Rush v. Rush
| Docket Number: | 2004-CT-00260-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-CT-00260-SCT ; 2004-CA-00260-COA ; 2004-CA-00260-COA |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-29-2006 Opinion Author: Easley, J. Holding: THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. THE JUDGMENT OF THE RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Divorce - Child support to non-custodial parent Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller and Cobb, P.JJ., Diaz, Carlson, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Non Participating Judge(s): Graves, J. Procedural History: Bench Trial Nature of the Case: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS Writ of Certiorari: Granted Appealed from Court of Appeals |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 01-08-2004 Appealed from: Rankin County Chancery Court Judge: John Grant Disposition: Charles was granted "primary" physical custody of the parties' minor child, Rose Marie Rush (Rosie), but he was ordered to pay $400 per month in child support for Rosie and $500 per month in periodic alimony to Latresa. Case Number: 51888 |
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| Consolidated: The supreme court granted certiorari to consider the issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Chancellor’s judgment ordering the payment of child support by a custodial parent to a noncustodial parent. Therefore, this opinion will only address the issue of child support. The judgment of the Rankin County Chancery Court, as to the issue of the monthly child support obligation in the amount of $400 to Latresa for Rosie, is remanded to the trial court in order to provide clarity and explanation as to its judgment and entry of a new judgment as to the physical custody and child support issues addressed by this Court. The trial court shall on remand clarify the contradictory language used in its judgment. The trial court granted the parties joint legal and physical custody of the minor child, but the trial court also specified visitation for Latresa which does not comply with Section 93-5-24's requirement of "significant periods of physical custody." As to the other issues raised by Charles not specifically addressed by this opinion, the judgment of the Rankin County Chancery Court is affirmed. See original COA opinion at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/Images/Opinions/CO28311.pdf | ||
| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Charles W. Rush |
STEPHEN L. BEACH, III |
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| Appellee: | Latresa A. Rush | WILLIAM D. KETNER, JUDY BARNETT |
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| Topic: | Divorce - Child support to non-custodial parent |
| Summary of the Facts: | Charles Rush and Latresa Rush were granted a divorce in Rankin County. Charles was granted primary physical custody of the parties' minor child, but he was ordered to pay $400 per month in child support and $500 per month in periodic alimony to Latresa. Both parties filed motions to alter or amend the judgment which were denied. Charles appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Charles argues that the child support payment to the non-custodial parent, Latresa, improperly amounts to additional alimony, not child support. The issue before the Court is whether Charles should be obligated to pay child support to Latresa as the “non-custodial parent” when Latresa was not obligated to bear any of the financial obligation for the child’s care and welfare. In fact, Charles was also ordered to maintain health insurance coverage on the child. An order that does not require a non-custodial parent to pay child support should be entered only in rare circumstances. The chancellor should also include detailed findings in the order to support the decision to relieve a non-custodial parent from their financial obligation to support his/her child. Despite the chancellor’s language that Charles and Latresa were awarded joint legal and physical custody, the chancellor addressed specified periods of visitation for the minor child with Latresa. Based on the specified visitation period stated, Charles bears the lion’s share of time caring for the minor child and as such, has physical custody of the minor child the majority of time. As such, the language in the case falls woefully short of establishing that Latresa was awarded joint physical custody of the minor child. Since Charles has the most extensive time with the minor child, he also bears the primary financial obligation of providing for the minor child’s financial needs. The chancellor completely relieved Latresa of any specific monthly financial obligation to care for her child. Under the terms of the chancellor’s order, the child is never in Latresa’s care long enough to support the award of joint physical custody or child support to Latresa. The contradictory terminology in the chancellor’s order requires that the case be remanded for clarification. |
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