ANDERSON v. STATE
| Docket Number: | 2009-KA-01614-SCT Linked Case(s): 2009-KA-01614-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 04-07-2011 Opinion Author: Presiding Justice Carlson Holding: Affirmed. |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Statutory rape & Sexual battery - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Tender years exception - M.R.E. 803(25) - Leading questions - M.R.E. 611(c) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Defective indictment - Section 97-3-65(1)(b) - URCCC 7.06 - Closing arguments - Right to remain silent - Exhibit - Sufficiency of evidence |
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| Topic: | Statutory rape & Sexual battery - Ineffective assistance of counsel - Tender years exception - M.R.E. 803(25) - Leading questions - M.R.E. 611(c) - Expert testimony - M.R.E. 702 - Defective indictment - Section 97-3-65(1)(b) - URCCC 7.06 - Closing arguments - Right to remain silent - Exhibit - Sufficiency of evidence |
| Summary of the Facts: | David Anderson was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and one count of sexual battery. Anderson was sentenced to life for each count of statutory rape and to thirty years for the one count of sexual battery, with all sentences to run concurrently. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Ineffective assistance of counsel Anderson argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a psychological examination to determine whether he was legally insane or incompetent to stand trial and for waiving his right to be present at pretrial hearings, his right to an in-court identification by the victim, and his right to testify. Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence for the Court adequately to address Anderson’s claims, this issue is more appropriate for post-conviction-relief proceedings. Issue 2: Tender years exception Anderson argues that the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony of the victim’s statements in accordance with the tender-years exception under M.R.E. 803(25). A rebuttable presumption exists that a child under the age of twelve is of tender years. The victim in this case was eleven years old when she told her mother and aunt that Anderson had been having sexual intercourse with her. In addition to this rebuttable presumption, the trial court’s ruling also met the requirements of Rule 803(25). First, a pretrial hearing was conducted to determine if the victim’s statements had substantial indicia of reliability. The trial court found that the victim’s statements were spontaneous and consistently repeated; her mental state seemed to be one of a person who would not fabricate; she used terminology consistent with a person of her age and she had a lack of motive to fabricate things; and she seemed to be of the character that would be able to relate things reliably to those she’s speaking to. Additionally, the trial court also considered that more than one person had heard the statements; that her relationships to the witnesses, especially her mother and aunt, showed reliability; that the possibility of faulty recollection was remote; and that the people giving the statements seemed to be credible. There was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that these factors showed substantial indicia of reliability in the victim’s out-of-court statements. Lastly, section (b) of Rule 803(25) was satisfied, because the victim testified at trial. Issue 3: Leading questions Anderson argues that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to lead the victim concerning the dates of the alleged acts charged in Counts I and II of the indictment because without the leading questions, the State would not have been able to present sufficient evidence as to those counts. M.R.E. 611(c) generally prohibits leading questions except as may be necessary to develop the witness’s testimony. Rule 611's prohibition applies to redirect examination as well. The classic example of a situation ripe for leading questions on direct is where the witness is a child. In this case, the witness is a young, sexual abuse victim, and the question was used to clarify her testimony regarding the dates alleged in the indictments. Thus, there was no error. Issue 4: Expert testimony Anderson filed a motion to exclude the testimony of Dr. Matherne, arguing that his testimony was not supported by Daubert principles. He now argues that the court erred by denying his motion. M.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. First, the court must determine that the expert testimony is relevant – that is, the requirement that the testimony must assist the trier of fact means the evidence must be relevant. Next, the trial court must determine whether the proffered testimony is reliable. Depending on the circumstances of the particular case, many factors may be relevant in determining reliability, and the Daubert analysis is a flexible one. Here, the court conducted a pretrial Daubert hearing to determine the admissibility of Dr. Matherne’s testimony. At the hearing, Dr. Matherne described his education, training, and work in the field of clinical psychology. Dr. Matherne testified regarding his interview with the victim and the methodology he had used to interview her, including the “fist demonstration” he had used. Dr. Matherne testified that he had used the demonstration for descriptive purposes only and that he did not use it to substantiate an allegation of abuse. The trial court noted Dr. Matherne’s experience and extensive training in the field of psychology, including teaching others clinical psychology. The trial court also noted that Dr. Matherne’s “fist demonstration” was not peer-reviewed. However, the trial judge found that peer review was not a requirement for a finding of reliability. Admittedly, Dr. Matherne’s “fist demonstration” does not meet many of the Daubert factors. However, this does not constitute automatic inadmissibility. Dr. Matherne’s testimony was based on scientific knowledge and would assist the trier of fact in determining or understanding a fact at issue. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Dr. Matherne’s testimony. Issue 5: Defective indictment Anderson argues that Count I of the indictment was flawed, because the time period was too uncertain or vague. Count I of the indictment charged Anderson with statutory rape under section 97-3-65(1)(b). URCCC 7.06 requires indictments to include the date of the alleged offense. It also states, however, that failure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient. With regard to child sexual-assault cases, specific dates in indictments are not required so long as the defendant is fully and fairly advised of the charge against him. Count I of Anderson’s indictment gave a range of dates when rape was alleged to have occurred. At trial, the victim testified that Anderson had intercourse with her both before and after Thanksgiving. These dates were similar to the ones charged in the indictment. Thus, the lack of specific dates in Count I was not fatal. Issue 6: Closing arguments Anderson argues that the prosecutor commented improperly during closing arguments, violating the golden rule. The golden rule prohibits attorneys from asking the jurors to put themselves in the place of one of the parties. While statements violating this rule generally are prohibited, when a statement is sufficiently insignificant in the overall context of the case, the result is harmless error. While it was error for the prosecutor in this case to make a statement concerning jurors’ past experiences with abuse, this error is harmless in light of the other evidence against Anderson. It did not create prejudice that would influence the jury verdict. Issue 7: Right to remain silent Anderson argues that the prosecutor violated his Fifth-Amendment right to remain silent during the State’s closing argument. When considering whether an attorney’s comment during opening or closing statements was improper, the Court must determine whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Comments on a defendant’s right to remain silent violate the Fifth Amendment, but comments on the defendant’s failure to present any evidence do not result in error. Here, the prosecutor commented on defense counsels’ failure to assert that Anderson did not commit the accused crimes. Thus, they were not a comment on the defendant’s right to remain silent. Issue 8: Exhibit Anderson argues that the trial court erred by failing to assure that the only defense exhibit received into evidence actually found its way into the jury room for consideration by the jury. The exhibit in question was a hand-drawn map of the home in which the victim lived with her mother and Anderson. The day after the jury deliberated and returned a guilty verdict, the trial court was advised that the exhibit was missing and subsequently called a hearing to discuss the issue. The jurors were contacted and nine jurors remembered seeing the exhibit in the jury room and three did not. Based on the record, it appears that the exhibit likely was present with the jury during deliberation. The exhibit arguably had little probative value. In reality, since the jury had heard the victim’s testimony as to the floor plan of the home, this exhibit could be considered cumulative. Although Anderson argues that the drawing was the only defense exhibit and that it was unclear whether all of the jurors had viewed the exhibit in deliberations, Anderson makes no showing that the exhibit’s alleged absence prejudiced him in anyway. Thus, there is no merit to this assignment of error. Issue 9: Sufficiency of evidence Anderson argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the two counts of statutory rape. An individual may be found guilty of rape on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness, where the testimony is not discredited or contradicted by other credible evidence. Other than the testimony of his brother, Anderson did not present evidence to discredit or contradict the victim’s testimony regarding the rapes that occurred. The jury is to determine the weight and credibility of testimony. |
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