Chandler v. State
| Docket Number: | 2004-KP-00506-COA Linked Case(s): 2004-KP-00506-COA ; 2004-CT-00506-SCT |
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| Court of Appeals: |
Opinion Link Opinion Date: 10-24-2006 Opinion Author: Southwick, J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Murder - Sufficiency of evidence - Prosecutorial misconduct - Peremptory challenges - Ineffective assistance of counsel Judge(s) Concurring: Lee and Myers, P.JJ., Irving, Chandler, Griffis, Barnes, Ishee and Roberts, JJ. Concurs in Result Only: King, C.J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-30-2003 Appealed from: Hinds County Circuit Court Judge: W. Swan Yerger Disposition: CONVICTION OF MURDER AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS District Attorney: ELEANOR JOHNSON PETERSON Case Number: 01-1-422 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Marcus Chandler |
MARCUS CHANDLER (PRO SE) |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: DEIRDRE MCCRORY |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Murder - Sufficiency of evidence - Prosecutorial misconduct - Peremptory challenges - Ineffective assistance of counsel |
| Summary of the Facts: | Marcus Chandler was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Chandler argues that the jury could only consider the lesser offense of manslaughter because the prosecution established that the victim was the aggressor in the earlier fistfight between the victim and Chandler. Permissible inferences from the evidence presented at trial include that Chandler armed himself, drove to the store, and intentionally killed the victim without justification. Whatever occurred earlier, that fight was over and the jury could find that Chandler was in no imminent danger from the victim. The victim’s back was to Chandler when he was killed. There was an ample supply of evidence that Chandler had no basis to believe he was acting in necessary self-defense. Issue 2: Prosecutorial misconduct Chandler argues that remarks by the prosecutor in closing argument that Chandler beat a pregnant woman were prejudicial. The closing argument by the prosecution will cause reversal only if the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by that prejudice. Images of Chandler’s beating a pregnant woman could invoke prejudice. However, the shocking nature of the crime for which Chandler was being prosecuted likely produced worse mental images. The brief mention of allegations that Chandler beat a pregnant woman, in context, did not likely create harmful, outcome-changing prejudice. Issue 3: Peremptory challenges Chandler argues that the pattern of the State’s striking such a disproportionate number of one race compared to another made a prima facie case of discrimination. A pattern of discriminatory strikes is a basis for finding a prima facie showing of discrimination, but the pattern the trial judge observed was not sufficiently clear. The State accepted about an equal number of blacks as whites, but struck a much larger percentage of blacks than whites. Thus, the pattern of possible discrimination was sufficiently broken so that the ruling was not clearly erroneous. Issue 4: Ineffective assistance of counsel Chandler argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to offer a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt and by failing to object and raise in the motion for new trial the failure of the trial court to allow a certain witness to testify. As to an instruction on reasonable doubt for jurors, the Mississippi practice has apparently unvaryingly been to refuse such an instruction. Chandler’s counsel did what he could on this point by explaining reasonable doubt in closing arguments. With regard to the witness, though she might have had evidence useful to Chandler, her testimony as described on appeal would have been cumulative to other evidence. Chandler has thus failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient and that there is a reasonable probability that without the deficiency, the trial would have had a different outcome. |
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