D.M. v. D.R.


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Docket Number: 2010-IA-01217-SCT
Linked Case(s): 2010-IA-01217-SCT

Supreme Court: Opinion Link
Opinion Date: 03-31-2011
Opinion Author: Kitchens, J.
Holding: Reversed and remanded.

Additional Case Information: Topic: Custody - Termination of parental rights - Death of adoptive parents - Natural parent presumption - Section 93-17-13
Judge(s) Concurring: Waller, C.J., Carlson and Dickinson, P.JJ., Randolph, Lamar, Chandler, Pierce and King, JJ.
Procedural History: Interlocutory Appeal
Nature of the Case: CIVIL - CUSTODY

Trial Court: Date of Trial Judgment: 07-23-2010
Appealed from: Leflore County Chancery Court
Judge: William Willard
Disposition: The chancery court summarily denied the Martins' motion for reconsideration on July 26, 2010. The Martins then petitition the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal, which was granted on the sole issue of whether Danica is entitled to the natural parent presumption.
Case Number: E06-0089

  Party Name: Attorney Name:  
Appellant: D.M. and M.M.




SAMUEL ERNEST LINTON ANDERSON, ARTHUR F. JERNIGAN, JR., RICHARD A. OAKES



 

Appellee: D.R. JAMES LAWTON ROBERTSON, LINDA FAYE COOPER  

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Topic: Custody - Termination of parental rights - Death of adoptive parents - Natural parent presumption - Section 93-17-13

Summary of the Facts: D.R. (“Danica”) gave birth to E.G. (“Edward”), a boy, on July 10, 2004. Edward’s natural father was F.M. (“Fred”). Danica and Fred were never married to each other. On December 15, 2005, Mr. and Mrs. Gold, Danica’s parents, filed a petition to adopt Edward, which Danica and Fred joined. The chancery court entered the final decree of adoption on the same day the petition was filed, waiving the waiting period in accordance with section 93-17-13. Mr. Gold died about four months after the adoption was final, and Mrs. Gold died about eight months after finalization of the adoption. While Mrs. Gold’s will appointed her son Louis as testamentary guardian for Edward, Louis immediately renounced that appointment. D.M. and M.M. (“the Martins”), Edward’s paternal grandparents, and Danica filed competing petitions for custody and guardianship of Edward. Pursuant to the guardian ad litem’s recommendation, the Martins were granted temporary physical custody of Edward. The chancery court entered an order, referring to a previous order not included in the record on appeal, that granted certain limited visitation rights to Danica. The chancery court entered its final judgment, awarding guardianship and physical custody of Edward to the Martins. The court found that Danica, having consented to Edward’s adoption, had abandoned him as a matter of law and that she therefore was not entitled to the natural parent presumption. The court ruled that her legal relationship to Edward was that of his sister. In 2009, the chancery court revisited its previous orders granting visitation rights to Danica upon discovering that the Martins were not cooperating concerning her visitation. The court stated that Edward’s best interests required meaningful visitation with Danica, citing the unusual circumstances of the case. The parties agreed to supervised visitation. In 2010, Danica filed a motion to change custody and visitation, petitioning the court to award her sole custody of Edward. Danica moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether she was entitled to the natural parent presumption. The chancery court granted her motion. The Martins filed a motion for reconsideration which the court denied. The Supreme Court granted an interlocutory appeal.

Summary of Opinion Analysis: The Martins argue that an adoption irrevocably terminates the natural parent’s right to rely on the natural parent presumption. They also argue that the chancery court’s determination that Danica was manifestly unsuitable to assume Edward’s guardianship after her parents’ deaths bars Danica’s assertion of the natural parent presumption as res judicata. Generally, it is presumed that the best interests of the child are served by remaining in the custody of the natural parent. Abandonment may result from a single decision by a parent at a particular point in time. It may arise from a course of circumstances. The test is an objective one: whether under the totality of the circumstances, be they single or multiple, the natural parent has manifested his severance of all ties with the child. Section 93-17-13 provides that the child’s status as adoptee is equivalent to the natural child of the adoptive parents, and the child’s legal relationship, whatever the individual circumstances, with the natural parent no longer exists. It also is well settled that voluntary consent to an adoption is valid and irrevocable, absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence of fraud, duress, or undue influence. Danica does not dispute that she voluntarily relinquished custody with respect to her parents’ adoption of Edward; she argues, however, that her relinquishment and surrender of her parental rights was effective only with respect to Mr. and Mrs. Gold and is not effective as to anyone else. Cases in which the natural parent attempts to recover custody of a child from a third party after the death of the adoptive parents are rare and apparently without precedent in this state, but the general rule reached by other jurisdictions is that death of the adoptive parents does not reinstate the parental rights of the natural parent. Danica has never attacked her consent to the adoption of Edward and does not now suggest that her consent to that adoption was procured by fraud, duress, or undue influence. She merely argues that she became entitled to resume the legal parent-child relationship with Edward after the death of her parents. This argument is in plain conflict with the adoption statute and prior decisions addressing the irrevocability of the adoption process. Danica consented to the irrevocable termination of her parental rights, and in so consenting, relinquished her legal relationship with Edward as his parent.


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