Stuart v. Stuart
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00945-COA Linked Case(s): 2005-CA-00945-COA ; 2005-CT-00945-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-17-2006 Opinion Author: King, C.J. Holding: AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Alimony - Attorney’s fees - Speedy trial - Child support - Marital property Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 04-11-2005 Appealed from: Leake County Chancery Court Judge: William Joseph Lutz Disposition: CHANCERY COURT ENTERED JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE Case Number: 2001-0125 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | David Laneil Stuart |
MORRIS C. PHILLIPS |
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| Appellee: | Karon Alice Stuart | PAT DONALD |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Divorce: Irreconcilable differences - Alimony - Attorney’s fees - Speedy trial - Child support - Marital property |
| Summary of the Facts: | David Stuart and Karon Stuart were granted an irreconcilable differences divorce. The chancellor resolved the issues of alimony, attorney’s fees, and several contempt motions. David appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Alimony The chancellor applied the factors prescribed in Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993). The chancellor’s findings were supported by the testimony of each party as well as their Rule 8.05 financial statements. Accordingly, the chancellor’s award of alimony to Karon in the amount of $250 per month is affirmed. Issue 2: Attorney’s fees Generally, attorney’s fees should only be awarded where the moving party has demonstrated an inability to pay. However, attorney’s fees may also be properly awarded where one party’s actions have caused the opposing party to incur additional legal fees. The chancellor found that Karon had illustrated an inability to pay her attorney’s fees of $36,646. The chancellor also noted that one of David’s attorneys filed a plethora of motions which he did not pursue, but which required Karon’s attorney to expend a significant amount of time reviewing and discussing with his client. Thus, the chancellor was within his discretion. Issue 3: Speedy trial David argues that the chancellor erred in not granting him a speedy trial, the result of which caused him expenses he would not have otherwise incurred. David was allowed a full, complete and impartial hearing. He called witnesses, was afforded the right to cross-examine, and presented documentary evidence to the court. His due process argument is completely misplaced. The record provides several reasons which necessitated delay. Not only were the delays necessary, but they were also caused as much by David as Karon. Also, the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial extends only to criminal defendants. Issue 4: Child support Prior to trial, David was ordered to pay temporary child support in the amount of $212.50 on the first and fifteenth of every month. At trial Karen testified that in April of 2003, David had missed two payments, but sent one of them later. The chancellor’s order erroneously stated that David failed to provide the court with proof of payment for each child support statement. David did, in fact, make each ordered payment and presented substantial credible evidence to prove the same. Issue 5: Marital property David argues that the chancellor failed to determine the marital assets of the parties and that his Thrift Savings Plan is his non-marital property. One of the provisions of the couple’s property settlement agreement stated that each party will receive one-half of David’s Thrift Savings Plan as of the date of the separation. The chancellor incorporated the agreement in the final judgment. Property settlement agreements which have been approved by the court and incorporated in the judgment of divorce are treated like any other legally binding contract. |
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