J.P.M. v. T.D.M.
| Docket Number: | 2005-CA-00320-SCT | |
| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-29-2006 Opinion Author: Graves, J. Holding: Affirmed |
|
| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Child custody - Equitable fatherhood doctrine - Albright factors - Child support Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Diaz, Carlson and Dickinson, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Cobb, P.J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion, Joined by Dickinson, J.; Randolph, J. Joins In Part. Easley, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion, Joined In Part by Randolph, J. Randolph, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion, Joined by Dickinson, J.; Cobb, P.J. Joins In Part. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY |
|
| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 06-24-2003 Appealed from: Tunica County Chancery Court Judge: Jon M. Barnwell Disposition: The chancellor found the husband to be the child’s "father-in-fact" through judicial adoption and through judicial estoppel, awarded him physical custody of the child, and required the wife to pay child support to the husband. The wife now appeals the chancellor’s ruling. Case Number: GN2001-158 |
|
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | J.P.M. |
JOE MORGAN WILSON |
||
| Appellee: | T.D.M. | JOSEPH RATCLIFF DULANEY |
|
|
Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
|
| Topic: | Child custody - Equitable fatherhood doctrine - Albright factors - Child support |
| Summary of the Facts: | Husband and wife were married, and a child was born to the marriage five months later. The couple separated, and the husband sued for divorce years later, after he had assumed the primary child-rearing responsibilities at the wife’s request. Husband sought custody of the child because of the wife’s drug use. On the day the trial for divorce was scheduled to start, the wife told the chancellor in chambers there was a strong possibility the husband was not the child’s biological father. Subsequent blood testing excluded the husband from being the child’s biological father. The chancellor, however, found the husband to be the child’s “father-in-fact” through judicial adoption and through judicial estoppel, awarded him physical custody of the child, and required the wife to pay child support to the husband. The wife appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Equitable fatherhood doctrine The mother argues that the court erred in ruling that the doctrine of equitable fatherhood, previously unknown in this state, is applicable to the present case and in using this doctrine as his basis for awarding physical custody of the child to the father. She argues that the chancellor’s decision completely ignores Mississippi law, as the Supreme Court has established that the doctrine of “in loco parentis” controls in child custody actions where a third party seeks to gain custody over a natural parent. The Court has held that in custody battles involving a natural parent and a third party, it is presumed that a child’s best interest will be served by placement in the custody of his or her natural parent, as against any third party. In order to overcome this presumption there must be a clear showing that the natural parent has abandoned the child; the conduct of the parent is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child; or the parent is unfit mentally or otherwise to have custody. In this case, the father has been the child’s “legal father” since her birth. Thus, he has existing legal rights and obligations that the third parties in other cases did not. In the recent case of Griffith v. Pell, 881 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 2004), the Court held that merely because another man was determined to be the minor child’s biological father does not automatically negate the father-daughter relationship held by the husband and the minor child. The Court said that it follows that if a stepparent can be required to pay child support for a stepchild based on his support of the stepchild over a period of time, where it is in the best interests of the child, he should be allowed to have custody of the stepchild based on the affection for and support of that child over a period of time. The facts here bring this case squarely within the Court’s holding in Pell; therefore, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in awarding custody to the father, despite his reliance on an equitable fatherhood doctrine. Furthermore, there is no putative father in this case seeking to be recognized as the child’s father. Issue 2: Albright factors The mother argues that the chancellor did not make an on-the-record analysis of the Albright factors. Although the initial Decree for Divorce did not make specific factual findings under Albright, the revised decree did. The chancellor’s written findings in the Revised Decree for Divorce are sufficient to constitute an “on-the-record” finding. The mother also argues that the chancellor weighted one Albright factor more heavily than the others and unfairly used it against her to award custody to the father, that of her prior use of illegal drugs. The chancellor did reference the mother’s drug use under the “physical and mental health and age” factor and found that this factor weighed heavily in the father’s favor, yet his ultimate determination that the father was more fit to retain custody was not based on this finding alone. In addition, the evidence clearly showed that her previous drug use affected several different aspects of her life. The chancellor’s ultimate findings under each Albright factor are supported by credible evidence in the record, so his decision to award the father physical custody of the child does not reflect an abuse of discretion. Issue 3: Child support The mother argues that the child support award was made in error because the $240 per month child support award exceeds the 14% statutory figure, in light of her testimony that she made roughly $1,600 per month, as 14% of $1,600 yields a figure of $224. She also argues it is unfair to make her pay one-half of the costs associated with sending the child to school because adding those costs to the $240 per month in child support easily constitutes one-half of her monthly income. As she has failed to cite any authority, let alone any relevant authority, she is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal. |
Home | Terms of Use | About the JDP | Feedback | Using JDP | MC Law Library | Mississippi Supreme Court
