Rule 901(b)(1). They testified to the following: their officers placed the audio/video recording devices on the confidential informant’s person, as well as the vehicle employed by the CI during the operation; they were familiar with the scene; and they listened by audio device to the drug transaction as it occurred. Issue 3: Chain of custody Crutcher argues that the chain of custody for the cocaine was insufficient; thus, the trial court should have excluded the evidence. The test for the continuous possession, i.e., chain of custody, of evidence is whether or not there is any indication or reasonable inference of probable tampering with the evidence or substitution of the evidence. The record shows that Crutcher raised no evidence or reasonable inference to support the assertion that the cocaine was tampered with or that a substitution of the evidence occurred. Therefore, Crutcher failed to meet his burden of proof to establish a break in the chain of custody to overcome the presumption of regularity. In addition, the two officers testified to the chain of custody for the drug evidence. Crutcher also argues that a proper chain of custody was not established because the cocaine was not entered into a secure vault until a week after the drug sale. This argument is unsupported by the evidence in the record. Issue 4: Habitual offender status Crutcher argues that his prior convictions failed to meet the requirements of a section 99-19-81 habitual offender and that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Crutcher failed to raise the issue regarding his sentence at the sentencing phase; therefore, he is procedurally barred from raising it on appeal. In addition, an individual is not required to have actually served any prison time in order to be sentenced as a habitual offender, and time served in a workhouse sufficiently satisfies the statutory requirements of section 99-19-81. Crutcher’s prior convictions are: Cause No. 94-10135 in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to sell, sentenced to one year in the workhouse, and Cause No. 94-04728 in the Criminal Court of Shelby County, Tennessee, sale of cocaine, sentenced to three years in the workhouse. Thus, each of Crutcher’s prior felony convictions satisfies the statutory requirement of serving time in a penal institution. Crutcher also argues that the enhanced sentence of sixty years, imposed for committing repeated drug offenses, constitutes a life sentence. Generally, a sentence should not be disturbed on appeal so long as it does not exceed the maximum allowed by statute. Crutcher’s sentence complies with section 41-29-147 and with section 99-19-81. |
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