Shumpert v. State
| Docket Number: | 2004-KA-02533-SCT Linked Case(s): 2004-KA-02533-SCT |
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| Supreme Court: | Opinion Link Opinion Date: 06-29-2006 Opinion Author: Cobb, P.J. Holding: Affirmed |
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| Additional Case Information: |
Topic: Manslaughter - Sufficiency of evidence - Jury instructions - Impeachment - M.R.E. 608 - Prosecutorial misconduct Judge(s) Concurring: Smith, C.J., Waller, P.J., Diaz, Easley, Dickinson and Randolph, JJ. Judge(s) Concurring Separately: Carlson, J., Specially Concurs With Separate Written Opinion, Joined by Waller, P.J., Diaz, Easley and Dickinson, JJ.; Graves, J. Joins In Part Concurs in Result Only: Graves, J. Procedural History: Jury Trial Nature of the Case: CRIMINAL - FELONY |
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| Trial Court: |
Date of Trial Judgment: 12-03-2004 Appealed from: Lee County Circuit Court Judge: SHARION R. AYCOCK Disposition: A jury found Shumpert guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence. District Attorney: John Richard Young Case Number: CR04-190 |
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| Party Name: | Attorney Name: | |||
| Appellant: | Jamarcus D. Shumpert |
JOHN CARL HELMERT, JR. |
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| Appellee: | State of Mississippi | OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL: JOSE BENJAMIN SIMO |
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Synopsis provided by:  If you are interested in subscribing to the weekly synopses of all Mississippi Supreme Court and Court of Appeals hand downs please contact Tammy Upton in the MLI Press office. |
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| Topic: | Manslaughter - Sufficiency of evidence - Jury instructions - Impeachment - M.R.E. 608 - Prosecutorial misconduct |
| Summary of the Facts: | Jamarcus Shumpert was convicted of manslaughter by culpable negligence. He appeals. |
| Summary of Opinion Analysis: | Issue 1: Sufficiency of evidence Shumpert argues the evidence is insufficient because he committed an intentional act, which cannot form the basis for a conviction of manslaughter by culpable negligence. Shumpert is asking the Court to make the broad declaration that intentional acts cannot form the basis for culpable negligence. However, culpable negligence must be ascertained from the facts of each case, and no ironclad statement can be set forth as applicable to all classes of cases. Shumpert also seeks to make a distinction between an intentional act leading to death and a negligent, or accidental act leading to death, arguing that because he intended to deliver the blow to the victim, he cannot be guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence. This attempted distinction is flawed because manslaughter by culpable negligence is such gross negligence as to evince a wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of human life, or such an indifference to the consequences of an act under the surrounding circumstances as to render such conduct tantamount to willfulness. The only requirement is recklessness or a willful disregard for an unreasonable risk. The determination of a defendant’s mental culpability is an issue properly resolved bythe jury. Shumpert admitted hitting the victim even though the victim never threatened, insulted, or attacked him. He said he did this because he thought the victim had some kind of weapon. The jury could have determined this series of events constituted criminal negligence because Shumpert stated he did not intend to kill the victim, but nevertheless hit him and left him lying on the street without medical attention after the attacks. Pursuant to the evidence presented, a rational juror could have determined that Shumpert was guilty of manslaughter by culpable negligence. There is a basis in evidence for the culpable negligence manslaughter charge because a blow delivered by one individual to another can be intentionally delivered, and at the same time negligently delivered with excessive force. Therefore, the trial court was required to give the instruction. Issue 2: Jury instructions Shumpert argues that the court erred by refusing to allow the jury instruction on simple assault. Not only is assault not a lesser-included offense of murder, but the jury was instructed on manslaughter, which is a lesser-included offense of murder. He also argues there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a jury instruction on simple assault. Lesser offense instructions should not be granted indiscriminately, and only where there is an evidentiary basis in the record. The record in this case does not support a charge of simple assault. Shumpert also argues that a flight instruction was inappropriate. The evidence supports the contention that the flight was not explained by any reason other than consciousness of guilt. Thus, the flight instruction was not error. Shumpert argues that the instruction on aiding and abetting was inappropriate. That Shumpert aided and abetted in bringing about the death of the victim is supported by the evidence. Shumpert argues that the court erred in failing to explicitly instruct the jury on causation. The trial court did not err. Both the manslaughter and murder instruction contained language of causation. Further, the aiding and abetting instruction adequately incorporated causation language necessary to inform the jury of the difference between being held liable as a principal versus being held liable as someone who aided and abetted. Issue 3: Impeachment Shumpert sought to introduce evidence to impeach a witness for the State, contending the witness reached into the pocket of the victim and stole some money. He argues the evidence is admissible to show that the witness was too consumed by his thoughts about taking the money from the pockets of a dying man to think clearly enough to correctly evaluate what transpired. The trial judge properly read M.R.E. 608 to allow for impeachment by specific acts, other than criminal convictions, when the character trait of truthfulness of the witness is under attack. The witness was questioned on cross examination about stealing money, and he denied it. The rules of evidence do not allow further questioning. Issue 4: Prosecutorial misconduct Shumpert argues that a statement by the prosecutor in closing argument constituted misconduct because it referred to prior bad acts in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). The prosecutor may comment on any facts introduced into evidence and may draw whatever deductions and inferences that seem proper to him from the facts. Here, the statement was already admitted into evidence in exhibit 3 over a general objection. |
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