McLean v. Kohnle
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00033-COA | |
| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-24-2006 Opinion Author: King, C.J. Holding: REVERSED AND REMANDED |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Contempt - College expenses - Subject matter jurisdiction - Uniform Interstate Family Support Act - Section 93-25-17 Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Southwick, Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes and Ishee, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Roberts, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-02-2004 Appealed from: Lauderdale County Chancery Court Judge: Sarah P. Springer Disposition: CHANCELLOR ORDERED FATHER BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL COLLEGE EXPENSES, HELD IN CONTEMPT OF COURT, AND INCARCERATED. AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO MOTHER. Case Number: 90-819-S |
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| Consolidated: Consolidated with 2005-CA-02140-COA Angus Laughton Malcolm Thom McLean, III v. Leigh Ann McLean Kohnle; Lauderdale Chancery Court; LC Case #: 90-819-S; Ruling Date: 09/27/2005; Ruling Judge: Sarah Springer | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Angus Laughton Malcolm Thom McLean, III |
J. MACK VARNER, JENNIFER POWELL FORTNER, CLIFFORD C. WHITNEY |
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| Appellee: | Leigh Ann (McLean) Kohnle | WILLIAM B. JACOB, JOSEPH A. KIERONSKI, DANIEL P. SELF |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Contempt - College expenses - Subject matter jurisdiction - Uniform Interstate Family Support Act - Section 93-25-17 |
| Summary of the Facts: | Leigh Ann McLean Kohnle filed a Complaint for Modification of prior judgment and complaint for citation for contempt against her ex-husband, Angus Laughton Malcolm Thom McLean III, seeking an increase in child support and an order citing McLean for contempt for refusing to bear the entire cost of his daughter’s college expenses at Harvard University. McLean filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case. Prior to the court’s ruling on the matter, Kohnle withdrew the portion of her petition requesting a modification of child support, leaving the issue of the daughter’s college expenses as the sole matter before the court. The trial court denied McLean’s motion to dismiss. McLean then filed his answer and a cross-petition for a citation of contempt. The court issued an order, finding McLean in contempt, ordering him to bear all of the daughter’s college expenses (including reimbursement of those expenses previously paid by Kohnle), and assessing costs and fees to McLean. McLean appealed. Kohnle filed two additional complaints seeking a contempt citation, alleging that McLean had failed to meet the conditions set forth in the court’s order. McLean argued that by posting of a supersedeas bond pending the outcome of his appeal, he had satisfied the court’s order that he pay future college expenses. The court ordered McLean to reimburse Kohnle for the outstanding expenses that she had paid as a result of McLean’s failure to do so and to pay Kohnle’s attorney’s fees incurred as a result of bringing the additional complaints. The court further ordered that McLean pay his daughter’s continuing college expenses at Harvard while his appeal was pending. McLean then filed a Motion to Reconsider Jurisdiction and to Determine Controlling Order. The chancellor denied the motion to reconsider and ordered McLean to spend weekends in jail for contempt, effective immediately, until and unless he purged himself of contempt. McLean appealed, and the two cases were consolidated. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | McLean argues that the Lauderdale Chancery Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case, because Virginia assumed continuing, exclusive jurisdiction when it modified his obligations to provide child support and continues to exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. The chancellor held that, under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Mississippi retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction to modify and continuing jurisdiction to enforce the 1990 Lauderdale County judgment of divorce. In order for a Mississippi court to have the authority to modify a child support order, Mississippi must have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Under section 93-25-17, continuing, exclusive jurisdiction exists in Mississippi in this case only if the following conditions are met: the 1990 decree is the controlling order and one of the interested parties (McLean, Kohnle, or the child) resides in Mississippi or the parties consent to have Mississippi serve as the state with continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Section 93-25-17(3) states if a tribunal of another state has issued a child support order pursuant to this chapter or to a law substantially similar to this chapter which modifies a child support order of a tribunal of the state, tribunals of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal of the other state. With McLean’s relocation to Georgia and Kohnle’s move, with the minor children, to Virginia, the 1990 decree remained in effect and was enforceable until Virginia modified the order in 1998 as a result of Kohnle’s 1997 petition for modification. Once the Virginia court modified the 1990 decree, the Virginia order became the controlling order, and Virginia assumed continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under section 93-25-17(3) to modify the terms of that order. In order for the chancellor to have concluded properly that she had the authority to hear Kohnle’s petition, Mississippi would have to reclaim continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. Even if the chancellor had held that the Virginia order was the controlling order and that she was assuming subject matter jurisdiction to enforce, not modify, the Virginia decree, the UIFSA requires that the Virginia order be registered with the court in Mississippi before enforcement proceedings could be heard. Neither party has even attempted to register the Virginia order. Because the Virginia court maintains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the UIFSA, Mississippi does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Kohnle’s petition for modification and citation for contempt. |
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