DENHAM v. HOLMES
| Docket Number: | 2008-CT-01933-SCT Linked Case(s): 2008-CA-01933-COA ; 2008-CA-01933-COA ; 2008-CT-01933-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-07-2011 Opinion Author: Presiding Justice Carlson Holding: Court of Appeals affirmed; Circuit Court reversed and remanded. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Personal injury - Jury instructions - Closing arguments - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.E. 403 |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Personal injury - Jury instructions - Closing arguments - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - M.R.E. 403 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Paula Denham and Pamela Caldwell filed a complaint against Adam Holmes, alleging that Holmes had negligently operated his motor vehicle, resulting in an accident in which they were injured. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Holmes. Denham and Caldwell appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Jury instructions A defendant generally is entitled to an instruction which presents his side of the case; however, such instruction must correctly state the law. Furthermore, it would be error to grant an instruction which is likely to mislead or confuse the jury as to the principles of law applicable to the facts in evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the trial judge erred when, over objection, he granted two jury instructions. The Court of Appeals held that Instruction D-4 misstated the law of comparative negligence and conflicted with a second jury instruction, D-10, regarding assigning negligence/fault percentages. In addition, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Instruction D-9 clearly misstated the facts, because, contrary to the language of the instruction, Denham was a party to the lawsuit. Defects in specific instructions do not require reversal where all instructions taken as a whole fairly – although not perfectly – announce the applicable primary rules of law. In this case, not only does Instruction D-4 misstate the law, but it conflicts irreconcilably with Instruction D-10. The problem with this instruction is that the jury was informed that, even if it found that Holmes’s speed at the time of the accident was in excess of the posted speed limit, and even if the jury found that this unlawful speed was a proximate cause of the accident, Holmes still could avoid culpability due to the “intervening negligence of another person,” for example, Denham. Likewise, contrary to the assertions of Holmes that any confusion caused by the language of the first paragraph of the jury instruction was remedied by the second paragraph of the instruction, in reading the two paragraphs of Instruction D-4 together as a whole, the second paragraph of the jury instruction only added to the confusion. The trial court provided a form-of-the-verdict instruction, allowing the jury to consider the negligence, if any, of both Holmes and Denham when rendering the verdict. This form-of-the-verdict instruction was consistent with Instruction D-9, which instructed the jury that it could consider the negligence of Denham in reaching a verdict. While permitting the defendant to offer Instruction D-9 was error, the trial court did not commit reversible error in granting this instruction, since it was unlikely to have confused the jury’s understanding of the facts in evidence. Issue 2: Closing arguments The test in determining whether a lawyer has made an improper argument which requires reversal is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument creates an unjust prejudice against the opposing party resulting in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. The only legitimate purpose of the closing argument of counsel in a jury case is to assist the jurors in evaluating the evidence and in understanding the law and in applying it to the facts. In this case, defense counsel made objectionable statements with the intent of being prejudicial to the other side’s case. However, these statements, while perhaps prejudicial (detrimental) to the plaintiffs’ case, were not unjustly prejudicial. The plaintiffs, through counsel, had remarked in opening statements that they would introduce expert testimony into evidence; however, based on the trial court’s ruling during trial as to the plaintiffs’ expert, the plaintiffs failed (were unable) to present this expert testimony. Defense counsel’s bringing to the jury’s attention this “missing link” in the plaintiffs’ evidence most likely harmed the plaintiffs’ case. But, acting at their own peril, the plaintiffs invited this comment by informing the jury during opening statements that they would provide expert testimony during the trial but failing to do so. Thus, the Court of Appeals should not have found that defense counsel committed error by identifying a legitimate evidentiary weakness in the plaintiffs’ case and rebutting the plaintiffs’ opening statements. Issue 3: Expert testimony The admissibility of expert testimony is evaluated in light of M.R.E. 702. For expert testimony to be admissible, it must be both relevant and reliable. Ultimately, if an expert’s testimony survives the threshold scrutiny under Rule 702, it is subject to further review under M.R.E. 403. Lack of reliable support may render expert testimony more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. Rawson’s deposition testimony concluded that, based on basic mathematics and the lack of skid marks, Holmes should have avoided the accident. Denham and Caldwell argued that the trial court should have admitted this deposition testimony because “several of the jury instructions hinged on the speed of Holmes’s vehicle and distance between the vehicles.” The Court of Appeals agreed and found that because the jury had no expert testimony from which to determine the negligence of the parties, the jury did not have sufficient information from which to reach a verdict. Rawson’s basic mathematics and timing estimates, based on Holmes’s professed speed, were relevant. However, contrary to the language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion, the mere existence of expert testimony– based on the facts available from an accident scene – does not mean that this testimony, although technical in nature, should be admitted as a matter of course. Rawson’s deposition testimony reveals that Rawson concluded Holmes had been speeding. This opinion is based on Holmes’s admitted estimated speed. Based on this estimated speed, Rawson performed some basic mathematical calculations to determine the distance between Holmes’s car and Denham’s car. He also viewed several photographs and determined no skid marks existed. He then made a second conclusion: that Denham had not been negligent and that Holmes had failed to avoid the accident. Rawson could not perform any tests to confirm or disprove Holmes’s estimated constant speed of forty-five miles per hour. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in finding this deposition testimony to be unreliable as expert testimony with regard to Rawson’s ultimate conclusion concerning causation and avoidance. But the Court of Appeals was correct to the extent that the trial court should have permitted Rawson to offer his timing and distance estimates to aid the jury. While Rawson’s timing and distance estimates arguably were shaky, the credibility of this portion of Rawson’s deposition was an issue for the trier of fact. Moreover, although the trial judge expressed concern over whether Rawson had performed a true accident reconstruction, Rawson’s testimony regarding his timing and distance estimates, based on common mathematics, did constitute expert testimony in the field of accident reconstruction. Rawson’s ultimate conclusion regarding causation and avoidance was not sufficiently reliable. Based on the lack of skid marks, Rawson concluded that Denham had not negligently caused an immediate hazard when she had turned in front of Holmes. Rawson reasoned that if Denham had caused an immediate hazard, then Holmes would have applied his brakes and left skid marks or swerve marks. And since no skid marks existed, according to Rawson, Denham could not have been negligent. But other than speaking generally about creating immediate hazards and pointing to the lack of skid marks, Rawson’s deposition testimony never clearly explained under the limited physical evidence why skid marks were required for a finding that Holmes had attempted to avoid the accident. Thus, the trial judge did not act arbitrarily by finding that Rawson’s ultimate conclusion regarding causation and avoidance did not satisfy Daubert’s reliability standard. |
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