Conliff v. Hudson


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Docket Number: 2009-CA-01803-COA

Court of Appeals: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 04-05-2011
Opinion Author: Roberts, J.
Holding: Affirmed.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Real property - Adverse possession - Boundary line description - Clerical error - M.R.C.P. 60(a)
Judge(s) Concurring: Lee, C.J., Irving and Griffis, P.JJ., Myers, Barnes, Ishee and Maxwell, JJ.
Dissenting Author : Carlton, J. Without Separate Written Opinion
Procedural History: Bench Trial
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 06-23-2009
Appealed from: Madison County Chancery Court
Judge: Janace Harvey Goree
Disposition: Awarded Contested Property to Hudson by Adverse Possession; Awarded Hudson $821 for Damage to the Property; and Enjoined Conliff's Video Surveillance of Hudson's Property
Case Number: 2004-633G

  Party Name: Attorney Name:   Brief(s) Available:
Appellant: Rebecca Conliff




K.F. BOACKLE, JEFFREY L. LEE



 
  • Appellant #1 Brief
  • Appellant #1 Reply Brief

  • Appellee: Walter Hudson JOHN W. CHRISTOPHER  

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    Topic: Real property - Adverse possession - Boundary line description - Clerical error - M.R.C.P. 60(a)

    Summary of the Facts: Therman Howard owned an eighty-acre tract of land located in Madison County. In 1974, Rebecca Conliff purchased a forty-acre tract of land from the eighty-acre tract owned by Howard. In 1977, Walter Hudson purchased the remaining forty-acre tract of land from Howard. These tracts are adjacent, with Conliff’s tract of land being on the west side of Hudson’s tract. Shortly after his purchase, Hudson had his residence constructed on his property. An old fence line between the parties’ property was thought by Hudson to be the property boundary. Believing the property all the way to the old fence to be his, Hudson planted shrubs, trees, flowers, and installed a water line on the property east of the old fence. The parties lived this way until Conliff had her property surveyed in 1996. The survey revealed that her actual boundary line was not the old fence line but was actually within eight feet of Hudson’s home. The actual boundary line now showed Conliff to be the owner of the property Hudson had previously developed east of the fence line. Conliff prepared and Hudson executed a lease agreement for the disputed property spanning twenty-nine feet in width from the old fence line to what the survey indicated was the actual boundary of Conliff’s property. Hudson testified that he only entered into the lease to keep the peace with Conliff. The first lease was executed on September 24, 1996, and was for a term of one year. A second lease was executed on November 5, 1997, with the same property description, but the lease was now for a term of sixty months. Approximately five years later and at the termination of this second lease, Conliff decided not to renew it. In 2003, Conliff sent Hudson a letter telling him to remove his belongings off the property because “he had trashed the property.” She also filed charges against Hudson in 2003 for violating the lease and malicious mischief. Then, in 2005, Conliff had a bulldozer tear down the existing old fence separating the property and constructed a new barbed wire fence on the survey line which came within a few feet of Hudson’s back steps. She also destroyed the plants that Hudson had planted on the property prior to the 1996 survey. In 2004, Hudson filed a complaint to confirm and quiet title to the twenty nine feet of property he had previously occupied and was currently leasing from Conliff. Hudson then filed an amended complaint seeking to confirm and quiet title to the property, an adjudication that Hudson owned the disputed tract through adverse possession, and damages for Conliff’s destruction of the plants on the disputed tract of land. The chancery court held that Hudson had sufficiently proven his ownership of the property through adverse possession, awarded him the disputed property plus damages in the amount of $821 for Conliff’s destruction of the plants and shrubs on the property, and enjoined Conliff from using a video camera to view Hudson’s property. Conliff appeals.

    Summary of Opinion Analysis: Issue 1: Adverse possession Conliff argues that the chancellor erred in both allowing Hudson to “reactivate” his prior adverse possession and granting Hudson the property by adverse possession. She argues that even if Hudson satisfied all the elements of adverse possession prior to 1996, by voluntarily entering into the lease, Hudson abandoned his ownership of the property. The party claiming adverse possession must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that his possession was under a claim of right or ownership; actual or hostile; open, notorious, and visible; continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; exclusive; and peaceful. It is undisputed that Hudson began his possession without permission from Conliff, the title owner. An offer to pay for land after an adverse-possession title has ripened is not a disclaimer of title. Once adverse possession creates an easement, it cannot be lost by the record title owner granting permission. Here, it is undisputed that prior to signing the lease in September 1996, Hudson had been in possession of the disputed property since 1977. He satisfied all six elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence between 1977, when he purchased the property, and August 1996, when Conliff had the survey done; thus, he acquired title to the disputed parcel by adverse possession. Once Hudson satisfied the elements of adverse possession, title to the disputed parcel vested in him. For Conliff to thereafter establish a superior claim to the disputed parcel, she would have to meet all six elements of adverse possession by clear and convincing proof. This she failed to do. Issue 2: Boundary line description Conliff argues that the chancellor committed manifest error by incorrectly describing the parties’ new boundary line. Conliff failed to cite to any legal authority in her original brief or reply brief to support this issue; therefore, it will not be considered. However, pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(a), the Court grants leave to the chancery court to correct, if necessary, any clerical errors that may be found in the boundary-line description contained in the judgment.


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